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Abstract—Since the advent of SPECTRE, a number of counter-
measures have been proposed and deployed. Rigorously reasoning
about their effectiveness, however, requires a well-defined notion
of security against speculative execution attacks, which has been
missing until now.
In this paper (1) we put forward speculative non-interference,
the first semantic notion of security against speculative execution
attacks, and (2) we develop SPECTECTOR, an algorithm based
on symbolic execution to automatically prove speculative non-
interference, or to detect violations.
We implement SPECTECTOR in a tool, which we use to
detect subtle leaks and optimizations opportunities in the way
major compilers place SPECTRE countermeasures. A scalability
analysis indicates that checking speculative non-interference does
not exhibit fundamental bottlenecks beyond those inherited by
symbolic execution.
I. INTRODUCTION
Speculative execution avoids expensive pipeline stalls by
predicting the outcome of branching (and other) decisions, and
by speculatively executing the corresponding instructions. If a
prediction is incorrect, the processor aborts the speculative ex-
ecution and rolls back the effect of the speculatively executed
instructions on the architectural (ISA) state, which consists of
registers, flags, and main memory.
However, the speculative execution’s effect on the microar-
chitectural state, which comprises the content of the cache, is
not (or only partially) rolled back. This side effect can leak
information about the speculatively accessed data and thus
violate confidentiality. The family of SPECTRE attacks [1]–[5]
demonstrates that this vulnerability affects all modern general-
purpose processors and poses a serious threat for platforms
with multiple tenants.
Since the advent of SPECTRE, a number of countermea-
sures have been proposed and deployed. At the software-
level, these include, for instance, the insertion of serializing
instructions [6], the use of branchless bounds checks [7], and
speculative load hardening [8]. Several compilers support the
automated insertion of these countermeasures during compi-
lation [8]–[10], and the first static analyses to help identify
vulnerable code patterns are emerging [11].
However, we still lack a precise characterization of security
against speculative execution attacks. Such a characterization
is a prerequisite for reasoning about the effectiveness of
countermeasures, and for making principled decisions about
their placement. It would enable one, for example, to identify
cases where countermeasures do not prevent all attacks, or
where they are unnecessary.
Our approach: We develop a novel, principled approach
for detecting information flows introduced by speculative
execution, and for reasoning about software defenses against
SPECTRE-style attacks. Our approach is backed by a semantic
notion of security against speculative execution attacks, and
it comes with an algorithm, based on symbolic execution, for
proving the absence of speculative leaks.
Defining security: The foundation of our approach is spec-
ulative non-interference, a novel semantic notion of secu-
rity against speculative execution attacks. Speculative non-
interference is based on comparing a program with respect
to two different semantics:
• The first is a standard, non-speculative semantics. We use
this semantics as a proxy for the intended program behavior.
• The second is a novel, speculative semantics that can
follow mispredicted branches for a bounded number of steps
before backtracking. We use this semantics to capture the
effect of speculatively executed instructions.
In a nutshell, speculative non-interference requires
that speculatively executed instructions do not leak more
information into the microarchitectural state than what the
intended behavior does, i.e., than what is leaked by the
standard, non-speculative semantics.
To capture “leakage into the microarchitectural state”, we
consider an observer of the program execution that sees the
locations of memory accesses and jump targets. This observer
model is commonly used for characterizing “side-channel
free” or “constant-time” code [12], [13] in the absence of
detailed models of the microarchitecture.
Under this observer model, an adversary may distinguish
two initial program states if they yield different traces
of memory locations and jump targets. Speculative non-
interference (SNI) requires that two initial program states can
be distinguished under the speculative semantics only if they
can also be distinguished under the standard, non-speculative
semantics.
The speculative semantics, and hence SNI, depends on the
decisions taken by a branch predictor. We show that one can
abstract from the specific predictor by considering a worst-case
predictor that mispredicts every branching decision. SNI w.r.t.
this worst-case predictor implies SNI w.r.t. a large class of
real-world branch predictors, without introducing false alarms.
Checking speculative non-interference: We propose SPEC-
TECTOR, an algorithm to automatically prove that programs
satisfy SNI. Given a program p, SPECTECTOR uses symbolic
execution with respect to the speculative semantics and the
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1 if (y < size)
2 temp &= B[A[y] * 512];
Fig. 1. SPECTRE variant 1 - C code
worst-case branch predictor to derive a concise representation
of the traces of memory accesses and jump targets during
execution along all possible program paths.
Based on this representation, SPECTECTOR creates an SMT
formula that captures that, whenever two initial program states
produce the same memory access patterns in the standard
semantics, they also produce the same access patterns in
the speculative semantics. Validity of this formula for each
program path implies speculative non-interference.
Case studies: We implement a prototype of SPECTECTOR,
with a front end for parsing (a subset of) x86 assembly and
a back end for solving SMT formulas using the Z3 SMT
solver. We perform two case studies where we evaluate the
precision and scalability of SPECTECTOR.
• For evaluating precision, we analyze the 15 variants of
SPECTRE v1 by Kocher [14]. We create a corpus of 240
microbenchmarks by compiling the 15 programs with the
CLANG, INTEL ICC, and Microsoft VISUAL C++ compilers,
using different levels of optimization and protection against
SPECTRE. Using SPECTECTOR, we successfully (1) detect
all leaks pointed out in [14], (2) detect novel, subtle leaks
that are out of scope of existing approaches that check for
known vulnerable code patterns [11], and (3) identify cases
where compilers unnecessarily inject countermeasures, i.e.,
opportunities for optimization without sacrificing security.
• For evaluating scalability, we apply SPECTECTOR to
the codebase of the Xen Project Hypervisor. Our evaluation
indicates that the cost of checking speculative non-interference
is comparable to that of discovering symbolic paths, which
shows that our approach does not exhibit bottlenecks beyond
those inherited by symbolic execution.
Scope: We focus on leaks introduced by speculatively
executed instructions resulting from mispredicted branch out-
comes, such as those exploited in SPECTRE v1 [2]. For an
in-depth discussion of our approach’s scope, see Section X.
Summary of contributions: Our contributions are both theo-
retical and practical. On the theoretical side, we present spec-
ulative non-interference, the first semantic notion of security
against speculative execution attacks. On the practical side, we
develop SPECTECTOR, an automated technique for detecting
speculative leaks (or prove their absence), and we use it to
detect subtle leaks – and optimization opportunities – in the
way compilers inject SPECTRE countermeasures.
SPECTECTOR is available at https://spectector.
github.io.
II. ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE
To illustrate our approach, we show how SPECTECTOR
applies to the SPECTRE v1 example [2] shown in Figure 1.
1 mov size, %rax
2 mov y, %rbx
3 cmp %rbx, %rax
4 jbe END
5 mov A(%rbx), %rax
6 shl $9, %rax
7 mov B(%rax), %rax
8 and %rax, temp
Fig. 2. SPECTRE variant 1 - Assembly code
Spectre v1: The program checks whether the index stored in
the variable y is less than the size of the array A, stored in the
variable size. If that is the case, the program retrieves A[y],
amplifies it with a multiple (here: 512) of the cache line size,
and uses the result as an address for accessing the array B.
If size is not cached, evaluating the branch condition re-
quires traditional processors to wait until size is fetched from
main memory. Modern processors instead speculate on the
condition’s outcome and continue the computation. Hence, the
memory accesses in line 2 may be executed even if y ≥ size.
When size becomes available, the processor checks
whether the speculated branch is the correct one. If it is not, it
rolls back the architectural (i.e., ISA) state’s changes and exe-
cutes the correct branch. However, the speculatively executed
memory accesses leave a footprint in the microarchitectural
state, in particular in the cache, which enables an adversary to
retrieve A[y], even for y ≥ size, by probing the array B.
Detecting leaks with SPECTECTOR: SPECTECTOR auto-
matically detects leaks introduced by speculatively executed
instructions, or proves their absence. Specifically, SPECTEC-
TOR detects a leak whenever executing the program under the
speculative semantics, which captures that the execution can
go down a mispredicted path for a bounded number of steps,
leaks more information into the microarchitectural state than
executing the program under a non-speculative semantics.
To illustrate how SPECTECTOR operates, we consider the
x86 assembly1 translation of Figure 1’s program (cf. Figure 2).
SPECTECTOR performs symbolic execution with respect to
the speculative semantics to derive a concise representation of
the concrete traces of memory accesses and program counter
values along each path of the program. These symbolic traces
capture the program’s effect on the microarchitectural state.
During speculative execution, the speculatively executed
parts are determined by the predictions of the branch predictor.
As shown in Section V-C, leakage due to speculative execution
is maximized under a branch predictor that mispredicts every
branch. The code in Figure 2 yields two symbolic traces w.r.t.
the speculative semantics that mispredicts every branch:2
start · rollback · τ when y < size (1)
start · τ · rollback when y ≥ size (2)
1We use a simplified AT&T syntax without operand sizes
2For simplicity of presentation, the example traces capture only loads but
not the program counter.
2
where τ = load (A+y)·load (B+A[y] * 512). Here, the
argument of load is visible to the observer, while start and
rollback denote the start and the end of a misspeculated
execution. The traces of the non-speculative semantics are
obtained from those of the speculative semantics by removing
all observations in between start and rollback.
Trace 1 shows that whenever y is in bounds (i.e., y <
size) the observations of the speculative semantics and the
non-speculative semantics coincide (i.e. they are both τ ).
In contrast, Trace 2 shows that whenever y ≥ size, the
speculative execution generates observations τ that depend
on A[y] whose value is not visible in the non-speculative
execution. This is flagged as a leak by SPECTECTOR.
Proving security with SPECTECTOR: The CLANG 7.0.0
C++ compiler implements a countermeasure, called specu-
lative load hardening [8], that applies conditional masks to
addresses to prevent leaks into the microarchitectural state.
Figure 3 depicts the protected output of CLANG on the
program from Figure 1.
1 mov size, %rax
2 mov y, %rbx
3 mov $0, %rdx
4 cmp %rbx, %rax
5 jbe END
6 cmovbe $-1, %rdx
7 mov A(%rbx), %rax
8 shl $9, %rax
9 or %rdx, %rax
10 mov B(%rax), %rax
11 or %rdx, %rax
12 and %rax, temp
Fig. 3. SPECTRE variant 1 - Assembly code with speculative load hardening.
CLANG inserted instructions 3, 6, 9, and 11.
The symbolic execution of the speculative semantics pro-
duces, as before, Trace 1 and Trace 2, but with
τ = load (A+ y) · load (B+ (A[y] * 512) |mask),
where mask = ite(y < size,0x0,0xFF..FF) corre-
sponds to the conditional move in line 6 and | is a bitwise-or
operator. Here, ite(y < size,0x0,0xFF..FF) is a sym-
bolic if-then-else expression evaluating to 0x0 if y < size
and to 0xFF..FF otherwise.
The analysis of Trace 1 is as before. For Trace 2, however,
SPECTECTOR determines (via a query to Z3 [15]) that, for
all y ≥ size there is exactly one observation that the
adversary can make during the speculative execution, namely
load (A+y)·load (B+0xFF..FF), from which it concludes
that no information leaks into the microarchitectural state, i.e.,
the countermeasure is effective in securing the program. See
Section VIII for examples where SPECTECTOR detects that
countermeasures are not applied effectively.
Basic Types
(Registers) x ∈ Regs
(Values) n, ` ∈ Vals = N ∪ {⊥}
Syntax
(Expressions) e := n | x | 	e | e1 ⊗ e2
(Instructions) i := skip | x← e | load x, e |
store x, e | jmp e | beqz x, ` |
x
e′?←−− e | spbarr
(Programs) p := n : i | p1; p2
Fig. 4. µASM syntax
III. LANGUAGE AND SEMANTICS
We now introduce µASM, a core assembly language which
we use for defining speculative non-interference and describ-
ing SPECTECTOR.
A. Syntax
The syntax of µASM is defined in Figure 4. Expressions
are built from a set of register identifiers Regs , which contains
a designated element pc representing the program counter,
and a set Vals of values, which consists of the natural
numbers and ⊥. µASM features eight kinds of instructions:
a skip instruction, (conditional) assignments, load and store
instructions, branching instructions, indirect jumps, and
speculation barriers spbarr. Both conditional assignments
and speculation barriers are commonly used to implement
SPECTRE countermeasures [6], [8].
A µASM program is a sequence of pairs n : i, where i is an
instruction and n ∈ N is a value representing the instruction’s
label. We say that a program is well-formed if (1) it does not
contain duplicate labels, (2) it contains an instruction labeled
with 0, i.e., the initial instruction, and (3) it does not contain
branch instructions of the form n : beqz x, n + 1. In the
following we consider only well-formed programs.
We often treat programs p as partial functions from natural
numbers to instructions. Namely, given a program p and a
number n ∈ N, we denote by p(n) the instruction labelled
with n in p if it exists, and ⊥ otherwise.
Example 1. The SPECTRE v1 example from Figure 1 can be
expressed in µASM as follows:
0 : x← y < size
1 : beqz x,⊥
2 : load z, A+ y
3 : z ← z ∗ 512
4 : load w, B+ z
5 : temp← temp & w
Here, registers y, size, and temp store the respective vari-
ables. Similarly, registers A and B store the memory addresses
of the first elements of the arrays A and B. 
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B. Non-speculative Semantics
The standard, non-speculative semantics models the
execution of µASM programs on a platform without
speculation. This semantics is formalized as a ternary relation
σ
o−→ σ′ mapping a configuration σ to a configuration σ′, while
producing an observation o. Observations are used to capture
what an adversary can see about a given execution trace. We
describe the individual components of the semantics below.
Configurations: A configuration σ is a pair 〈m, a〉 of a
memory m ∈ Mem and a register assignment a ∈ Assgn ,
modeling the state of the computation. Memories m are
functions mapping memory addresses, represented by natural
numbers, to values in Vals . Register assignments a are func-
tions mapping register identifiers to values. We require that ⊥
can only be assigned to the program counter pc, signaling
termination. A configuration 〈m, a〉 is initial (respectively
final) if a(pc) = 0 (respectively a(pc) = ⊥). We denote
the set Mem ×Assgn of all configurations by Conf .
Adversary model and observations: We consider an adver-
sary that observes the program counter and the locations of
memory accesses during computation. This adversary model
is commonly used to formalize timing side-channel free
code [12], [13], without requiring microarchitectural models.
In particular, it captures leakage through caches without re-
quiring an explicit cache model.
We model this adversary in our semantics by annotating
transactions with observations load n and store n, which
expose read and write accesses to an address n, and observa-
tions pc n, which expose the value of the program counter.
We denote the set of all observations by Obs .
Evaluation relation: We describe the execution of µASM
programs using the evaluation relation −→⊆ Conf × Obs ×
Conf . Most of the rules defining −→ are fairly standard, which
is why Figure 5 presents only a selection. We refer the reader
to Appendix A for the remaining rules.
The rules LOAD and STORE describe the behavior of
instructions load x, e and store x, e respectively. The former
assigns to the register x the memory content at the address n
to which expression e evaluates; the latter stores the content
of x at that address. Both rules expose the address n using
observations and increment the program counter.
The rule CONDUPDATE-SAT describes the behavior of a
conditional update x e
′?←−− e whose condition e′ is satisfied. It
first checks that the condition e′ evaluates to 0. It then updates
the register assignment a by storing in x the value of e, and
by incrementing pc.
The rule BEQZ-SAT describes the effect of the instruction
beqz x, ` when the branch is taken. Under the condition that
x evaluates to 0, it sets the program counter to ` and exposes
this change using the observation pc `.
Finally, the rule JMP executes jmp e instructions. The rule
stores the value of e in the program counter and records this
change using the observation pc `.
Runs and traces: The evaluation relation captures individual
steps in the execution of a program. Runs capture full execu-
tions of the program. We formalize them as triples 〈σ, τ, σ′〉
consisting of an initial configuration σ, a trace of observa-
tions τ , and a final configuration σ′. Given a program p, we
denote by LpM the set of all possible runs of the non-speculative
semantics, i.e., it contains all triples 〈σ, τ, σ′〉 corresponding
to executions σ τ−→∗ σ′. Finally, we denote by LpM(σ) the
trace τ such that there is a final configuration σ′ for which 〈σ,
τ, σ′〉 ∈ LpM. In this paper, we only consider terminating
programs. Extending the definitions and algorithms to non-
terminating programs is future work.
IV. SPECULATIVE SEMANTICS
This section introduces a model of speculation that captures
the execution of µASM programs on speculative in-order
microarchitectures. We first informally explain this model in
Section IV-A before formalizing it in the rest of the section.
A. Modeling speculation
Non-branching instructions are executed as in the standard
semantics. Upon reaching a branching instruction, the predic-
tion oracle, which is a parameter of our model, is queried to
obtain a branch prediction that is used to decide which of the
two branches to execute speculatively.
To enable a subsequent rollback in case of a misprediction,
a snapshot of the current program configuration is taken,
before starting a speculative transaction. In this speculative
transaction, the program is executed speculatively along the
predicted branch for a bounded number of computation steps.
Computing the precise length w of a speculative transactions
would (among other aspects) require a detailed model of the
memory hierarchy. To abstract from this complexity, in our
model w is also provided by the prediction oracle.
At the end of a speculative transaction, the correctness of
the prediction is evaluated:
• If the prediction was correct, the transaction is committed
and the computation continues using the current configuration.
• If the prediction was incorrect, the transaction is aborted,
the original configuration is restored, and the computation
continues on the correct branch.
In the following we formalize the behavior intuitively de-
scribed above in the speculative semantics. The main technical
challenge lies in catering for nested branches and transactions.
B. Prediction oracles
In our model, prediction oracles serve two distinct purposes:
(1) predicting branches, and (2) determining the speculative
transactions’ lengths. A prediction oracle O is a partial func-
tion that takes as input a program p, a branching history h,
and a label ` such that p(`) is a branching instruction, and
that returns as output a pair 〈`′, w〉 ∈ Vals × N, where
`′ represents the predicted branch (i.e., `′ ∈ {` + 1, `′′}
where p(`) = beqz x, `′′) and w represents the speculative
transaction’s length.
Taking into account the branching history enables us to
capture history-based branch predictors, a general class of
branch predictors that base their decisions on the sequence
of branches leading up to a branching instruction. Formally,
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LOAD
p(a(pc)) = load x, e x 6= pc n = JeK(a)
〈m,a〉 load n−−−−→ 〈m,a[pc 7→ a(pc) + 1, x 7→ m(n)]〉
STORE
p(a(pc)) = store x, e n = JeK(a)
〈m,a〉 store n−−−−→ 〈m[n 7→ a(x)], a[pc 7→ a(pc) + 1]〉
CONDUPDATE-SAT
p(a(pc)) = x
e′?←−− e Je′K(a) = 0 x 6= pc
〈m,a〉 −→ 〈m,a[pc 7→ a(pc) + 1, x 7→ JeK(a)]〉
BEQZ-SAT
p(a(pc)) = beqz x, ` a(x) = 0
〈m,a〉 pc `−−→ 〈m,a[pc 7→ `]〉
JMP
p(a(pc)) = jmp e ` = JeK(a)
〈m,a〉 pc `−−→ 〈m,a[pc 7→ `]〉
Fig. 5. Standard semantics for µASM program p – selected rules
a branching history is a sequence of triples 〈`, id , `′〉, where
` ∈ Vals is the label of a branching instruction, `′ ∈ Vals is
the label of the predicted branch, and id ∈ N is the identifier
of the transaction in which the branch is executed.
A prediction oracle O has speculative window at most w if
the length of the transactions generated by its predictions is
at most w, i.e., for all programs p, branching histories h, and
labels `, O(p, h, `) = 〈`′, w′〉, for some `′ and with w′ ≤ w.
Example 2. The “backward taken forward not taken”
(BTFNT) branch predictor, implemented in early CPUs [16],
predicts the branch as taken if the target instruction address
is lower than the program counter. It can be formalized as
part of a prediction oracle BTFNT , for a fixed speculative
window w, as follows: BTFNT (p, h, `) = 〈min(` + 1, `′),
w〉, where p(`) = beqz x, `′. 
Dynamic branch predictors, such as simple 2-bit predictors
and more complex correlating or tournament predictors [16],
can also be formalized using prediction oracles.
C. Speculative transactions
To manage each ongoing speculative transaction3, the specu-
lative semantics needs to remember a snapshot σ of the config-
uration prior to the start of the transaction, the length w of the
transaction (i.e., the number of instructions left to be executed
in this transaction), the branch prediction ` used at the start of
the transaction, and the transaction’s identifier id . We call such
a 4-tuple 〈σ, id , w, `〉 ∈ Conf × N× N× Vals , a speculative
state, and we denote by SpecS the set of all speculative states.
Nested transactions are represented by sequences of spec-
ulative states. We use standard notation for sequences: S∗ is
the set of all finite sequences over the set S, ε is the empty se-
quence, and s1 ·s2 is the concatenation of sequences s1 and s2.
We use the following two helper functions to manipulate
sequences of speculative states s ∈ SpecS∗:
• decr : SpecS∗ → SpecS∗ decrements by 1 the length of
all transactions in the sequence.
• zeroes : SpecS∗ → SpecS∗ sets to 0 the length of all
transactions in the sequence.
• The predicate enabled(s) holds if and only if none of the
transactions in s has remaining length 0.
In addition to branch and jump instructions, speculative
transactions can also modify the program counter: rolling back
3Due to nesting, multiple transactions may be happening simultaneously.
a transaction results in resetting the program counter to the one
in the correct branch. To expose such changes to the adversary,
we extend the set Obs of observations with elements of the
form start id , commit id , and rollback id , to denote start,
commit, and rollback of a speculative transaction id . ExtObs
denotes the set of extended observations.
D. Evaluation relation
The speculative semantics operates on extended configura-
tions, which are 4-tuples 〈ctr , σ, s, h〉 ∈ ExtConf consisting
of a global counter ctr ∈ N for generating transaction
identifiers, a configuration σ ∈ Conf , a sequence s of specu-
lative states representing the ongoing speculative transactions,
and a branching history h. Along the lines of the standard
semantics, we describe the speculative semantics of µASM
programs under a prediction oracle O using the relation
 ⊆ ExtConf × ExtObs∗ × ExtConf . The rules are given
in Figure 6 and are explained below:
SE-NOBRANCH captures the behavior of non-branching
instructions as long as the length of all speculative states in s is
greater than 0, that is, as long as enabled(s) holds. In this case,
 mimics the behavior of the non-speculative semantics −→.
If the instruction is not a speculation barrier, the lengths of
all speculative transactions are decremented by 1 using decr .
In contrast, if the instruction is a speculation barrier spbarr,
the length of all transactions is set to 0 using zeroes . In this
way, spbarr forces the termination (either with a commit or
with a rollback) of all ongoing speculative transactions.
SE-BRANCH models the behavior of branch instructions.
The rule (1) queries the prediction oracle O to obtain a
prediction 〈`, w〉 consisting of the predicted next instruction
address ` and the length of the transaction w, (2) sets the pro-
gram counter to `, (3) decrements the length of the transactions
in s, (4) increments the transaction counter ctr , (5) appends
a new speculative state with configuration σ, identifier ctr ,
transaction’s length w, and predicted instruction address `,
and (6) updates the branching history by appending an entry
〈a(pc), ctr , `〉 modeling the prediction. The rule also records
the start of the speculative execution and the change of the
program counter through observations.
SE-COMMIT captures a speculative transaction’s commit. It
is executed whenever a speculative state’s remaining length
reaches 0. Application of the rule requires that the prediction
made for the transaction is correct, which is checked by
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comparing the predicted address ` with the one obtained by
executing one step of the non-speculative semantics starting
from the configuration σ′. The rule records the transaction’s
commit through an observation, and it updates the branching
history according to the branch decision that has been taken.
SE-ROLLBACK captures a speculative transaction’s roll-
back. The rule checks that the prediction is incorrect (again by
comparing the predicted address ` with the one obtained from
the non-speculative semantics), and it restores the configura-
tion stored in s. Rolling back a transaction also terminates the
speculative execution of all the nested transactions. This is
modeled by dropping the portion s′ of the speculative state
associated with the nested transactions. The rule also pro-
duces observations recording the transaction’s rollback and the
change of the program counter, and it updates the branching
history by recording the branch instruction’s correct outcome.
Runs and traces: Runs and traces are defined analogously to
the non-speculative case: Given a program p and an oracle O,
we denote by JpKO the set of all possible runs of the specu-
lative semantics. By JpKO(σ) we denote the trace τ such that
there is a final configuration σ′ for which 〈σ, τ, σ′〉 ∈ JpKO.
Example 3. For illustrating the speculative semantics, we
execute the program from Ex. 1 with the oracle from Ex. 2
and a configuration 〈0, 〈m, a〉, ε, ε〉 where a(y) ≥ a(size).
First, the rule SE-NOJUMP is applied to execute the
assignment x ← y < size. Then, the branch instruction
beqz x,⊥ is reached and so rule SE-JUMP applies. This
produces the observations start 0, modeling the beginning
of a speculative transaction with id 0, and pc 2, representing
the program counter’s change. Next, rule SE-NOJUMP
applies three times to execute the instructions 2–5, thereby
producing the observations load v1 and load v2 that record
the memory accesses. Finally, rule SE-ROLLBACK applies,
which terminates the speculative transaction and rolls back
its effects. This rule produces the observations rollback 0
and pc ⊥. Thus, executing the program produces the trace:
τ := start 0 · pc 2 · load v1 · load v2 · rollback 0 · pc ⊥ ,
where v1 = a(A) + a(y) and v2 = a(B) +m(v1) ∗ 512. 
E. Speculative and Non-speculative Semantics
We conclude this section by connecting the speculative
and non-speculative semantics. For this, we introduce two
projections of speculative traces τ :
• the non-speculative projection τnse is the trace obtained
by removing from τ (1) all substrings that correspond to
rolled-back transactions, i.e. all substrings start id · τ ′ ·
rollback id , and (2) all extended observations.
• the speculative projection τse is the trace produced by
rolled-back transactions, i.e. the complement of τnse.
We lift projections se and nse to sets of runs in the natural
way. Then, a program’s non-speculative behavior can be ob-
tained from its speculative behavior by dropping all speculative
observations, i.e., by applying τnse to all of its runs τ :
Proposition 1. Let p be a program and O be a prediction
oracle. Then, LpM = JpKOnse.
The proof of Proposition 1 is given in Appendix F.
V. SPECULATIVE NON-INTERFERENCE
This section introduces speculative non-interference (SNI),
a semantic notion of security characterizing those information
leaks that are introduced by speculative execution.
A. Security policies
Speculative non-interference is parametric in a policy that
specifies which parts of the configuration are known or con-
trolled by an adversary, i.e., “public” or “low” data.
Formally, a security policy P is a finite subset of Regs ∪N
specifying the low register identifiers and memory addresses.
Two configurations σ, σ′ ∈ Conf are indistinguishable with
respect to a policy P , written σ ∼P σ′, iff they agree on all
registers and memory locations in P .
Example 4. A policy P for the program from Example 1
may state that the content of the registers y, size, A, and B
is non-sensitive, i.e., P = {y, size, A, B}. 
Policies need not be manually specified but can in principle
be inferred from the context in which a piece of code executes,
e.g., whether a variable is reachable from public input or not.
B. Speculative non-interference
Speculative non-interference requires that executing a pro-
gram under the speculative semantics does not leak more
information than executing the same program under the non-
speculative semantics. Formally, whenever two indistinguish-
able configurations produce the same non-speculative traces,
then they must also produce the same speculative traces.
Definition 1. A program p satisfies speculative non-
interference for a prediction oracle O and a security policy P
iff for all initial configurations σ, σ′ ∈ InitConf , if σ ∼P σ′
and LpM(σ) = LpM(σ′), then JpKO(σ) = JpKO(σ′).
Speculative non-interference is a variant of non-interference.
While non-interference compares what is leaked by a program
with a policy specifying the allowed leaks, speculative non-
interference compares the program leakage under two seman-
tics, the non-speculative and the speculative one. The security
policy and the non-speculative semantics, together, specify
what the program may leak under the speculative semantics.4
Example 5. The program p from Example 1 does not sat-
isfy speculative non-interference for the BTFNT oracle from
Example 2 and the policy P from Example 4. Consider two
initial configurations σ := 〈m, a〉, σ′ := 〈m′, a′〉 that agree on
the values of y, size, A, and B but disagree on the value of
B[A[y] ∗ 512]. Say, for instance, that m(a(A) + a(y)) = 0 and
m′(a′(A) + a′(y)) = 1. Additionally, assume that y ≥ size.
4Conceptually, the non-speculative semantics can be seen as a declassifica-
tion assertion for the speculative semantics [17].
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SE-NOBRANCH
p(σ(pc)) 6= beqz x, ` σ τ−→ σ′ enabled(s)
s′ =
{
decr(s) if p(σ(pc)) 6= spbarr
zeroes(s) otherwise
〈ctr , σ, s, h〉 τ 〈ctr , σ′, s′, h〉
SE-BRANCH
p(σ(pc)) = beqz x, `′ O(p, h, σ(pc)) = 〈`, w〉 σ = 〈m,a〉
enabled(s) s′ = decr(s) · 〈σ, ctr , w, `〉 id = ctr
〈ctr , σ, s, h〉 start id·pc ` 〈ctr + 1, 〈m,a[pc 7→ `]〉, s′, h · 〈a(pc), id , `〉〉
SE-COMMIT
σ′ τ−→ 〈m,a〉 ` = a(pc) enabled(s′)
h′ = h · 〈σ′(pc), id , a(pc)〉
〈ctr , σ, s · 〈σ′, id , 0, `〉 · s′, h〉 commit id 〈ctr , σ, s · s′, h′〉
SE-ROLLBACK
σ′ τ−→ 〈m,a〉 ` 6= a(pc) enabled(s′)
h′ = h · 〈σ′(pc), id , a(pc)〉
〈ctr , σ, s · 〈σ′, id , 0, `〉 · s′, h〉 rollback id·pc a(pc) 〈ctr , 〈m,a〉, s, h′〉
Fig. 6. Speculative execution for µASM for a program p and a prediction oracle O
Executing the program under the non-speculative semantics
produces the trace pc ⊥ when starting from σ and σ′.
Moreover, the two initial configurations are indistinguishable
with respect to the policy P . However, executing p under
the speculative semantics produces two distinct traces τ =
start 0 ·pc 3 ·load v1 ·load (a′(B)+0) ·rollback 0 ·pc ⊥
and τ ′ = start 0·pc 3·load v1·load (a′(B)+1)·rollback 0·
pc ⊥, where v1 = a(A) + a(y) = a′(A) + a′(y). Therefore, p
does not satisfy speculative non-interference. 
C. Always-mispredict speculative semantics
The speculative semantics and SNI are parametric in the
prediction oracle O. Often, it is desirable obtaining guarantees
w.r.t. any prediction oracle, since branch prediction models in
modern CPUs are unavailable and as different CPUs employ
different predictors. To this end, we introduce a variant of the
speculative semantics that facilitates such an analysis.
Intuitively, leakage due to speculative execution is maxi-
mized under a branch predictor that mispredicts every branch.
This intuition holds true unless speculative transactions are
nested, where a correct prediction of a nested branch some-
times yields more leakage than a misprediction.
Example 6. Consider the following variation of the SPECTRE
v1 example [2] from Figure 1, and assume that the function
benign() runs for longer than the speculative window and
does not leak any information.
1 if (y < size)
2 if (y-1 < size)
3 benign();
4 temp &= B[A[y] * 512];
Then, under a branch predictor that mispredicts every branch,
the speculative transaction corresponding to the outer branch
will be rolled back before reaching line 4. On the other hand,
given a correct prediction of the inner branch, line 4 would
be reached and a speculative leak would be present. 
A simple but inefficient approach to deal with this chal-
lenge would be to consider both cases, correct and incorrect
prediction, upon every branch. This, however, would result in
an exponential explosion of the number of paths to consider.
To avoid this, we introduce the always-mispredict semantics
that differs from the speculative semantics in three key ways:
(1) It mispredicts every branch, hence its name. In partic-
ular, it is not parametric in the prediction oracle.
(2) It initializes the length of every non-nested transaction
to w, and the length of every nested transaction to the remain-
ing length of its enclosing transaction decremented by 1.
(3) Upon executing instructions, only the remaining length
of the innermost transaction is decremented.
The consequence of these modifications is that nested trans-
actions do not reduce the number of steps that the semantics
may explore the correct path for, after the nested transactions
have been rolled back. In Example 6, after rolling back the
nested speculative transaction, the outer transaction continues
as if the nested branch had been correctly predicted in the first
place, and thus the speculative leak in line 4 is reached.
Modifications (1)-(3) are formally captured in the three rules
AM-NOBRANCH, AM-BRANCH, and AM-ROLLBACK given
in Appendix C. Similarly to JpKO(σ), we denote by {|p|}w(σ)
the trace of observations obtained by executing the program p,
starting from initial configuration σ according to the always-
mispredict evaluation relation with speculative window w.
Theorem 1 (proved in Appendix H) states that checking SNI
w.r.t. the always- mispredict semantics is sufficient to obtain
security guarantees w.r.t. all prediction oracles.
Theorem 1. A program p satisfies SNI for a security policy
P and all prediction oracles O with speculative window at
most w iff for all initial configurations σ, σ′ ∈ InitConf , if
σ ∼P σ′ and LpM(σ) = LpM(σ′), then {|p|}w(σ) = {|p|}w(σ′).
In our case studies in Sections VIII and IX, we use w = 200.
This is motivated by typical sizes of the reorder buffer [18],
which limits the lengths of speculative transactions in modern
microarchitectures.
VI. DETECTING SPECULATIVE INFORMATION FLOWS
We now present SPECTECTOR, an approach to detect
speculative leaks, or to prove their absence. SPECTECTOR
symbolically executes the program p under analysis to derive
a concise representation of p’s behavior as a set of symbolic
traces. It analyzes each symbolic trace using an SMT solver to
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detect possible speculative leaks through memory accesses or
control-flow instructions. If neither memory nor control leaks
are detected, SPECTECTOR reports the program as secure.
A. Symbolically executing µASM programs
We symbolically execute programs w.r.t. the always mispre-
dict semantics, which enables us to derive security guarantees
that hold for arbitrary prediction oracles, see Theorem 1. Our
symbolic execution engine relies on the following components:
• A symbolic expression se is a concrete value n ∈ Vals ,
a symbolic value s ∈ SymbVals , an if-then-else expression
ite(se, se ′, se ′′), or the application of unary or binary opera-
tors to symbolic expressions.
• A symbolic memory is a term in the standard theory of
arrays [19]. A memory update write(sm, se, se ′) updates the
symbolic memory sm by assigning the symbolic value se ′ to
the symbolic address se . We extend symbolic expressions with
memory reads read(sm, se), which retrieve the value of the
symbolic address se from the symbolic memory sm.
• A symbolic trace τ is a sequence of symbolic observa-
tions of the form load se or store se , symbolic branching
conditions of the form symPc(se), and transaction-related
observations of the form start n and rollback n, for natural
numbers n and symbolic expressions se .
• The path condition pthCnd(τ)=
∧
symPc(se)∈τ se of trace τ
is the conjunction of all symbolic branching conditions in τ .
• The symbolic execution derives symbolic runs 〈σ, τ, σ′〉,
consisting of symbolic configurations σ, σ′ and a symbolic
trace τ . The set of all symbolic runs forms the symbolic
semantics, which we denote by {|p|}symbw . The derivation rules
are fairly standard and are given in Appendix D.
• The value of an expression se depends on a valuation
µ : SymbVals → Vals mapping symbolic values to concrete
ones. The evaluation µ(se) of se under µ is standard and
formalized in Appendix D.
• A symbolic expression se is satisfiable, written µ |= se ,
if there is a valuation µ such that µ(se) 6= 0. Every valuation
that satisfies a symbolic run’s path condition maps the
run to a concrete run. We denote by γ(〈σ, τ, σ′〉) the set
{〈µ(σ), µ(τ), µ(σ′)〉 | µ |= pthCnd(τ)} of 〈σ, τ, σ′〉’s
concretizations, and we lift it to {|p|}symbw . The concretization
of the symbolic runs yields the set of all concrete runs:
Proposition 2. Let p be a program and w ∈ N be a speculative
window. Then, {|p|}w = γ({|p|}symbw ).
The proof of Proposition 2 is given in Appendix I.
Example 7. Executing the program from Example 1 under
the symbolic speculative semantics with speculative window 2
yields the following two symbolic traces: τ1 := symPc(y <
size) · start 0 · pc 2 · pc 10 · rollback 0 · pc 3 · load A+
y · load B+ read(sm, (A+ y)) ∗ 512, and τ2 := symPc(y ≥
size) · start 0 · pc 3 · load A + y · load B + read(sm,
(A+ y)) ∗ 512 · rollback 0 · pc 2 · pc 10. 
Algorithm 1 SPECTECTOR
Input: A program p, a security policy P , a speculative
window w ∈ N.
Output: SECURE if p satisfies speculative non-interference
with respect to the policy P ; INSECURE otherwise
1: procedure SPECTECTOR(p, P, w)
2: for each symbolic run 〈σ, τ, σ′〉 ∈ {|p|}symbw do
3: if MEMLEAK(τ, P ) ∨ CTRLLEAK(τ, P ) then
4: return INSECURE
5: return SECURE
6: procedure MEMLEAK(τ, P )
7: ψ ← pthCnd(τ)1∧2 ∧ polEqv(P )∧
obsEqv(τnse) ∧ ¬obsEqv(τse)
8: return SATISFIABLE(ψ)
9: procedure CTRLLEAK(τ, P )
10: for each prefix ν · symPc(se) of τse do
11: ψ ← pthCnd(τnse · ν)1∧2 ∧ polEqv(P )∧
obsEqv(τnse) ∧ ¬sameSymbPc(se)
12: if SATISFIABLE(ψ) then
13: return >
14: return ⊥
B. Checking speculative non-interference
SPECTECTOR is given in Algorithm 1. It relies on two pro-
cedures: MEMLEAK and CTRLLEAK, to detect leaks resulting
from memory and control-flow instructions, respectively. We
start by discussing the SPECTECTOR algorithm and next
explain the MEMLEAK and CTRLLEAK procedures.
SPECTECTOR takes as input a program p, a policy P speci-
fying the non-sensitive information, and a speculative window
w. The algorithm iterates over all symbolic runs produced by
the symbolic always-mispredict speculative semantics (lines
2-4). For each run 〈σ, τ, σ′〉, the algorithm checks whether τ
speculatively leaks information through memory accesses or
control-flow instructions. If this is the case, then SPECTECTOR
has found a witness of a speculative leak and it reports p as
INSECURE. If none of the traces contain speculative leaks, the
algorithms terminates returning SECURE (line 5).
Detecting leaks caused by memory accesses: The procedure
MEMLEAK takes as input a trace τ and a policy P , and
it determines whether τ leaks information through symbolic
load and store observations. The check is expressed as a
satisfiability check of a constraint ψ. The construction of ψ
is inspired by self-composition [20], which reduces reasoning
about pairs of program runs to reasoning about single runs by
replacing each symbolic variable x with two copies x1 and x2.
We lift the subscript notation to symbolic expressions.
The constraint ψ is the conjunction of four formulas:
• pthCnd(τ)1∧2 stands for pthCnd(τ)1 ∧ pthCnd(τ)2,
which ensures that both runs follow the path associated with τ .
• polEqv(P ) introduces constraints x1 = x2 for each
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register x ∈ P and read(sm1, n) = read(sm2, n) for each
memory location n ∈ P , which ensure that both runs agree
on all non-sensitive inputs.
• obsEqv(τnse) introduces a constraint se1 = se2 for
each load se or store se in τnse, which ensures that
the non-speculative observations associated with memory
accesses are the same in both runs.
• ¬obsEqv(τse) ensures that speculative observations
associated with memory accesses differ among the two runs.
If ψ is satisfiable, there are two P -indistinguishable config-
urations that produce the same non-speculative traces (since
pthCnd(τ)1∧2 ∧ polEqv(P )∧ obsEqv(τnse) is satisfied) and
whose speculative traces differ in a memory access observation
(since ¬obsEqv(τse) is satisfied), i.e. a violation of SNI.
Detecting leaks caused by control-flow instructions: To
detect leaks caused by control-flow instructions, CTRLLEAK
checks whether there are two traces in τ ’s concretization that
agree on the outcomes of all non-speculative branch and jump
instructions, while differing in the outcome of at least one
speculatively executed branch or jump instruction.
In addition to pthCnd(τ), obsEqv(τ), and polEqv(P ),
the procedure relies on the function sameSymbPc(se) that
introduces the constraint se1 ↔ se2 ensuring that se is
satisfied in one concretization iff it is satisfied in the other.
CTRLLEAK checks, for each prefix ν · symPc(se) in τ ’s
speculative projection τse, the satisfiability of the conjunction
of pthCnd(τnse · ν)1∧2, polEqv(P ), obsEqv(τnse), and
¬sameSymbPc(se). Whenever the formula is satisfiable, there
are two P -indistinguishable configurations that produce the
same non-speculative traces, but whose speculative traces
differ on program counter observations, i.e. a violation of SNI.
Example 8. Consider the trace τ2 := symPc(y ≥ size) ·
start 0 ·pc 3 ·load A+y ·load B+read(sm, (A+y))∗512 ·
rollback 0·pc 2·pc 10 from Example 7. MEMLEAK detects a
leak caused by the observation load B+ read(sm, (A+y)) ∗
512. Specifically, it detects that there are distinct symbolic
valuations that agree on the non-speculative observations but
disagree on the value of load B + read(sm, (A + y)) ∗ 512.
That is, the observation depends on sensitive information that
is not disclosed by τ2’s non-speculative projection. 
Soundness and completeness: Theorem 2 states that
SPECTECTOR deems secure only speculatively non-interferent
programs, and all detected leaks are actual violations of SNI.
Theorem 2. If SPECTECTOR(p, P, w) terminates, then
SPECTECTOR(p, P, w) = SECURE iff the program p satisfies
speculative non-interference w.r.t. the policy P and all predic-
tion oracles O with speculative window at most w.
The theorem follows from the soundness and completeness
of the always-mispredict semantics w.r.t. prediction oracles
(Theorem 1) and of the symbolic semantics w.r.t. to the
always-mispredict semantics (Proposition 2). The proof of
Theorem 2 is given in Appendix J.
VII. TOOL IMPLEMENTATION
We implement our approach in our tool SPECTECTOR,
which is available at https://spectector.github.
io. The tool, which is implemented on top of the CIAO logic
programming system [21], consists of three components: a
front end that translates x86 assembly programs into µASM,
a core engine implementing Algorithm 1, and a back end
handling SMT queries.
x86 front end: The front end translates AT&T/GAS and
Intel-style assembly files into µASM. It currently supports
over 120 instructions: data movement instructions (mov, etc.),
logical, arithmetic, and comparison instructions (xor, add,
cmp, etc.), branching and jumping instructions (jae, jmp,
etc.), conditional moves (cmovae, etc.), stack manipulation
(push, pop, etc.), and function calls5 (call, ret).
It currently does not support privileged x86 instructions,
e.g., for handling model specific registers and virtual memory.
Further it does not support sub-registers (like eax, ah, and
al) and unaligned memory accesses, i.e., we assume that only
64-bit words are read/written at each address without overlaps.
Finally, the translation currently maps symbolic address names
to µASM instruction addresses, limiting arithmetic on code
addresses.
Core engine: The core engine implements Algorithm 1. It
relies on a concolic approach to implement symbolic execution
that performs a depth-first exploration of the symbolic runs.
Starting from a concrete initial configuration, the engine exe-
cutes the program under the always-mispredict speculative se-
mantics while keeping track of the symbolic configuration and
path condition. It discovers new runs by iteratively negating
the last (not previously negated) conjunct in the path condition
until it finds a new initial configuration, which is then used to
re-execute the program concolically. In our current implemen-
tation, indirect jumps are not included in the path conditions,
and thus new symbolic runs and corresponding inputs are only
discovered based on negated branch conditions.6 This process
is interleaved with the MEMLEAK and CTRLLEAK checks and
iterates until a leak is found or all paths have been explored.
SMT back end: The Z3 SMT solver [15] acts as a back
end for checking satisfiability and finding models of symbolic
expressions using the BITVECTOR and ARRAY theories, which
are used to model registers and memory. The implementation
currently does not rely on incremental solving, since it was
less efficient than one-shot solving for the selected theories.
VIII. CASE STUDY: COMPILER COUNTERMEASURES
This section reports on a case study in which we apply
SPECTECTOR to analyze the security of compiler-level coun-
termeasures against SPECTRE. We analyze a corpus of 240
assembly programs derived from the variants of the SPECTRE
v1 vulnerability by Kocher [14] using different compilers and
compiler options. This case study’s goals are: (1) to determine
5We model the so-called “near calls”, where the callee is in the same code
segment as the caller.
6We plan to remove this limitation in a future release of our tool.
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Ex.
VCC ICC CLANG
UNP FEN 19.15 FEN 19.20 UNP FEN UNP FEN SLH
-O0 -O2 -O0 -O2 -O0 -O2 -O0 -O2 -O0 -O2 -O0 -O2 -O0 -O2 -O0 -O2
01 ◦ ◦ •◦ •◦ •◦ •◦ ◦ ◦ •◦ •◦ ◦ ◦ •◦ •◦ •◦ •◦
02 ◦ ◦ •◦ •◦ •◦ •◦ ◦ ◦ •◦ •◦ ◦ ◦ •◦ •◦ •◦ •◦
03 ◦ ◦ •◦ ◦ •◦ •◦ ◦ ◦ •◦ •◦ ◦ ◦ •◦ •◦ •◦ •◦
04 ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ •◦ •◦ ◦ ◦ •◦ •◦ ◦ ◦ •◦ •◦ •◦ •◦
05 ◦ ◦ •◦ ◦ •◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ •◦ •◦ ◦ ◦ •◦ •◦ •◦ •◦
06 ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ •◦ •◦ ◦ ◦ •◦ •◦ •◦ •◦
07 ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ •◦ •◦ ◦ ◦ •◦ •◦ •◦ •◦
08 ◦ •◦ ◦ •◦ ◦ •◦ ◦ •◦ •◦ •◦ ◦ •◦ •◦ •◦ •◦ •◦
09 ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ •◦ •◦ ◦ ◦ •◦ •◦ •◦ •◦
10 ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ •◦ •◦ ◦ ◦ •◦ •◦ •◦ ◦
11 ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ •◦ •◦ ◦ ◦ •◦ •◦ •◦ •◦
12 ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ •◦ •◦ ◦ ◦ •◦ •◦ ◦ ◦ •◦ •◦ •◦ •◦
13 ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ •◦ •◦ ◦ ◦ •◦ •◦ •◦ •◦
14 ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ •◦ •◦ ◦ ◦ •◦ •◦ ◦ ◦ •◦ •◦ •◦ •◦
15 ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ •◦ •◦ ◦ ◦ •◦ •◦ ◦ •◦
Fig. 7. Analysis of Kocher’s examples [14], compiled with different compilers and options. For each of the 15 examples, we analyzed the unpatched version
(denoted by UNP), the version patched with speculation barriers (denoted by FEN), and the version patched using speculative load hardening (denoted by
SLH). Programs have been compiled without optimizations (-O0) or with compiler optimizations (-O2) using the compilers VISUAL C++ (two versions),
ICC, and CLANG. ◦ denotes that SPECTECTOR detects a speculative leak, whereas •◦ indicates that SPECTECTOR proves the program secure.
whether speculative non-interference realistically captures
speculative leaks, and (2) to assess SPECTECTOR’s precision.
A. Experimental Setup
For our analysis, we rely on three state-of-the-art com-
pilers: Microsoft VISUAL C++ versions v19.15.26732.1 and
v19.20.27317.96, Intel ICC v19.0.0.117, and CLANG v7.0.0.
We compile the programs using two different optimization
levels (-O0 and -O2) and three mitigation levels: (a) UNP:
we compile without any SPECTRE mitigations. (b) FEN: we
compile with automated injection of speculation barriers.7
(c) SLH: we compile using speculative load hardening.8
Compiling each of the 15 examples from [14] with each of
the 3 compilers, each of the 2 optimization levels, and each of
the 2-3 mitigation levels, yields a corpus of 240 x64 assembly
programs.9 For each program, we specify a security policy
that flags as “low” all registers and memory locations that can
either be controlled by the adversary or can be assumed to
be public. This includes variables y and size, and the base
addresses of the arrays A and B as well as the stack pointer.
B. Experimental Results
Figure 7 depicts the results of applying SPECTECTOR to the
240 examples. We highlight the following findings:
7Fences are supported by CLANG with the flag -x86-speculative-
load-hardening-lfence, by ICC with -mconditional-
branch=all-fix, and by VISUAL C++ with /Qspectre.
8Speculative load hardening is supported by CLANG with the flag
-x86-speculative-load-hardening.
9The resulting assembly files are available at https://spectector.
github.io.
• SPECTECTOR detects the speculative leaks in almost
all unprotected programs, for all compilers (see the UNP
columns). The exception is Example #8, which uses a con-
ditional expression instead of the if statement of Figure 1:
1 temp &= B[A[y<size?(y+1):0]*512];
At optimization level -O0, this is translated to a (vulnerable)
branch instruction by all compilers, and at level -O2 to a (safe)
conditional move, thus closing the leak. See Appendix E-A for
the corresponding CLANG assembly.
• The CLANG and Intel ICC compilers defensively insert
fences after each branch instruction, and SPECTECTOR can
prove security for all cases (see the FEN columns for CLANG
and ICC). In Example #8 with options -O2 and FEN, ICC
inserts an lfence instruction, even though the baseline relies
on a conditional move, see line 10 below. This lfence is
unnecessary according to our semantics, but may close leaks
on processors that speculate over conditional moves.
1 mov y, %rdi
2 lea 1(%rdi), %rdx
3 mov size, %rax
4 xor %rcx, %rcx
5 cmp %rax, %rdi
6 cmovb %rdx, %rcx
7 mov temp, %r8b
8 mov A(%rcx), %rsi
9 shl $9, %rsi
10 lfence
11 and B(%rsi), %r8b
12 mov %r8b, temp
10
• For the VISUAL C++ compiler, SPECTECTOR automati-
cally detects all leaks pointed out in [14] (see the FEN 19.15
-O2 column for VCC). Our analysis differs from Kocher’s
only on Example #8, where the compiler v19.15.26732.1
introduces a safe conditional move, as explained above.
Moreover, without compiler optimizations (which is not
considered in [14]), SPECTECTOR establishes the security
of Examples #3 and #5 (see the FEN 19.15 -O0 column).
The latest VCC compiler additionally mitigates the leaks in
Examples #4, #12, and #14 (see the FEN 19.20 column).
• SPECTECTOR can prove the security of speculative load
hardening in Clang (see the SLH column for CLANG), except
for Example #10 with -O2 and Example #15 with -O0.
Example 10 with Speculative Load Hardening: Example
#10 differs from Figure 1 in that it leaks sensitive information
into the microarchitectural state by conditionally reading the
content of B[0], depending on the value of A[y].
1 if (y < size)
2 if (A[y] == k)
3 temp &= B[0];
SPECTECTOR proves the security of the program produced
with CLANG -O0, and speculative load hardening.
However, at optimization level -O2, CLANG outputs the
following code that SPECTECTOR reports as insecure.
1 mov size, %rdx
2 mov y, %rbx
3 mov $0, %rax
4 cmp %rbx, %rdx
5 jbe END
6 cmovbe $-1, %rax
7 or %rax, %rbx
8 mov k, %rcx
9 cmp %rcx, A(%rbx)
10 jne END
11 cmovne $-1, %rax
12 mov B, %rcx
13 and %rcx, temp
14 jmp END
The reason for this is that CLANG masks only the register
%rbx that contains the index of the memory access A[y],
cf. lines 6–7. However, it does not mask the value that
is read from A[y]. As a result, the comparison at line 9
speculatively leaks (via the jump target) whether the content of
A[0xFF...FF] is k. SPECTECTOR detects this subtle leak
and flags a violation of speculative non-interference.
While this example nicely illustrates the scope of SPECTEC-
TOR, it is likely not a problem in practice: First, the leak may
be mitigated by how data dependencies are handled in modern
out-of-order CPUs. Specifically, the conditional move in line 6
relies on the comparison in Line 4. If executing the conditional
leak effectively terminates speculation, the reported leak is
spurious. Second, the leak can be mitigated at the OS-level by
ensuring that 0xFF...FF is not mapped in the page tables,
or that the value of A[0xFF...FF] does not contain any
secret [22]. Such contextual information can be expressed with
policies (see V-A) to improve the precision of the analysis.
C. Performance
We run all experiments on a Linux machine (kernel 4.9.0-8-
amd64) with Debian 9.0, a Xeon Gold 6154 CPU, and 64 GB
of RAM. We use CIAO version 1.18 and the Z3 version 4.8.4.
SPECTECTOR terminates within less than 30 seconds on all
examples, with several examples being analyzed in about 0.1
seconds, except for Example #5 in mode SLH -O2. In this
exceptional case, SPECTECTOR needs 2 minutes for proving
security. This is due to Example #5’s complex control-flow,
which leads to loops involving several branch instructions.
IX. CASE STUDY: XEN PROJECT HYPERVISOR
This section reports on a case study in which we apply
SPECTECTOR on the Xen Project hypervisor [23]. This case
study’s goal is to understand the challenges in scaling the tool
to a significant real-world code base. It forms a snapshot of
our ongoing effort towards the comprehensive side-channel
analysis of the Xen hypervisor.
A. Challenges for scaling-up
There are three main challenges for scaling SPECTECTOR
to a large code base such as the Xen hypervisor:
ISA support: Our front end currently supports only a
fraction of the x64 ISA (cf. Section VII). Supporting the
full x64 ISA is conceptually straightforward but out of the
scope of this paper. For this case study, we treat unsupported
instructions as skip, sacrificing the analysis’s correctness.
Policies: SPECTECTOR uses policies specifying the public
and secret parts of configurations. The manual specification
of precise policies (as in Section VIII) is infeasible for large
code bases, and their automatic inference from the calling
context is not yet supported by SPECTECTOR. For this case
study, we use a policy that treats registers as “low” and
memory locations as “high”, which may introduce false
alarms. For instance, the policy treats as “high” all function
parameters that are retrieved from memory (e.g., popped from
the stack), which is why SPECTECTOR flags their speculative
uses in memory or branching instructions as leaks.
Path explosion and nontermination: SPECTECTOR is based
on symbolic execution, which suffers from path explosion and
nontermination when run on programs with loops and indirect
jumps. In the future, we plan to address this challenge by em-
ploying approximate but sound static analysis techniques, such
as abstract interpretation. Such techniques can be employed
both to efficiently infer loop invariants, and jump targets, but
also to directly address the question whether a given program
satisfies SNI or not. A systematic study of techniques to
soundly approximate SNI is out of scope of this paper. For this
case study, as discussed in the following section, we bound the
number and the lengths of symbolic paths that are explored,
thereby sacrificing the soundness of our analysis.
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(a) Checking non-interference with MEMLEAK (b) Checking non-interference with CTRLLEAK
(c) Discovering symbolic paths (d) Symbolic execution versus SNI check
Fig. 8. Scalability analysis for the Xen Project hypervisor. In (a) and (b), green denotes secure traces, red denotes insecure traces, and blue denotes traces
producing timeouts. In (c) and (d), yellow denotes the first trace discovered for each function, while blue denotes all discovered further traces. The vertical
lines in (d) represent traces where either MEMLEAK times out and CTRLLEAK succeed or both time out.
B. Evaluating scalability
Approach: To perform a meaningful evaluation of SPEC-
TECTOR’s scalability despite the incomplete path coverage,
we compare the time spent on discovering new symbolic
paths with the time spent on checking SNI. Analyzing paths
of different lengths enables us to evaluate the scalability of
checking SNI relative to that of symbolic execution, which
factors out the path explosion problem from the analysis.
We stress that we sacrifice soundness and completeness
of the analysis for running SPECTECTOR on the full Xen
codebase (see Section IX-A). This is why in this section we
do not attempt to make statements about the security of the
hypervisor.
Setup: We analyze the Xen Project hypervisor version
4.10, which we compile using CLANG v7.0.0. We identify
3 959 functions in the generated assembly. For each function,
we explore at most 25 symbolic paths of at most 10 000
instructions each, with a global timeout of 10 minutes.10
We record execution times as a function of the trace
length, i.e., the number of load se, store se, and symPc(se)
observations, rather than path length, since the former is more
relevant for the size of the resulting SMT formulas. We execute
our experiments on the machine described in Section VIII-C.
C. Experimental results
Cost of symbolic execution: We measure the time taken
for discovering symbolic paths (cf. Section VII). In total,
SPECTECTOR discovers 24 701 symbolic paths. Figure 8(c)
depicts the time for discovering paths. We highlight the
following findings:
• As we apply concolic execution, discovering the first
symbolic path does not require any SMT queries and is hence
cheap. These cases are depicted by yellow dots in Fig. 8(c).
10The sources and scripts needed for reproducing our results are available
at https://spectector.github.io.
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• Discovering further paths requires SMT queries. This
increases execution time by approximately two orders of mag-
nitude. These cases correspond to the blue dots in Fig. 8(c).
• For 48.3% of the functions we do not reach the limit of 25
paths, for 35.4% we do not reach the limit of 10 000 instruc-
tions per path, and for 18.7% we do not encounter unsupported
instructions. 13 functions satisfy all three conditions.
Cost of checking SNI: We apply MEMLEAK and CTRL-
LEAK to the 24 701 traces (derived from the discovered paths),
with a timeout of 1 minute each. Figure 8(a) and 8(b) depict
the respective analysis runtimes; Figure 8(d) relates the time
required for discovering a new trace with the time for checking
SNI, i.e., for executing lines 3–4 in Algorithm 1.
We highlight the following findings:
• MEMLEAK and CTRLLEAK can analyze 93.8% and
94.7%, respectively, of the 24 701 traces in less than 1 minute.
The remaining traces result in timeouts.
• For 41.9% of the traces, checking SNI is at most 10x
faster than discovering the trace, and for 20.2% of the traces
it is between 10x and 100x faster. On the other hand, for 26.9%
of the traces, discovering the trace is at most 10x faster than
checking SNI, and for 7.9% of the traces, discovering the trace
is between 10x and 100x faster than checking SNI.
Summary: Overall, our data indicates that the cost of check-
ing SNI is comparable to that of discovering symbolic paths.
This may be surprising since SNI is a relational property,
which requires comparing executions and is know to scale
poorly. However, note that SPECTECTOR only compares exe-
cutions that follow the same symbolic path. This is sufficient
because the program counter is observable, i.e., speculative
non-interference never requires to consider two executions
that disagree on path conditions. We hence conclude that our
approach does not exhibit fundamental bottlenecks beyond
those it inherits from symbolic execution.
X. DISCUSSION
A. Exploitability
Exploiting speculative execution attacks requires an adver-
sary to (1) prepare the microarchitectural state, (2) run victim
code—partially speculatively—to encode information into the
microarchitectural state, and (3) extract the leaked information
from the microarchitectural state. SPECTECTOR analyzes the
victim code to determine whether it may speculatively leak
information into the microarchitectural state in any possi-
ble attack context. Following the terminology of [24], [25],
speculative non-interference is a semantic characterization of
disclosure gadgets enabled by speculative execution.
B. Scope of the model
The results obtained by SPECTECTOR are only valid to the
extent that the speculative semantics and the observer model
accurately capture the target system.
In particular, SPECTECTOR may incorrectly classify a pro-
gram as secure if the speculative semantics does not implic-
itly11 capture all additional observations an adversary may
make due to speculative execution on an actual microar-
chitecture. For example, microarchitectures could potentially
speculate on the condition of a conditional update, which our
speculative semantics currently does not permit.
Similarly, SPECTECTOR may incorrectly classify a program
as insecure if the speculative semantics admits speculative ex-
ecutions that are not actually possible on an actual microarchi-
tecture. This might be the case for speculative load hardening
on Kocher’s Example #10, as discussed in Section VIII.
The speculative semantics, however, can always be adapted
to more accurately reflect reality, once better documentation
of processor behavior becomes available. In particular, it
would be relatively straightforward to extend the speculative
semantics with models of indirect jump predictors [2], return
stack buffers [1], and memory disambiguation predictors [26].
The notion of SNI itself is robust to such changes, as it is
defined relative to the speculative semantics.
We capture “leakage into the microarchitectural state” using
the relatively powerful observer of the program execution
that sees the location of memory accesses and the jump
targets. This observer could be replaced by a weaker one,
which accounts for more detailed models of a CPU’s memory
hierarchy, and SPECTECTOR could be adapted accordingly,
e.g. by adopting the cache models from CacheAudit [27]. We
believe, however, that highly detailed models are not actually
desirable for several reasons: (a) they encourage brittle designs
that break under small changes to the model, (b) they have to
be adapted frequently, and (c) they are hard to understand and
reason about for compiler developers and hardware engineers.
The “constant-time” observer model adopted in this paper
has proven to offer a good tradeoff between precision and
robustness [12], [13].
XI. RELATED WORK
Speculative execution attacks: These attacks exploit specu-
latively executed instructions to leak information. After SPEC-
TRE [2], [5], many speculative execution attacks have been
discovered that differ in the exploited speculation sources [1],
[4], [26], the covert channels [3], [28], [29] used, or the target
platforms [30]. We refer the reader to [25] for a survey of
speculative execution attacks and their countermeasures.
Here, we overview only SPECTRE v1 software-level coun-
termeasures. AMD and Intel suggest inserting lfence instruc-
tions after branches [6], [31]. These instructions effectively act
as speculation barriers, and prevent speculative leaks. The Intel
C++ compiler [9], the Microsoft Visual C++ compiler [10],
and the CLANG [8] compiler can automatically inject this
countermeasure at compile time. Taram et al. [32] propose
context-sensitive fencing, a defense mechanism that dynami-
cally injects fences at the microoperation level where neces-
sary, as determined by a dynamic information-flow tracker. An
11Implicitly, because we take the memory accesses performed by the
program and the flow of control as a proxy for the observations an adversary
might make, e.g., through the cache.
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alternative technique to injecting fences is to introduce artifi-
cial data dependencies [8], [33]. Speculative Load Hardening
(SLH) [8], implemented in the CLANG compiler, employs
carefully injected data dependencies and masking operations to
prevent the leak of sensitive information into the microarchi-
tectural state. A third software-level countermeasure consists
in replacing branching instructions by other computations, like
bit masking, that do not trigger speculative execution [7].
Detecting speculative leaks: oo7 [11] is a binary analysis
tool for detecting speculative leaks. The tool looks for specific
syntactic code patterns and it can analyze large code bases.
However, it misses some speculative leaks, like Example #4
from Section VIII. oo7 would also incorrectly classify all the
programs patched by SLH in our case studies as insecure,
since they still match oo7’s vulnerable patterns. In contrast,
SPECTECTOR builds on a semantic notion of security and is
thus not limited to particular syntactic code patterns.
Disselkoen et al. [34] and Mcilroy et al. [35] develop models
for capturing speculative execution, which they use to illustrate
several known Spectre variants. Neither approach provides
a security notion or a detection technique. Compared with
our speculative semantics, the model of [35] more closely
resembles microarchitectural implementations by explicitly
modeling the reorder buffer, caches, and branch predictors,
which we intentionally abstract away.
In work concurrent to ours, Cheang et al. [36] introduce the
notion of trace property-dependent observational determinism
(TPOD), which they instantiate to formally capture the new
leaks introduced by the interaction of microarchitectural side
channels with speculative execution. As TPOD is a 4-safety
property it can be checked using 4-way self composition. In
contrast, SNI can be checked by 2-way self composition (cf.
Proposition 1), which is likely to be more efficient.
Formal architecture models: Armstrong et al. [37] present
formal models for the ARMv8-A, RISC-V, MIPS, and CHERI-
MIPS instruction-set architectures. Degenbaev [38] and Goel
et al. [39] develop formal models for parts of the x86 architec-
ture. Such models enable, for instance, the formal verification
of compilers, operating systems, and hypervisors. However,
ISA models naturally abstract from microarchitectural aspects
such as speculative execution or caches, which are required to
reason about side-channel vulnerabilities.
Zhang et al. [40] present Coppelia, a tool to automatically
generate software exploits for hardware designs. However,
the processor designs they consider, OR1200, PULPino, and
Mor1kx, do not feature speculative execution.
Static detection of side-channel vulnerabilities: Several
approaches have been proposed for statically detecting side-
channel vulnerabilities in programs [13], [27], [41], [42].
These differ from our work in that (1) they do not consider
speculative execution, and (2) we exclusively target specula-
tion leaks, i.e., we ignore leaks from the standard semantics.
However, we note that our tool could easily be adapted to also
detect leaks from the standard semantics.
XII. CONCLUSIONS
We introduce speculative non-interference, the first semantic
notion of security against speculative execution attacks. Based
on this notion we develop SPECTECTOR, a tool for automat-
ically detecting speculative leaks or proving their absence,
and we show how it can be used to detect subtle leaks—
and optimization opportunities—in the way state-of-the-art
compilers apply SPECTRE mitigations.
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APPENDIX A: NON-SPECULATIVE SEMANTICS
Given a program p, we formalize its non-speculative seman-
tics using the relation −→⊆ Conf ×Obs × Conf in Figure 9.
APPENDIX B: TRACE PROJECTIONS
Here, we formalize the speculative projection τse and the
non-speculative projection τnse.
Non-speculative projection: Given a trace τ , its non-
speculative projection contains only the observations that are
produced by committed transactions; in other words, rolled-
back transactions are removed in the projection. Formally,
τnse is defined as follows: εnse = ε, (o · τ)nse = o · τnse
if o is load se , store se , pc n, or symPc(se), (start i ·
τ)nse = τnse if rollback i is not in τ , (commit i·τ)nse =
τnse, (start i · τ · rollback i · τ ′)nse = τ ′nse, and
τnse = ε otherwise.
Speculative projection: Given a speculative trace τ , its
speculative projection contains only the observations produced
by rolled-back transactions. Formally, τse is defined as:
εse = ε, (o · τ)se = τse if o is load se , store se , pc n,
or symPc(se), (start i · τ)se = τse if rollback i is not
in τ , (commit i · τ)se = τse, (start i · τ · rollback i ·
τ ′)se = filter(τ) · τ ′nse, and τnse = ε otherwise, where
filter(τ) denotes the trace obtained by dropping all extended
observations start id , commit id , and rollback id from τ .
APPENDIX C: ALWAYS-MISPREDICT SEMANTICS
We describe the execution of µASM programs under the
always-mispredict oracle with speculative window w as a
ternary evaluation relation 〈ctr , σ, s〉 τ=⇒ 〈ctr ′, σ′, s′〉 map-
ping a configuration 〈ctr , σ, s〉 to a configuration 〈ctr ′, σ′,
s′〉 while producing the observations τ . Differently from the
speculative semantics, the always-mispredict semantics does
not require a branching history h, since its prediction only
depends on the branch outcome. The rules formalizing the
always-mispredict semantics are given in Figure 10.
AM-NOBRANCH captures the behavior of non-branching
instructions. Similar to its counterpart SE-NOBRANCH, the
rule acts as a wrapper for the standard semantics. The dif-
ference lies in the the auxiliary predicate enabled ′(s) and
the auxiliary functions decr ′(s), and zeroes ′(s), which ap-
ply their non-primed counterpart only to the last transaction
in the speculative state. E.g., enabled ′(s · 〈id , w, `, σ〉) =
enabled(〈id , w, `, σ〉). This ensures that upon rolling back a
nested transaction, its enclosing transaction can explore the
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Expression evaluationJnK(a) = n JxK(a) = a(x) J	eK(a) = 	JeK(a) Je1 ⊗ e2K(a) = Je1K(a)⊗ Je2K(a)
Instruction evaluation
SKIP
p(a(pc)) = skip
〈m,a〉 −→ 〈m,a[pc 7→ a(pc) + 1]〉
BARRIER
p(a(pc)) = spbarr
〈m,a〉 −→ 〈m,a[pc 7→ a(pc) + 1]〉
ASSIGN
p(a(pc)) = x← e x 6= pc
〈m,a〉 −→ 〈m,a[pc 7→ a(pc) + 1, x 7→ JeK(a)]〉
CONDITIONALUPDATE-SAT
p(a(pc)) = x
e′?←−− e Je′K(a) = 0 x 6= pc
〈m,a〉 −→ 〈m,a[pc 7→ a(pc) + 1, x 7→ JeK(a)]〉
CONDITIONALUPDATE-UNSAT
p(a(pc)) = x
e′?←−− e Je′K(a) 6= 0 x 6= pc
〈m,a〉 −→ 〈m,a[pc 7→ a(pc) + 1]〉
TERMINATE
p(a(pc)) = ⊥
〈m,a〉 −→ 〈m,a[pc 7→ ⊥]〉
LOAD
p(a(pc)) = load x, e x 6= pc n = JeK(a)
〈m,a〉 load n−−−−→ 〈m,a[pc 7→ a(pc) + 1, x 7→ m(n)]〉
STORE
p(a(pc)) = store x, e n = JeK(a)
〈m,a〉 store n−−−−→ 〈m[n 7→ a(x)], a[pc 7→ a(pc) + 1]〉
BEQZ-SAT
p(a(pc)) = beqz x, ` a(x) = 0
〈m,a〉 pc `−−→ 〈m,a[pc 7→ `]〉
BEQZ-UNSAT
p(a(pc)) = beqz x, ` a(x) 6= 0
〈m,a〉 pc a(pc)+1−−−−−−−→ 〈m,a[pc 7→ a(pc) + 1]〉
JMP
p(a(pc)) = jmp e ` = JeK(a)
〈m,a〉 pc `−−→ 〈m,a[pc 7→ `]〉
Fig. 9. µASM semantics for a program p
other alternative branch to the full depth of the speculative
window (corresponding to the case of a correct prediction).
AM-BRANCH models the behavior of branching instructions
beqz x, `′. The rule mispredicts the outcome of the branch
instruction by setting the program counter to `′ only when the
condition is not satisfied. The length of the new transaction
is set to the minimum of the oracle’s speculative window w
and wndw(s)− 1, where wndw(s) is the remaining length of
the last speculative transaction in s. This ensures that nested
transactions are not explored for longer than permitted by
their enclosing transactions, whose remaining lengths are not
decremented during the execution of the nested transaction.
AM-ROLLBACK models the rollback of speculative transac-
tions. Different from SE-ROLLBACK, and by design of AM-
NOBRANCH, the rule applies only to the last transaction in s.
Since the semantics always-mispredicts the outcome of branch
instructions, SE-ROLLBACK is always applied, i.e there is no
need for a rule that handles committed transactions.
Similarly to Proposition 1, a program’s non-speculative be-
havior can be recovered from the always-mispredict semantics.
Proposition 3. Let p be a program and w be a speculative
window. Then, LpM = {|p|}wnse.
The proof of Proposition 3 is given in Appendix G.
Proposition 4 states that the always-mispredict semantics
yields the worst-case leakage.
Proposition 4. Let p be a program, w ∈ N be a speculative
window, and σ, σ′ ∈ InitConf be initial configurations.
{|p|}w(σ) = {|p|}w(σ′) iff JpKO(σ) = JpKO(σ′) for all pre-
diction oracles O with speculative window at most w.
The proof of Proposition 4 is given in Appendix H.
APPENDIX D: SYMBOLIC SEMANTICS
Here, we formalize the symbolic semantics.
Symbolic expressions: Symbolic expressions represent com-
putations over symbolic values. A symbolic expression se is a
concrete value n ∈ Vals , a symbolic value s ∈ SymbVals , an
if-then-else expression ite(se, se ′, se ′′), or the application of
a unary 	 or a binary operator ⊗.
se := n | s | ite(se, se ′, se ′′) | 	se | se ⊗ se ′
Symbolic memories: We model symbolic memories as sym-
bolic arrays using the standard theory of arrays [19]. That is,
we model memory updates as triples of the form write(sm,
se, se ′), which updates the symbolic memory sm by assigning
the symbolic value se ′ to the symbolic location se , and
memory reads as read(sm, se), which denote retrieving the
value assigned to the symbolic expression se .
A symbolic memory sm is either a function mem : N →
SymbVals mapping memory addresses to symbolic values or
a term write(sm, se, se ′), where sm is a symbolic memory
and se, se ′ are symbolic expressions. To account for symbolic
memories, we extend symbolic expressions with terms of the
form read(sm, se), where sm is a symbolic memory and se
is a symbolic expression, representing memory reads.
sm := mem | write(sm, se, se ′)
se := . . . | read(sm, se)
Evaluating symbolic expressions: The value of a symbolic
expression se depends on a valuation µ : SymbVals → Vals
mapping symbolic values to concrete ones:
µ(n) = n if n ∈ Vals
µ(s) = µ(s) if s ∈ SymbVals
µ(ite(se, se ′, se ′′)) = µ(se ′) if µ(se) 6= 0
µ(ite(se, se ′, se ′′)) = µ(se ′′) if µ(se) = 0
µ(	se) = 	µ(se)
µ(se ⊗ se ′) = µ(se)⊗ µ(se ′)
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p(σ(pc)) 6= beqz x, ` σ τ−→ σ′ enabled ′(s)
s′ =
{
decr ′(s) if p(σ(pc)) 6= spbarr
zeroes ′(s) otherwise
〈ctr , σ, s〉 τ=⇒ 〈ctr , σ′, s′〉
AM-BRANCH
p(σ(pc)) = beqz x, `′ enabled ′(s)
` =
{
σ(pc) + 1 if σ(x) = 0
`′ if σ(x) 6= 0 id = ctr
s′ = decr ′(s) · 〈σ, ctr ,min(w,wndw(s)− 1), `〉
〈ctr , σ, s〉 start id·pc `========⇒ 〈ctr + 1, σ[pc 7→ `], s′〉
AM-ROLLBACK
σ′ τ−→ σ′′
〈ctr , σ, s · 〈σ′, id , 0, `〉〉 rollback id·pc σ
′′(pc)
==============⇒ 〈ctr , σ′′, s〉
Fig. 10. Always-mispredict speculative semantics for a program p and speculative window w
µ(mem) = µ ◦mem
µ(write(sm, se, se ′)) = µ(sm)[µ(se) 7→ µ(se ′)]
µ(read(sm, se)) = µ(sm)(µ(se))
An expression se is satisfiable if there is a valuation µ
satisfying it, i.e., µ(se) 6= 0.
Symbolic assignments: A symbolic assignment sa is a
function mapping registers to symbolic expressions sa :
Regs → SymbExprs . Given a symbolic assignment sa and
a valuation µ, µ(sa) denotes the assignment µ ◦ sa. We
assume the program counter pc to always be concrete, i.e.,
sa(pc) ∈ Vals .
Symbolic configurations: A symbolic configuration is a
pair 〈sm, sa〉 consisting of a symbolic memory sm and a
symbolic assignment sa. We lift speculative states to symbolic
configurations. A symbolic extended configuration is a triple
〈ctr , σ, s〉 where ctr ∈ N is a counter, σ ∈ Conf is a symbolic
configuration, and s is a symbolic speculative state.
Symbolic observations: When symbolically executing a
program, we may produce observations whose value is sym-
bolic. To account for this, we introduce symbolic observations
of the form load se and store se , which are produced
when symbolically executing load and store commands, and
symPc(se), produced when symbolically evaluating branch-
ing instructions, where se is a symbolic expression. In our
symbolic semantics, we use the observations symPc(se) to
represent the symbolic path condition indicating when a path
is feasible. Given a sequence of symbolic observations τ and a
valuation µ, µ(τ) denotes the trace obtained by (1) dropping
all observations symPc(se), and (2) evaluating all symbolic
observations different from symPc(se) under µ.
Symbolic semantics: The non-speculative semantics is cap-
tured by the relation −→s in Fig. 11, while the speculative
semantics is captured by the relation =⇒s in Fig. 12.
Computing symbolic runs and traces: We now fix the
symbolic values. The set SymbVals consists of a symbolic
value xs for each register identifier x and of a symbolic value
memns for each memory address n. We also fix the initial
symbolic memory sm0 = λn ∈ N. mns and the symbolic
assignment sa0 such that sa0(pc) = 0 and sa0(x) = xs.
The set {|p|}symbw contains all runs that can be derived using
the symbolic semantics (with speculative window w) starting
from the initial configuration 〈sm0, sa0〉. That is, {|p|}symbw
contains all triples 〈〈sm0, sa0〉, τ, σ′〉, where τ is a symbolic
trace and σ′ is a final symbolic configuration, corresponding
to symbolic computations 〈0, 〈sm0, sa0〉, ε〉 τ=⇒
∗
s 〈ctr , σ′, ε〉
where the path condition
∧
symPc(se)∈τ se is satisfiable.
We compute {|p|}symbw in the standard way. We keep track of
a path constraint PC and we update it whenever the semantics
produces an observation symPc(se). We start the computation
from 〈0, 〈sm0, sa0〉, ε〉 and PC = >. When executing branch
and jump instructions, we explore all branches consistent with
the current PC, and, for each of them, we update PC.
APPENDIX E: CODE FROM CASE STUDIES
A. Example #8
In Example #8, the bounds check of Figure 1 is imple-
mented using a conditional operator:
1 temp &= B[A[y<size?(y+1):0]*512];
When compiling the example without countermeasures or
optimizations, the conditional operator is translated to a branch
instruction (cf. line 4), which is a source of speculation.
Hence, the resulting program contains a speculative leak,
which SPECTECTOR correctly detects.
1 mov size, %rcx
2 mov y, %rax
3 cmp %rcx, %rax
4 jae .L1
5 add $1, %rax
6 jmp .L2
7 .L1:
8 xor %rax, %rax
9 jmp .L2
10 .L2:
11 mov A(%rax), %rax
12 shl $9, %rax
13 mov B(%rax), %rax
14 mov temp, %rcx
15 and %rax, %rcx
17
Expression evaluationJnK(a) = n if n ∈ ValsJseK(a) = se if sa ∈ SymbExprs \ValsJxK(a) = a(x) if x ∈ RegsJ	eK(a) = apply(	, JeK(a)) if JeK(a) ∈ ValsJ	eK(a) = 	JeK(a) if JeK(a) ∈ SymbExprs \ValsJe1 ⊗ e2K(a) = apply(⊗, Je1K(a), Je2K(a)) if Je1K(a), Je2K(a) ∈ ValsJe1 ⊗ e2K(a) = Je1K(a)⊗ Je2K(a) if Je1K(a) ∈ SymbExprs \ValsJe1 ⊗ e2K(a) = Je1K(a)⊗ Je2K(a) if Je2K(a) ∈ SymbExprs \Vals
Instruction evaluation
SKIP
p(sa(pc)) = skip
〈sm, sa〉 −→s 〈sm, sa[pc 7→ sa(pc) + 1]〉
BARRIER
p(sa(pc)) = spbarr
〈sm, sa〉 −→s 〈sm, sa[pc 7→ sa(pc) + 1]〉
ASSIGN
p(sa(pc)) = x← e x 6= pc
〈sm, sa〉 −→s 〈sm, sa[pc 7→ sa(pc) + 1, x 7→ JeK(sa)]〉
CONDITIONALUPDATE-CONCR-SAT
p(sa(pc)) = x
e′?←−− e Je′K(sa) = 0 x 6= pc
〈sm, sa〉 −→s 〈sm, sa[pc 7→ sa(pc) + 1, x 7→ JeK(sa)]〉
CONDITIONALUPDATE-CONCR-UNSAT
p(sa(pc)) = x
e′?←−− e Je′K(sa) = n n ∈ Vals
n 6= 0 x 6= pc
〈sm, sa〉 −→s 〈sm, sa[pc 7→ sa(pc) + 1]〉
CONDITIONALUPDATE-SYMB
p(sa(pc)) = x
e′?←−− e Je′K(sa) = se se 6∈ Vals x 6= pc
〈sm, sa〉 −→s 〈sm, sa[pc 7→ sa(pc) + 1, x 7→ ite(se = 0, JeK(sa), sa(x))]〉
LOAD-SYMB
p(sa(pc)) = load x, e x 6= pc se = JeK(sa)
se ′ = read(sm, se)
〈sm, sa〉 load se−−−−→s 〈sm, sa[pc 7→ sa(pc) + 1, x 7→ se ′]〉
STORE-SYMB
p(sa(pc)) = store x, e se = JeK(sa)
sm′ = write(sm, se, sa(x))
〈sm, sa〉 store se−−−−−→s 〈sm′, sa[pc 7→ sa(pc) + 1]〉
BEQZ-CONCR-SAT
p(sa(pc)) = beqz x, ` sa(x) = 0 sa(x) ∈ Vals
〈sm, sa〉 symPc(>)·pc `−−−−−−−−→s 〈sm, sa[pc 7→ `]〉
BEQZ-SYMB-SAT
p(sa(pc)) = beqz x, ` sa(x) 6∈ Vals
〈sm, sa〉 symPc(sa(x)=0)·pc `−−−−−−−−−−−−→s 〈sm, sa[pc 7→ `]〉
BEQZ-CONCR-UNSAT
p(sa(pc)) = beqz x, ` sa(x) 6= 0 sa(x) ∈ Vals
〈sm, sa〉 symPc(>)·pc sa(pc)+1−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→s 〈sm, sa[pc 7→ sa(pc) + 1]〉
BEQZ-SYMB-UNSAT
p(sa(pc)) = beqz x, ` sa(x) 6∈ Vals
〈sm, sa〉 symPc(sa(x)6=0)·pc sa(pc)+1−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→s 〈sm, sa[pc 7→ sa(pc) + 1]〉
JMP-CONCR
p(sa(pc)) = jmp e ` = JeK(sa) ` ∈ Vals
〈sm, sa〉 symPc(>)·pc `−−−−−−−−→s 〈sm, sa[pc 7→ `]〉
JMP-SYMB
p(sa(pc)) = jmp e JeK(sa) 6∈ Vals ` ∈ Vals
〈sm, sa〉 symPc(JeK(sa)=`)·pc `−−−−−−−−−−−−−→s 〈sm, sa[pc 7→ `]〉
TERMINATE
p(sa(pc)) = ⊥
〈sm, sa〉 −→s 〈sm, sa[pc 7→ ⊥]〉
Fig. 11. µASM symbolic non-speculative semantics for a program p
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p(σ(pc)) 6= beqz x, ` σ τ−→s σ′ enabled ′(s)
s′ =
{
decr ′(s) if p(σ(pc)) 6= spbarr
zeroes ′(s) otherwise
〈ctr , σ, s〉 τ=⇒s 〈ctr , σ′, s′〉
AM-BRANCH-SYMB
p(σ(pc)) = beqz x, `′′ enabled ′(s)
σ
symPc(se)·pc `′−−−−−−−−−→s σ′ ` =
{
σ(pc) + 1 if `′ 6= σ(pc) + 1
`′′ if `′ = σ(pc) + 1
s′ = decr ′(s) · 〈σ, ctr ,min(w,wndw(s)− 1), `〉 id = ctr
〈ctr , σ, s〉 symPc(se)·start id·pc `==============⇒s 〈ctr + 1, σ[pc 7→ `], s′〉
AM-ROLLBACK
σ′ τ−→s σ′′ σ′′(pc) 6= `
〈ctr , σ, s · 〈σ′, id , 0, `〉〉 rollback id·pc σ
′′(pc)
==============⇒s 〈ctr , σ′′, s〉
Fig. 12. Symbolic always-mispredict speculative semantics for a program p and speculative window w
16 mov %rcx, temp
In the UNP -O2 mode, the conditional operator is translated
as a conditional move (cf. line 6), for which SPECTECTOR can
prove security.
1 mov size, %rax
2 mov y, %rdx
3 xor %rcx, %rcx
4 cmp %rdx, %rax
5 lea 1(%rdx), %rax
6 cmova %rax, %rcx
7 mov A(%rcx), %rax
8 shl $9, %rax
9 mov B(%rax), %rax
10 and %rax, temp
B. Example #15 in SLH mode
Here, the adversary provides the input via the pointer *y:
1 if (*y < size)
2 temp &= B[A[*y] * 512];
In the -O0 SLH mode, CLANG hardens the address used
for performing the memory access A[*y] in lines 8–12,
but not the resulting value, which is stored in the register
%cx. However, the value stored in %cx is used to perform
a second memory access at line 14. An adversary can exploit
the second memory access to speculatively leak the content of
A[0xFF...FF]. In our experiments, SPECTECTOR correctly
detected such leak.
1 mov $0, %rax
2 mov y, %rdx
3 mov (%rdx), %rsi
4 mov size, %rdx
5 cmp %rdx, %rsi
6 jae END
7 cmovae $-1, %rax
8 mov y, %rcx
9 mov (%rcx), %rcx
10 mov %rax, %rdx
11 or %rcx, %rdx
12 mov A(%rdx), %rcx
13 shl $9, %rcx
14 mov B(%rcx), %rcx
15 mov temp, %rdx
16 and %rcx, %rdx
17 mov %rdx, temp
In contrast, when Example #15 is compiled with the -O2
flag, CLANG correctly hardens A[*y]’s result (cf. line 10).
This prevents information from flowing into the microarchitec-
tural state during speculative execution. Indeed, SPECTECTOR
proves that the program satisfies speculative non-interference.
1 mov $0, %rax
2 mov y, %rdx
3 mov (%rdx), %rdx
4 mov size, %rsi
5 cmp %rsi, %rdx
6 jae END
7 cmovae $-1, %rax
8 mov A(%rdx), %rcx
9 shl $9, %rcx
10 or %rax, %rcx
11 mov B(%rcx), %rcx
12 or %rax, %rcx
13 and %rcx, temp
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APPENDIX F: RELATING THE SPECULATIVE AND NON-SPECULATIVE SEMANTICS (PROPOSITION 1)
We start by spelling out the definition of JpKO. Given a program p and a prediction oracle O, we denote by JpKO the set
of all triples 〈σ, τ, σ′〉 ∈ InitConf × ExtObs∗ × FinalConf corresponding to executions 〈0, σ, ε, ε〉 τ ∗ 〈ctr , σ′, ε, h〉.
We are now ready to prove Proposition 1, which we restate here for simplicity:
Proposition 1. Let p be a program and O be a prediction oracle. Then, LpM = JpKOnse.
Proof. We prove the two directions separately.
(⇐): Assume that 〈σ, τ ′, σ′〉 ∈ JpKO. From Proposition 5 (proved in Section F-A), it follows that 〈σ, τnse, σ′〉 ∈ LpM.
(⇒): Assume that 〈σ, τ, σ′〉 ∈ LpM. From Proposition 6 (proved in Section F-B), it follows that there exists a trace τ ′ ∈
ExtObs∗ such that 〈σ, τ ′, σ′〉 ∈ JpKO and τ ′nse = τ .
In the following, we rely on the concept of rolled-back transactions to denote portions of program executions associated
with rolled-back speculative transactions. Concretely, an execution 〈ctr0, σ0, s0, h0〉 τ0 〈ctr1, σ1, s1, h1〉 τ1 . . . τn−1 〈ctrn,
σn, sn, hn〉 τn 〈ctrn+1, σn+1, sn+1, hn+1〉 is a rolled back speculative transaction iff there is an identifier id ∈ N and two
labels `, `′ ∈ Vals such that τ0 = start i · pc ` and τn = rollback i · pc `′.
A. Soundness of the speculative semantics
Proposition 5 states that the speculative semantics does not introduce spurious non-speculative behaviors.
Proposition 5. Let p be a program and O be a prediction oracle. Whenever 〈0, σ, ε, ε〉 τ ∗ 〈ctr , σ′, ε, h〉, σ ∈ InitConf , and
σ′ ∈ FinalConf , then σ τnse−−−→
∗
σ′.
Proof. Let p be a program andO be a prediction oracle. Furthermore, let r be an execution 〈0, σ, ε, ε〉 τ ∗ 〈ctr , σ′, ε, h〉 such that
σ ∈ InitConf and σ′ ∈ FinalConf . We denote by R the set of rolled back transactions and by C the set containing all identifiers
of transactions committed in r, i.e., R = {id ∈ N | ∃i ∈ N. τ |i = rollback id} and C = {id ∈ N | ∃i ∈ N. τ |i = commit id}.
We can incrementally construct the execution σ
τnse−−−→
∗
σ′ by applying Lemmas 1–4. In particular, for instructions that are not
inside a speculative transaction we apply Lemma 1. For branch instructions, there are two cases. If the associated speculative
transaction is eventually rolled back (i.e., its identifier is in R), then we apply Lemma 4 to the whole rolled back transaction
to generate the corresponding step in the non-speculative semantics. In contrast, if the speculative transaction is eventually
committed (i.e., its identifier is in C), then we can apply Lemma 2 (in conjunction with Lemmas 5) to generate the corresponding
step in the non-speculative semantics as well as Lemma 1 for the other instructions in the transaction. Finally, we can simply
ignore the steps associated with the SE-COMMIT rule (see Lemma 3). Observe that the resulting traces can be combined to
obtain τnse since 〈0, σ, ε, ε〉 τ
∗ 〈ctr , σ′, ε, h〉 is a terminated execution.
The above proof relies on the auxiliary lemmas below to handle non-branch instructions (Lemma 1), committed transactions
(Lemmas 2, 3, and 5), and rolled back transactions (Lemma 4).
Lemma 1. Let p be a program and O be a prediction oracle. Whenever 〈ctr , σ, s, h〉 τ 〈ctr ′, σ′, s′, h′〉, p(σ(pc)) 6= beqz x, `,
and enabled(s), then σ τ−→ σ′.
Proof. Let p be a program and O be a prediction oracle. Assume that 〈ctr , σ, s, h〉 τ 〈ctr ′, σ′, s′, h′〉, p(σ(pc)) 6= beqz x, `,
and enabled(s). From this and the SE-NOBRANCH rule, it follows σ τ−→ σ′.
Lemma 2. Let p be a program and O be a prediction oracle. Whenever 〈ctr , σ, s, h〉 τ 〈ctr ′, σ′, s′, h′〉, p(σ(pc)) = beqz x, `,
enabled(s), O(p, h, σ(pc)) = 〈`′, w〉, σ pc `
′
−−−→ σ′′, then σ τnse−−−→ σ′.
Proof. Let p be a program and O be a prediction oracle. Assume that 〈ctr , σ, s, h〉 τ 〈ctr ′, σ′, s′, h′〉, p(σ(pc)) = beqz x, `,
enabled(s), O(p, h, σ(pc)) = 〈`′, w〉, σ pc `
′
−−−→ σ′′. From this, the run was produced by applying the SE-BRANCH rule. Hence,
σ′ = σ[pc 7→ `′] and τ = start ctr · pc `′. From this, σ pc `
′
−−−→ σ′′, τnse = pc `′, and σ′′ = σ[pc 7→ `′], it follows that
τnse = pc `′ and σ′ = σ′′. Hence, σ τ−→ σ′.
Lemma 3. Let p be a program and O be a prediction oracle. Whenever 〈ctr , σ, s, h〉 commit id 〈ctr ′, σ′, s′, h′〉, then σ = σ′.
Proof. Let p be a program and O be a prediction oracle. Assume that 〈ctr , σ, s, h〉 commit id 〈ctr ′, σ′, s′, h′〉. The only
applicable rule is SE-COMMIT and σ = σ′ directly follows from the rule’s definition.
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Lemma 4. Let p be a µASM program and O be a prediction oracle. Whenever r := 〈ctr , σ, s, h〉 τ ∗ 〈ctr ′, σ′, s′, h′〉,
enabled(s), p(σ(pc)) = beqz x, `, and the run r is a rolled-back transaction, then σ
τnse−−−→ σ′.
Proof. Let p be a µASM program and O be a prediction oracle. Assume that r := 〈ctr , σ, s, h〉 τ ∗ 〈ctr ′, σ′, s′, h′〉, enabled(s),
p(σ(pc)) = beqz x, `, and the run r is a rolled-back transaction. Since r is a rolled back transaction, there is an identifier
id ∈ N and two labels `, `′ ∈ Vals such that 〈ctr , σ, s, h〉 start id·pc ` 〈ctr1, σ1, s1, h1〉 τ1 . . . τn−1 〈ctrn, σn, sn,
hn〉 rollback id·pc `
′
〈ctrn+1, σn+1, sn+1, hn+1〉.
First, observe that τ is start i · pc ` · τ ′ · rollback i · pc `′. From this, τnse = pc `′nse = pc `′.
Next, the first step in r is obtained by applying the SE-BRANCH rule (since it is the only rule producing start id
observations). Hence, the last transaction in s′ is 〈σ, ctr , w, `〉, where 〈`, w〉 is the prediction produced by O, and id = ctr .
We never modify the identifier, label, and rollback state inside the speculative transaction during the execution up to the last
step. Therefore, it follows (from the rules) that 〈σ, ctr , 0, `〉 is a transaction in sn.
Finally, the last step is obtained by applying the SE-ROLLBACK rule (since it is the only rule producing rollback id
observations). Hence, the rolled back transaction in sn is 〈σ, ctr , 0, `〉. From this, we have σ pc `
′
−−−→ σn+1. From this, τnse =
pc `′, and σ′ = σn+1 (by construction), we have σ
τnse−−−→ σ′.
Lemma 5. Let p be a program, O be a prediction oracle, and 〈ctr0, σ0, s0, h0〉 τ0 〈ctr1, σ1, s1, h1〉 τ1 . . . τn−1 〈ctrn,
σn, sn, hn〉 τn 〈ctrn+1, σn+1, sn+1, hn+1〉 be an execution. For all identifiers id ∈ N, if there is a index 0 ≤ j ≤ n such
that τj = commit id , then there exists an 0 ≤ i < j and w ∈ N such that 〈m, a〉 pc `−−→ 〈m, a[pc 7→ `]〉, 〈m, a〉 = σi,
〈`, w〉 = O(p, hi, σi(pc)), and τi = start ctr i · pc σi+1(pc).
Proof. Let p be a program, O be a prediction oracle, and 〈ctr0, σ0, s0, h0〉 τ0 〈ctr1, σ1, s1, h1〉 τ1 . . . τn−1 〈ctrn, σn,
sn, hn〉 τn 〈ctrn+1, σn+1, sn+1, hn+1〉 be an execution. Let id ∈ N be an arbitrary identifier such that τj = commit id
for some 0 ≤ j ≤ n. The j-th step in the run has been produced by applying the SE-COMMIT rule, which is the only
rule producing commit id observations, while committing the the speculative transaction 〈〈m, a〉, id , 0, `〉 in sj . Hence, 〈m,
a〉 pc `−−→ 〈m, a[pc 7→ `]〉 holds. Therefore, there is an 0 ≤ i < j when we executed the SE-BRANCH rule for the identifier
id . In particular, the rule created the speculative transaction 〈σi, ctr i, w, `′〉 where 〈`′, w〉 = O(p, hi, σi(pc)), the observations
are τi = start ctr i · pc `′, and the next program counter is `′. Since (1) we only modify the speculative windows inside
the speculative transactions states, and (2) there is always only one speculative transaction per identifier, it follows that
ctr i = id , σi = 〈m, a〉, and `′ = `. From this, 〈m, a〉 pc `−−→ 〈m, a[pc 7→ `]〉, 〈m, a〉 = σi, 〈`, w〉 = O(p, hi, σi(pc)), and
τi = start ctr i · pc σi+1(pc).
B. Completeness of the speculative semantics
Proposition 6 states that the speculative semantics models all behaviors of the non-speculative semantics (independently on
the prediction oracle).
Proposition 6. Let p be a program and O be a prediction oracle. Whenever σ τ−→∗ σ′, σ ∈ InitConf , and σ′ ∈ FinalConf ,
there are τ ′ ∈ ExtObs∗, ctr ∈ N, and h ∈ H such that 〈0, σ, ε, ε〉 τ ′
∗
〈ctr , σ′, ε, h〉 and τ = τ ′nse.
Proof. Let p be a program and O be a prediction oracle. Moreover, let r be an execution σ0 τ0−→ σ1 τ1−→ . . . σn τn−→ σn+1 such
that σ0 ∈ InitConf and σn+1 ∈ FinalConf .
We now define a procedure EXPAND(〈ctr , σ, s, h〉, σ τ−→ σ′) for constructing the execution under the speculative semantics
as follows:
• If p(σ(pc)) 6= beqz x, `′ and enabled(s), then we apply the SE-NOBRANCH rule once. This produces the step r′ := 〈ctr ,
σ, s, h〉 τ 〈ctr , σ′, decr(s), h′〉. We return r′.
• If p(σ(pc)) = beqz x, `′ and enabled(s), there are two cases:
– If O(p, h, σ(pc)) = 〈`, w〉 and ` = σ′(pc), then we correctly predict the outcome of the branch instruction. We produce
the execution r′ by applying the SE-BRANCH rule: r′ := 〈ctr , σ, s, h〉 start ctr ·pc ` 〈ctr + 1, σ′, decr(s) · 〈σ, ctr , w,
`〉, h · 〈σ(pc), ctr , `〉〉. Observe that this step starts a speculative transaction that will be committed (since ` = σ′(pc)).
We return r′.
– If O(p, h, σ(pc)) = 〈`, w〉 and ` 6= σ′(pc), then we mispredict the outcome of the branch instruction.We produce the
execution r′ by (1) applying SE-BRANCH once to start the transaction ctr , (2) we repeatedly apply the speculative
semantics rules until we roll back the transaction ctr . This is always possible since speculative transactions always
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terminate. Hence, r′ is 〈ctr , σ, s, h〉 start ctr ·pc ` 〈ctr + 1, σ[pc 7→ `], decr(s) · 〈σ, ctr , w, `〉, h · 〈σ(pc), ctr , `〉〉 τ ′
∗
〈ctr ′′, σ′′, s′′ · 〈σ, ctr , 0, `〉 · s′′′, h′〉 rollback ctr ·pc σ
′(pc) 〈ctr ′′, σ′, s′′, h′ · 〈σ(pc), ctr , σ′(pc)〉〉. We return r′.
• If ¬enabled(s), then there is a pending transaction (with identifier id ) that has to be committed. In this case, we simply
perform one step by applying the SE-COMMIT rule.
Finally, the execution r′ is constructed by concatenating the partial executions r0, . . . , rn, which are constructed as follows:
cfg0 := 〈ctr0, σ0, ε, ε〉
ri = EXPAND(cfg i, σi
τi−→ σi+1)
cfg i := last(ri−1) if i > 0
From the construction, it immediately follows that the initial extended configuration in r′ is 〈ctr0, σ0, ε, ε〉 and the final
configuration is 〈ctr , σ0, ε, h〉 (for some ctr ∈ N and h ∈ H) since (1) r is a terminating run, (2) we always execute all
transactions until completion, (3) speculative transactions always terminate given that speculative windows are decremented
during execution, (4) rolled-back speculative transactions do not affect the configuration σ. Similarly, it is easy to see that
τnse = τ0 · . . . · τn since (1) the observations associated with committed steps are equivalent to those in the non-speculative
semantics, (2) observations associated with rolled back transactions are removed by the projection (and we execute all
transactions until termination, and (3) other extended observations are removed by the non-speculative projection.
APPENDIX G: RELATING THE ALWAYS-MISPREDICT AND NON-SPECULATIVE SEMANTICS (PROPOSITION 3)
We start by spelling out the definition of {|p|}w. Given a program p and a speculative window w, we denote by {|p|}w the
set of all triples 〈σ, τ, σ′〉 ∈ InitConf × ExtObs∗ × FinalConf corresponding to executions 〈0, σ, ε〉 τ=⇒∗ 〈ctr , σ′, ε〉.
We are now ready to prove Proposition 3, which we restate here for simplicity:
Proposition 3. Let p be a program and w be a speculative window. Then, LpM = {|p|}wnse.
Proof. The proposition can be proved in a similar way to Proposition 1. Specifically, the proof of the direction (⇐) is a
simpler version of Proposition 5’s proof since there are only rolled-back transactions. The proof of the direction (⇒), instead,
is identical Proposition 6’s proof.
APPENDIX H: RELATING SPECULATIVE AND ALWAYS MISPREDICT SEMANTICS (THEOREM 1 AND PROPOSITION 4)
Below, we provide the proof of Theorem 1, which we restate here for simplicity:
Theorem 1. A program p satisfies SNI for a security policy P and all prediction oracles O with speculative window at most
w iff for all initial configurations σ, σ′ ∈ InitConf , if σ ∼P σ′ and LpM(σ) = LpM(σ′), then {|p|}w(σ) = {|p|}w(σ′).
Proof. Let p be a program, P be a policy, and w ∈ N be a speculative window. We prove the two directions separately.
(⇒): Assume that p satisfies SNI for P and all prediction oracles O with speculative window at most w. Then, for all
O with speculative window at most w, for all initial configurations σ, σ′ ∈ InitConf , if σ ∼P σ′ and LpM(σ) = LpM(σ′), thenJpKO(σ) = JpKO(σ′). From this and Proposition 4 (proved below), we have that for all initial configurations σ, σ′ ∈ InitConf ,
if σ ∼P σ′ and LpM(σ) = LpM(σ′), then {|p|}w(σ) = {|p|}w(σ′).
(⇐): Assume that p is such that for all initial configurations σ, σ′ ∈ InitConf , if σ ∼P σ′ and LpM(σ) = LpM(σ′), then
{|p|}w(σ) = {|p|}w(σ′). Let O be an arbitrary prediction oracle with speculative window at most w. From Proposition 4 (proved
below), we have that for all initial configurations σ, σ′ ∈ InitConf , if σ ∼P σ′ and LpM(σ) = LpM(σ′), then JpKO(σ) = JpKO(σ′).
Therefore, p satisfies SNI w.r.t. P and O. Since O is an arbitrary predictor with speculation window at most w, then p satisfies
SNI for P and all prediction oracles O with speculative window at most w.
The proof of Theorem 1 depends on Proposition 4, which we restate here for simplicity:
Proposition 4. Let p be a program, w ∈ N be a speculative window, and σ, σ′ ∈ InitConf be initial configurations.
{|p|}w(σ) = {|p|}w(σ′) iff JpKO(σ) = JpKO(σ′) for all prediction oracles O with speculative window at most w.
Proof. The proposition follows immediately from Propositions 7 (proved in Section H-B) and 8 (proved in Section H-C).
A. Auxiliary definitions
Before proving Propositions 7 and 8, we introduce some auxiliary definitions.
pc-similar configurations: Two configurations σ, σ′ ∈ Conf are pc-similar, written σ ∼pc σ′, iff σ(pc) = σ′(pc).
Next-step agreeing configurations: Two configurations σ, σ′ ∈ Conf are next-step agreeing, written σ ∼next σ′, iff there
are σ1, σ′1 ∈ Conf such that σ τ−→ σ1, σ′ τ−→ σ′1, and σ1 ∼pc σ′1.
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Similar extended configurations: Two speculative states 〈σ, id , w, `〉 and 〈σ′, id ′, w′, `′〉 in SpecS are similar, written 〈σ,
id , w, `〉 ∼= 〈σ′, id ′, w′, `′〉, iff id = id ′, w = w′, ` = `′, σ ∼pc σ′, and σ ∼next σ′.
Two sequences of speculative states s and s′ in SpecS∗ are similar, written s ∼= s′, iff all their speculative states are similar.
Formally, ε ∼= ε and s · 〈σ, id , w, `〉 ∼= s′ · 〈σ′, id ′, w′, `′〉 iff s ∼= s′ and 〈σ, id , w, `〉 ∼= 〈σ′, id ′, w′, `′〉.
Two extended configurations 〈ctr , σ, s〉, 〈ctr ′, σ′, s′〉 are similar, written 〈ctr , σ, s〉 ∼= 〈ctr ′, σ′, s′〉, iff ctr = ctr ′, σ ∼pc σ′,
and s ∼= s′. Similarly, 〈ctr , σ, s, h〉 ∼= 〈ctr ′, σ′, s′, h′〉 iff ctr = ctr ′, σ ∼pc σ′, s ∼= s′, and h = h′.
Commit-free projection: The commit-free projection of a sequence of speculative state s ∈ SpecS∗, written scom, is as
follows: εcom = ε, s · 〈σ, id , w, `〉com = scom · 〈σ, id , w, `〉 if σ τ−→ σ′ and σ′(pc) 6= `, and s · 〈σ, id , w, `〉com = scom if
σ
τ−→ σ′ and σ′(pc) = `.
Mirrored configurations: Two speculative states 〈σ, id , w, `〉 and 〈σ, id ′, w′, `′〉 in SpecS are mirrors if σ = σ′ and ` = `′.
Two sequences of speculative states s and s′ in SpecS∗ are mirrors, written s||s′, if |s| = |s′| and their speculative states are
pairwise mirrors. Finally, 〈ctr , σ, s〉||〈ctr ′, σ′, s′, h′〉 iff σ = σ′ and s||s′com.
Auxiliary functions for handling transactions’ lenghts: The wndw(·) : SpecS∗ → N ∪ {∞} function is defined as follows:
wndw(ε) = ∞ and wndw(s · 〈ctr , w, n, σ〉) = w. The minWndw(·) : SpecS∗ → N ∪ {∞} function is defined as follows:
minWndw(ε) =∞ and minWndw(s · 〈ctr , w, n, σ〉) = min(w,minWndw(s)).
Invariants: We denote by INV (s, s′), where s, s′ ∈ SpecS∗, the fact that |s| = |s′| and for all 1 ≤ i ≤ |s|, minWndw(s′i) ≤
wndw(si), where si denotes the prefix of s of length i. Additionally, INV (〈ctr , σ, s〉, 〈ctr ′, σ′, s′, h′〉), where 〈ctr , σ, s〉 is
an extended configuration for the always mispredict semantics whereas 〈ctr ′, σ′, s′, h′〉 is an extended configuration for the
speculative semantics, holds iff INV (s, s′com) does.
We denote by INV 2(s, s′), where s, s′ ∈ SpecS∗, the fact that |s| = |s′| and for all 1 ≤ i ≤ |s|, minWndw(s′i) = wndw(si),
where si denotes the prefix of s of length i. Moreover, INV 2(〈ctr , σ, s〉, 〈ctr ′, σ′, s′, h′〉), where 〈ctr , σ, s〉 is an extended
configuration for the always mispredict semantics whereas 〈ctr ′, σ′, s′, h′〉 is an extended configuration for the speculative
semantics, holds iff INV 2(s, s′com) does.
Notation for runs and traces: For simplicity, we restate here the definitions of {|p|}w(σ) and JpKO(σ). Let p be a program,
w ∈ N be a speculative window, O be a prediction oracle, and σ ∈ InitConf be an initial configuration. Then, {|p|}w(σ)
denotes the trace τ ∈ ExtObs∗ such that there is a final configuration σ′ ∈ FinalConf such that 〈σ, τ, σ′〉 ∈ {|p|}w, whereasJpKw(σ) denotes the trace τ ∈ ExtObs∗ such that there is a final configuration σ′ ∈ FinalConf such that 〈σ, τ, σ′〉 ∈ JpKO. If
there is no such τ , then we write {|p|}w(σ) = ⊥ (respectively JpKw(σ) = ⊥).
B. Soundness
In Proposition 7 , we prove the soundness of the always mispredict semantics w.r.t. the speculative semantics.
Proposition 7. Let p be a program, w ∈ N be a speculative window, and σ, σ′ ∈ InitConf be two initial configurations. If
{|p|}w(σ) = {|p|}w(σ′), then JpKO(σ) = JpKO(σ′) for all prediction oracle O with speculation window at most w.
Proof. Let w ∈ N be a speculative window and σ, σ′ ∈ InitConf be two initial configurations such that {|p|}w(σ) = {|p|}w(σ′).
Moreover, let O be an arbitrary prediction oracle with speculative window at most w. If {|p|}w(σ) = ⊥, then the computation
does not terminate in σ and σ′. Since speculation does not introduce non-termination, the computation does not terminate
according to  as well. Hence, JpKO(σ) = JpKO(σ′) = ⊥. If {|p|}w(σ) 6= ⊥, then we can obtain the runs for  by repeatedly
applying Lemma 6 (proved below) to the runs corresponding to {|p|}w(σ) and {|p|}w(σ′). Observe that we can apply the
Lemma 6 because (I) {|p|}w(σ) = {|p|}w(σ′), (II) {|p|}w(σ) 6= ⊥, (III) the initial configurations 〈0, σ, ε〉, 〈0, σ′, ε〉, 〈0, σ, ε, ε〉,
〈0, σ′, ε, ε〉 trivially satisfy conditions (1)–(4), and (IV) the application of Lemma 6 preserves (1)–(4). From the point (g) in
Lemma 6, we immediately have that the runs have the same traces. Hence, JpKO(σ) = JpKO(σ′).
We now prove Lemma 6.
Lemma 6. Let p be a program, w ∈ N be a speculative window, O be a prediction oracle with speculative window at most
w, am0, am′0 be two extended speculative configurations for the always mispredict semantics, and sp0, sp
′
0 be two extended
speculative configurations for the speculative semantics.
If the following conditions hold:
1) am0 ∼= am′0,
2) sp0 ∼= sp′0,
3) am0||sp0 ∧ am′0||sp′0,
4) INV (am0, sp0) ∧ INV (am′0, sp′0),
5) {|p|}w(am0) 6= ⊥,
6) {|p|}w(am0) = {|p|}w(am′0),
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then there are configurations am1, am′1 (for the always mispredict semantics), sp1, sp
′
1 (for the speculative semantics), and
n ∈ N such that:
(a) am0
τ0=⇒n am1 ∧ am′0 τ0=⇒
n
am′1,
(b) sp0
τ sp1 ∧ sp′0 τ
′
sp′1,
(c) am1 ∼= am′1,
(d) sp1 ∼= sp′1,
(e) am1||sp1 ∧ am′1||sp′1,
(f) INV (am1, sp1) ∧ INV (am′1, sp′1), and
(g) τ = τ ′.
Proof. Let p be a program, w ∈ N be a speculative window, O be a prediction oracle with speculative window at most w,
am0, am
′
0 be two extended speculative configurations for the “always mispredict” semantics, and sp0, sp
′
0 be two extended
speculative configurations for the speculative semantics.
In the following, we use a dot notation to refer to the components of the extended configurations. For instance, we write
am0.σ to denote the configuration σ in am0. We also implicitly lift functions like minWndw(·) and wndw(·) to extended
configurations.
Assume that (1)–(6) hold. Observe that, from (2), it follows minWndw(sp0) = minWndw(sp′0). We proceed by case
distinction on minWndw(sp0):
minWndw(sp0) > 0: From minWndw(sp0) > 0, (1), (2), and (4), we also get that wndw(am0) > 0 and wndw(am′0) > 0
(this follows from sp0.s = sp0.s|sp0.s| and (4)). From minWndw(sp0) > 0 and (2), it follows that enabled(sp0) and
enabled(sp′0) hold. Additionally, from wndw(am0) > 0 and (1), we also get enabled
′(am0) and enabled ′(am1). That is,
we can apply only the rules SE-NOBRANCH and SE-BRANCH according to both semantics. Observe that sp0.σ(pc) =
sp′0.σ(pc) (from (2)) and am0.σ(pc) = am
′
0.σ(pc) (from (1)). Moreover, am0.σ(pc) = sp0.σ(pc) and am
′
0.σ(pc) =
sp′0.σ(pc) (from (3)). Hence, the program counters in the four states point to the same instructions. There are two cases:
p(sp0.σ(pc)) is a branch instruction beqz x, n: Observe that O(sp0.σ, p, sp0.h) = O(sp′0.σ, p, sp′0.h) since
am0.σ(pc) = sp0.σ(pc), sp0.h = sp′0.h (from (2)), and O is a prediction oracle. Let 〈m,w′〉 be the corresponding
prediction.
There are two cases:
〈`′, w′〉 is a correct prediction w.r.t. sp0: We first show that 〈`′, w′〉 is a correct prediction w.r.t. sp′0 as well. From
(6), we know that the trace produced starting from am0 and am′0 are the same. From this, am0.σ(pc) = sp0.σ(pc),
and p(sp0.σ(pc)) is a branch instruction, we have that the always mispredict semantics modifies the program counter
pc in the same way in am0 and am′0 when applying the SE-BRANCH in =⇒. Hence, am0.σ(x) = am′0.σ(x).
From this and (3), we also have sp0.σ(x) = sp′0.σ(x). Thus, 〈`′, w′〉 is a correct prediction w.r.t. sp′0 as well.
According to the always mispredict semantics, there are k, k′ such that:
r := am0
start am0.ctr ·pc `0
=============⇒ am2 ν=⇒
k
am3
rollback am0.ctr ·pc `1
===============⇒ am1
r′ := am′0
start am′0.ctr ·pc `′0=============⇒ am′2 ν
′
=⇒
k′
am′3
rollback am′0.ctr ·pc `′1===============⇒ am′1
From (1) and (6), we immediately have that am0.ctr = am′0.ctr , `0 = `
′
0, k = k
′, ν = ν′, and `1 = `′1. Moreover,
since 〈`′, w′〉 is a correct prediction we also have that `1 = `′ and `′1 = `′. Hence, we pick n to be k + 2.
Additionally, by applying the rule SE-BRANCH once in  we also get sp0 τ sp1 and sp′0 τ
′
sp′1.
We have already shown that (a) and (b) hold. We now show that (c)–(g) hold as well.
(c): To show that am1 ∼= am′1, we need to show am1.ctr = am′1.ctr , am1.σ ∼pc am′1.σ, and am1.s ∼= am′1.s.
First, am1.ctr = am′1.ctr immediately follows from ν = ν
′ and (1) (that is, am0.ctr = am′0.ctr and during
the mispredicted branch we created the same transactions in both runs). Second, am1.σ ∼pc am′1.σ follows
from `1 = `′1 (since am1.σ = am0.σ[pc 7→ `1] and am′1.σ = am′0.σ[pc 7→ `′1]). Finally, am1.s ∼= am′1.s
immediately follows from am1.s = am0.s, am′1.s = am0.s, and (1).
(d): To show that sp1 ∼= sp′1, we need to show sp1.ctr = sp′1.ctr , sp1.σ ∼pc sp′1.σ, sp1.s ∼= sp′1.s, and sp1.h =
sp′1.h. First, sp1.ctr = sp
′
1.ctr immediately follows from sp1.ctr = sp0.ctr + 1, sp
′
1.ctr = sp
′
0.ctr + 1, and
(2). Second, sp1.σ ∼pc sp′1.σ follows from (2) and O(sp0.σ, p, sp0.h) = O(sp′0.σ, p, sp′0.h) (so the program
counter is updated in the same way in both configurations). Third, sp1.s ∼= sp′1.s follows from (2), sp1.s
being decr(sp0.s) · 〈sp0.σ, sp0.ctr , w′, `′〉, sp′1.s being decr(sp′0.s) · 〈sp′0.σ, sp′0.ctr , w′, `′〉, sp0.ctr = sp′0.ctr
(from (2)), sp0.σ ∼pc sp′0.σ (from (2)), and sp0.σ ∼next sp′0.σ (we proved above that sp0.σ(x) = sp′0.σ(x);
from this, it follows that the outcome of the branch instruction w.r.t. the non-speculative semantics is the
same). Finally, sp1.h = sp′1.h immediately follows from (2), sp1.h = sp0.h · 〈sp0.σ(pc), sp0.ctr , `′〉, sp′1.,
h = sp′0.h · 〈sp′0.σ(pc), sp′0.ctr , `′〉, sp0.ctr = sp′0.ctr (from (2)), and sp0.σ(pc) = sp′0.σ(pc) (from (2)).
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(e): We show only am1||sp1 (the proof for am′1||sp′1 is similar). To show am1||sp1, we need to show am1.σ = sp1.σ
and am1.s||sp1.scom. From the SE-BRANCH rule in  , we have that sp1.σ = sp0.σ[pc 7→ `′]. The last
step in r is obtained by applying the rule SE-ROLLBACK in =⇒. From this rule, am1.σ is the configuration
obtained by executing one step of the non-speculative semantics starting from am0.σ. From (3), we have that
am0.σ = sp0.σ. Moreover, since 〈`′, w′〉 is a correct prediction for sp0, we have that am1.σ = am0.σ[pc 7→ `′].
Hence, am1.σ = sp1.σ.
We now show that am1.s||sp1.scom. From the SE-BRANCH rule in  , we have that sp1.s = decr(sp0.s) ·
〈sp0.σ, sp0.ctr , w′, `′〉. Since 〈`′, w′〉 is a correct prediction for sp0, however, sp1.scom = decr(sp0.s)com =
decr(sp0.scom). Moreover, from r, it follows that am1.s = am0.s. Hence, am1.s||sp1.scom follows from
(3), am1.s = am0.s, and sp1.scom = decr(sp0.s)com.
(f): Here we prove that INV (am1, sp1) holds. INV (am′1, sp′1) can be proved in a similar way. To show INV (am1,
sp1), we need to show that |am1.s| = |sp1.scom| and for all i ≤ i ≤ |am1.s|, minWndw(sp1.scomi) ≤
wndw(am1.s
i).
We first prove |am1.s| = |sp1.scom|. From (4), we have |am0.s| = |sp0.scom|. From the run r, we have that
am1.s = am0.s and, therefore, |am1.s| = |am0.s|. From the SE-BRANCH rule in  , we have that sp1.s =
decr(sp0.s) · 〈sp0.σ, sp0.ctr , w′, `′〉. Since 〈`′, w′〉 is a correct prediction for sp0, we have that sp1.scom =
decr(sp0.s)com. Hence, |sp1.scom| = |sp0.scom|. From |am0.s| = |sp0.scom|, |sp1.scom| = |sp0.scom|,
and |am1.s| = |am0.s|, we therefore have that |am1.s| = |sp1.scom|.
We now show that for all 1 ≤ i ≤ |am1.s|, minWndw(sp1.scomi) ≤ wndw(am1.si). Observe that
am1.s = am0.s and sp1.s = decr(sp0.s) · 〈sp0.σ, sp0.ctr , w′, `′〉. Since 〈`′, w′〉 is a correct prediction for
sp0, we have that sp1.scom = decr(sp0.s)com. Let i be an arbitrary value such that 1 ≤ i ≤ |am1.s|.
Then, wndw(am1.si) = wndw(am0.si) and minWndw(sp1.scomi) = minWndw(decr(sp0.s)comi).
From (4), we have that minWndw(sp0.scomi) ≤ wndw(am0.si). From this and wndw(am1.si) =
wndw(am0.s
i), we get minWndw(sp0.scomi) ≤ wndw(am1.si). From the definition of decr(·), we also
have minWndw(decr(sp0.s)comi) ≤ minWndw(sp0.scomi). From this and minWndw(sp0.scomi) ≤
wndw(am1.s
i), we have minWndw(decr(sp0.s)comi) ≤ wndw(am1.si). Hence, minWndw(sp1.scomi) ≤
wndw(am1.s
i) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ |am1.s| (since we have proved it for an arbitrary i).
(g): The observations are τ = start sp0.ctr · pc `′ and τ = start sp′0.ctr · pc `′. From this, O(sp0.σ, p,
sp0.h) = O(sp′0.σ, p, sp′0.h), and sp0.ctr = sp′0.ctr (from (2)), we get τ = τ ′.
This completes the proof of this case.
〈`′, w′〉 is a misprediction w.r.t. sp0: We first show that 〈`′, w′〉 is a misprediction w.r.t. sp′0 as well. From (6), we
know that the trace produced starting from am0 and am′0 are the same. From this, am0.σ(pc) = sp0.σ(pc), and
p(sp0.σ(pc)) is a branch instruction, we have that the always mispredict semantics modifies the program counter
pc in the same way in am0 and am′0 when applying the SE-BRANCH in =⇒. Hence, am0.σ(x) = am′0.σ(x).
From this and (3), we also have sp0.σ(x) = sp′0.σ(x). Thus, 〈`′, w′〉 is a misprediction w.r.t. sp′0 as well.
Let n = 1. We obtain am0
τ0=⇒n am1 and am′0
τ ′0=⇒
n
am′1 by applying once the rule SE-BRANCH in =⇒. From
(5) and (6), we have that τ0 = τ ′0. Moreover, by applying the rule SE-BRANCH once in  we also get sp0 τ sp1
and sp′0
τ ′ sp′1.
We have already shown that (a) and (b) hold. We now show that (c)–(g) hold as well.
(c): To show that am1 ∼= am′1, we need to show am1.ctr = am′1.ctr , am1.σ ∼pc am′1.σ, and am1.s ∼= am′1.s.
First, am1.ctr = am′1.ctr immediately follows from am0.ctr + 1 = am1.ctr , am
′
0.ctr + 1 = am
′
1.ctr , and
(1). Second, am1.σ ∼pc am′1.σ follows from τ0 = τ ′0 (i.e., the program counter is modified in the same
ways in both runs). Finally, to show that am1.s ∼= am′1.s, we need to show that am0.ctr = am′0.ctr , min(w,
wndw(am0.s)−1) = min(w,wndw(am′0.s)−1), n0 = n′0, am0.σ ∼pc am′0.σ, and am0.σ ∼next am′0.σ (since
am1.s = am0.s · 〈am0.σ, am0.ctr ,min(w,wndw(am0.s) − 1), n0〉 and am′1.s = am′0.s · 〈am′0.σ, am′0.ctr ,
min(w,wndw(am′0.s)−1), n′0〉). Observe that am0.ctr = am′0.ctr follows from (1), min(w,wndw(am0.s)−
1) = min(w,wndw(am′0.s) − 1) also follow from (1), n0 = n′0 follows from τ0 = τ ′0 (which indicates that
pc is modified in a similar way), am0.σ ∼pc am′0.σ follows from (1), and am0.σ ∼next am′0.σ follows from
τ0 = τ
′
0 (i.e., since we mispredict in the same direct, then the outcome of the branch instruction must be the
same according to the non-speculative semantics).
(d): To show that sp1 ∼= sp′1, we need to show sp1.ctr = sp′1.ctr , sp1.σ ∼pc sp′1.σ, sp1.s ∼= sp′1.s, and sp1.h =
sp′1.h. First, sp1.ctr = sp
′
1.ctr immediately follows from sp1.ctr = sp0.ctr + 1, sp
′
1.ctr = sp
′
0.ctr + 1, and
(2). Second, sp1.σ ∼pc sp′1.σ follows from (2) and O(sp0.σ, p, sp0.h) = O(sp′0.σ, p, sp′0.h) (so the program
counter is updated in the same way in both configurations). Third, sp1.s ∼= sp′1.s follows from (2), sp1.s
being decr(sp0.s) · 〈sp0.σ, sp0.ctr , w′, `′〉, sp′1.s being decr(sp′0.s) · 〈sp′0.σ, sp′0.ctr , w′, `′〉, sp0.ctr = sp′0.ctr
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(from (2)), sp0.σ ∼pc sp′0.σ (from (2)), and sp0.σ ∼next sp′0.σ (we proved above that sp0.σ(x) = sp′0.σ(x);
from this, it follows that the outcome of the branch instruction w.r.t. the non-speculative semantics is the
same). Finally, sp1.h = sp′1.h immediately follows from (2), sp1.h = sp0.h · 〈sp0.σ(pc), sp0.ctr , `′〉, sp′1.,
h = sp′0.h · 〈sp′0.σ(pc), sp′0.ctr , `′〉, sp0.ctr = sp′0.ctr (from (2)), and sp0.σ(pc) = sp′0.σ(pc) (from (2)).
(e): To show am1||sp1 ∧ am′1||sp′1, we need to show am1.σ = sp1.σ, am′1.σ = sp′1.σ, am1.s||sp1.scom, and
am′1.s||sp′1.scom. In the following, we show only am1.σ = sp1.σ and am1.s||sp1.scom (am′1.σ = sp′1.σ and
sp′1.scom can be derived in the same way). The SE-BRANCH rule in both semantics only modify the program
counter. From this and (3), for showing am1.σ = sp1.σ, it is enough to show am1.σ(pc) = sp1.σ(pc). From
the SE-BRANCH rule in the speculative semantics  , we have that sp1.σ(pc) = `′. There are two cases:
sp0.σ(x) = 0: From this and 〈`′, w′〉 being a misprediction for sp0, it follows that `′ = sp0.σ(pc) + 1.
Moreover, from sp0.σ(x) = 0 and (3), we also have that am0.σ(x) = 0. From this and the SE-BRANCH
rule in =⇒, we have am1.σ(pc) = am0.σ(pc) + 1. Therefore, am1.σ(pc) = sp0.σ(pc) + 1 (because
am0.σ(pc) = sp0.σ(pc) follows from (3)). Hence, am1.σ(pc) = sp1.σ(pc). Thus, am1.σ = sp1.σ.
sp0.σ(x) 6= 0: From this and 〈`′, w′〉 being a misprediction for sp0, it follows that `′ = `. Moreover, from
sp0.σ(x) 6= 0 and (3), we also have that am0.σ(x) 6= 0. From this and the SE-BRANCH rule in =⇒, we
have am1.σ(pc) = `. Hence, am1.σ(pc) = sp1.σ(pc). Thus, am1.σ = sp1.σ.
We still have to show that am1.s||sp1.scom. From the SE-BRANCH rule in =⇒, we have that am1.s =
am0.s · 〈am0.σ, am0.ctr ,min(w,wndw(am0.s)− 1), `′〉 (note that the prediction is `′ as we showed above).
In contrast, from the SE-BRANCH rule in  , we have that sp1.s = decr(sp0.s) · 〈sp0.σ, sp0.ctr , w′, `′〉. Since
〈`′, w′〉 is a misprediction for sp0, we have that sp1.scom = decr(sp0.s)com · 〈sp0.σ, sp0.ctr , w′, `′〉. Observe
that am0.s||decr(sp0.s)com immediately follows from (3). Hence, we just have to show that 〈am0.σ, am0.ctr ,
min(w,wndw(am0.s) − 1), `′〉||〈sp0.σ, sp0.ctr , w′, `′〉. Since the prediction is the same in both speculative
states, this requires only to show that am0.σ = sp0.σ, which follows from (3).
(f): Here we prove that INV (am1, sp1) holds. INV (am′1, sp′1) can be proved in a similar way. To show INV (am1,
sp1), we need to show that |am1.s| = |sp1.scom| and for all i ≤ i ≤ |am1.s|, minWndw(sp1.scomi) ≤
wndw(am1.s
i).
We first prove |am1.s| = |sp1.scom|. From (4), we have |am0.s| = |sp0.scom|. From the SE-BRANCH rule in
=⇒, we have that am1.s = am0.s · 〈am0.σ, am0.ctr ,min(w,wndw(am0.s)− 1), `′〉 (note that the prediction
is `′ as we showed above). Hence, |am1.s| = |am0.s| + 1. From the SE-BRANCH rule in  , we have that
sp1.s = decr(sp0.s)·〈sp0.σ, sp0.ctr , w′, `′〉. Since 〈`′, w′〉 is a misprediction for sp0, we have that sp1.scom =
decr(sp0.s)com · 〈sp0.σ, sp0.ctr , w′, `′〉. Hence, |sp1.scom| = |sp0.scom|+ 1. From |am0.s| = |sp0.scom|,
|am1.s| = |am0.s|+ 1, and |sp1.scom| = |sp0.scom|+ 1, we therefore have |am1.s| = |sp1.scom|.
We now show that for all i ≤ i ≤ |am1.s|, minWndw(sp1.scomi) ≤ wndw(am1.si). Observe that am1.s =
am0.s·〈am0.σ, am0.ctr ,min(w,wndw(am0.s)−1), `′〉 and sp1.s = decr(sp0.s)·〈sp0.σ, sp0.ctr , w′, `′〉. Since
〈`′, w′〉 is a misprediction for sp0, we have that sp1.scom = decr(sp0.s)com · 〈sp0.σ, sp0.ctr , w′, `′〉. There
are two cases:
i = |am1.s|: From the SE-BRANCH rule in =⇒, we have that wndw(am1.si) = min(w,wndw(am0.s)−1).
From the SE-BRANCH rule in , we also have that minWndw(sp1.scomi) = min(minWndw(sp0.scomi)−
1, w′). Moreover, we have that (1) w′ ≤ w (since O has speculative window at most w), and (2)
minWndw(sp0.scomi) − 1 ≤ wndw(am0.s) − 1 (since we have minWndw(sp0.scomi) ≤ wndw(am0.s)
from (4) because am0.s = am0.si). As a result, we immediately have that min(minWndw(sp0.scomi)−1,
w′) ≤ min(w,wndw(am0.s)− 1). Hence, minWndw(sp1.scomi) ≤ wndw(am1.si).
i < |am1.s|: We have wndw(am1.si) = wndw(am0.si) (because am1.si = am0.si) and
minWndw(sp1.scomi) = minWndw(sp0.scomi) − 1 (because sp1.scomi = decr(sp0.scomi)). From
(4), we also have that minWndw(sp0.scomi) ≤ wndw(am0.si). Therefore, minWndw(sp0.scomi) −
1 ≤ wndw(am0.si). From this, wndw(am1.si) = wndw(am0.si), and minWndw(sp1.scomi) =
minWndw(sp0.scomi)− 1, we have minWndw(sp1.scomi) ≤ wndw(am1.si).
(g): The observations are τ = start sp0.ctr · pc `′ and τ = start sp′0.ctr · pc `′. From this, O(sp0.σ, p,
sp0.h) = O(sp′0.σ, p, sp′0.h), and sp0.ctr = sp′0.ctr (from (2)), we get τ = τ ′.
This completes the proof of this case.
This completes the proof of this case.
p(sp0.σ(pc)) is not a branch instruction: Let n = 1. We obtain am0
τ0=⇒n am1 and am′0
τ ′0=⇒
n
am′1 by applying
once the rule SE-NOBRANCH in =⇒. From (5) and (6), we have that τ0 = τ ′0. Moreover, by applying the rule
SE-NOBRANCH once in  we also get sp0 τ sp1 and sp′0 τ
′
sp′1.
We have already shown that (a) and (b) hold. We now show that (c)–(g) hold as well.
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(c): To show that am1 ∼= am′1, we need to show am1.ctr = am′1.ctr , am1.σ ∼pc am′1.σ, and am1.s ∼= am′1.s.
First, am1.ctr = am′1.ctr immediately follows from am0.ctr = am1.ctr , am
′
0.ctr = am
′
1.ctr , and (1). Second,
am1.σ ∼pc am′1.σ follows from (1) and the fact that −→ modifies the program counters in am0.σ and am′0.σ in
the same way (if the current instruction is not a jump, both program counters are incremented by 1 and if the
instruction is a jump, the target is the same since τ0 = τ ′0). Finally, am1.s ∼= am′1.s follows from (1), am1.s
being either decr ′(am0.s) or zeroes ′(am0.s) (depending on am0.pc), and am′1.s being either decr
′(am′0.s) or
zeroes ′(am′0.s) (depending on am
′
0.pc).
(d): To show that sp1 ∼= sp′1, we need to show sp1.ctr = sp′1.ctr , sp1.σ ∼pc sp′1.σ, sp1.s ∼= sp′1.s, and sp1.h =
sp′1.h. First, sp1.ctr = sp
′
1.ctr immediately follows from sp0.ctr = sp1.ctr , sp
′
0.ctr = sp
′
1.ctr , and (2). Second,
sp1.σ ∼pc sp′1.σ follows from (2) and the fact that −→ modifies the program counters in sp0.σ and sp′0.σ in the
same way (if the current instruction is not a jump, both program counters are incremented by 1 and if the instruction
is a jump, the target is the same since τ = τ ′, which we prove in (g) below). Third, sp1.s ∼= sp′1.s follows from
(2), sp1.s being either decr(sp0.s) or zeroes(sp0.s) (depending on sp0.pc), and sp′1.s being either decr(sp
′
0.s) or
zeroes(sp′0.s) (depending on sp
′
0.pc). Finally, sp1.h = sp
′
1.h immediately follows from (2), sp1.h = sp0.h, and
sp′1.h = sp
′
0.h.
(e): To show am1||sp1 ∧ am′1||sp′1, we need to show am1.σ = sp1.σ, am′1.σ = sp′1.σ, am1.s||sp1.scom, and
am′1.s||sp′1.scom. From the SE-NOBRANCH, we have that am0.σ τ0−→ am1.σ, am′0.σ
τ ′0−→ am′1.σ, sp0.σ τ−→ sp1.σ,
sp′0.σ
τ ′−→ sp′1.σ. From this and (3), we have that am1.σ = sp1.σ and am′1.σ = sp′1.σ (since am0.σ = sp0.σ,
am′0.σ = sp
′
0.σ). Moreover, am1.s||sp1.scom, and am′1.s||sp′1.scom immediately follow from (3), sp1.s being
either decr(sp0.s) or zeroes(sp0.s) (depending on sp0.pc), and sp′1.s being either decr(sp
′
0.s) or zeroes(sp
′
0.s)
(depending on sp′0.pc), which only modify the speculation windows.
(f): For simplicity, we show only INV (am1, sp1), the proof for INV (am′1, sp′1) is analogous. To show INV (am1,
sp1), we need to show that |am1.s| = |sp1.scom| (which immediately follows from INV (am0, sp0) and the
fact that we do not add or remove speculative states) and for all i ≤ i ≤ |am1.s|, minWndw(sp1.scomi) ≤
wndw(am1.s
i). There are two cases:
i = |am1.s|: If the instruction is not spbarr, then wndw(am1.si) = wndw(am0.si) − 1 and
minWndw(sp1.scomi) = minWndw(sp0.scomi)− 1. From (4), we also have that minWndw(sp0.scomi) ≤
wndw(am0.s
i). Hence, minWndw(sp1.scomi) ≤ wndw(am1.si).
If the executed instruction is spbarr, then wndw(am1.si) = 0 and minWndw(sp1.scomi) = 0. Therefore,
minWndw(sp1.scomi) ≤ wndw(am1.si).
i < |am1.s|: If the executed instruction is not spbarr, then wndw(am1.si) = wndw(am0.si) (because
am1.s
i = am0.s
i) and minWndw(sp1.scomi) = minWndw(sp0.scomi) − 1. From (4), we also have that
minWndw(sp0.scomi) ≤ wndw(am0.si). Therefore, minWndw(sp0.scomi) − 1 ≤ wndw(am0.si). From
this, wndw(am1.si) = wndw(am0.si), and minWndw(sp1.scomi) = minWndw(sp0.scomi) − 1, we have
minWndw(sp1.scomi) ≤ wndw(am1.si).
If the executed instruction is spbarr, then wndw(am1.si) = wndw(am0.si) (because am1.si = am0.si) and
minWndw(sp1.scomi) = 0. From this, we immediately have minWndw(sp1.scomi) ≤ wndw(am1.si).
(g): From (3), we have that am0.σ = sp0.σ and am′0.σ = sp′0.σ. From the SE-NOBRANCH, we have that am0.σ
τ0−→
am1.σ, am′0.σ
τ ′0−→ am′1.σ, sp0.σ τ−→ sp1.σ, sp′0.σ τ
′
−→ sp′1.σ. That is, τ0 = τ and τ ′0 = τ ′. From this and τ0 = τ ′0,
we get τ = τ ′.
This completes the proof of this case.
This completes the proof of this case.
minWndw(sp0) = 0: Let i, i′ be the largest values such that minWndw(sp0.si) > 0 and minWndw(sp′0.s
i′
) > 0. We
now show that i = i′. From (2), we have that sp0.s ∼= sp′0.s which means that the speculative states in sp0.s and sp′0.s
are pairwise similar. As a result, the remaining speculative windows are pairwise the same. Hence, minWndw(sp0.si) =
minWndw(sp′0.s
i′
) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ |sp0.s|. Observe also that each pair of speculative states in sp0.s and sp′0.s results
either in two commits or two rollbacks (again from (2)).
There are two cases:
We can apply the SE-COMMIT rule in sp0: Hence, sp0.s = s0 · 〈σ0, id0, 0, `0〉 · s1, σ0 ρ−→ σ1, enabled(s1), and
σ1(pc) = `0. From (2), we have that sp′0.s = s
′
0 · 〈σ′0, id ′0, 0, `′0〉 · s′1, enabled(s′1), σ′0 ρ
′
−→ σ′1, `0 = `′0,
id0 = id
′
0, and σ
′
1(pc) = `
′
0. As a result, we can apply the SE-COMMIT rule also to sp
′
0. Therefore, we have
sp0
rollback id0·pc σ1(pc)
sp1 and sp′0
rollback id′0·pc σ′1(pc) sp′1.
Let n = 0. Therefore, we have am0 =⇒0 am1, am′0 =⇒0 am′1, am0 = am1, and am′0 = am′1.
We have already shown that (a) and (b) hold. We now show that (c)-(g) hold as well.
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(c): am1 ∼= am′1 immediately follows from (1), am0 = am1, and am′0 = am′1.
(d): To show that sp1 ∼= sp′1, we need to show sp1.ctr = sp′1.ctr , sp1.σ ∼pc sp′1.σ, sp1.s ∼= sp′1.s, and sp1.h =
sp′1.h. First, sp1.ctr = sp
′
1.ctr immediately follows from sp0.ctr = sp1.ctr , sp
′
0.ctr = sp
′
1.ctr , and (2). Second,
sp1.σ ∼pc sp′1.σ follows from (2), sp1.σ = sp0.σ, and sp′1.σ = sp′0.σ. Third, sp1.s ∼= sp′1.s follows from (2),
sp1 = s0 · s1, and sp′1 = s′0 · s′1. Finally, sp1.h = sp′1.h immediately follows from (2), sp1.h = sp0.h · 〈σ0(pc),
id0, σ1(pc)〉, and sp′1.h = sp′0.h · 〈σ′0(pc), id ′0, σ′1(pc)〉, id0 = id ′0 (from (2)), σ0(pc) = σ′0(pc) (since all
configurations in the speculative states are pairwise pc-agreeing), and σ1(pc) = σ′1(pc) (since all configurations
in the speculative states are pairwise next-step agreeing).
(e): Here we prove only am1||sp1 (am′1||sp′1 can be proved in the same way). To show am1||sp1, we need to show
am1.σ = sp1.σ and am1.s||sp1.scom. From the SE-COMMIT rule in  , we have that sp1.σ = sp0.σ1. Moreover,
am1 = am0 and, therefore, am1.σ = am0.σ. From (3), sp1.σ = sp0.σ1, and am1.σ = am0.σ, we have am1.σ =
sp1.σ. Observe also that am1.s||sp1.scom follows from am1.s = am0.s (since am1 = am0) and sp1.scom =
sp0.scom (since the removed speculative state is one leading to a commit).
(f): For simplicity, we show only INV (am1, sp1), the proof for INV (am′1, sp′1) is analogous. To show INV (am1,
sp1), we need to show that |am1.s| = |sp1.scom| and for all i ≤ i ≤ |am1.s|, minWndw(sp1.scomi) ≤
wndw(am1.s
i). Observe that am1.s = am0.s (because am1 = am0) and sp1.scom = sp0.scom (because we
remove a committed speculative state). As a result, both |am1.s| = |sp1.scom| and minWndw(sp1.scomi) ≤
wndw(am1.s
i) for all i ≤ i ≤ |am1.s| immediately follow from (4).
(g): The observations τ0 and τ ′0 are respectively commit id0 and commit id
′
0. From (2), we have that sp0.s ∼= sp′0.s
which implies id0 = id ′0. Hence, τ0 = τ
′
0.
This completes the proof of this case.
We can apply the SE-ROLLBACK rule in sp0: Hence, sp0.s = s0 · 〈σ0, id0, 0, `0〉 · s1, σ0 ρ−→ σ1, enabled(s1), and
σ1(pc) 6= `0. From (2), we have that sp′0.s = s′0 · 〈σ′0, id ′0, 0, `′0〉 · s′1, enabled(s′1), σ′0 ρ
′
−→ σ′1, `0 = `′0,
id0 = id
′
0, and σ
′
1(pc) 6= `′0. As a result, we can apply the SE-ROLLBACK rule also to sp′0. Therefore, we have
sp0
rollback id0·pc σ1(pc)
sp1 and sp′0
rollback id′0·pc σ′1(pc) sp′1.
In the following, we denote by idx the index of sp0.s’s i+1-th speculative state (i.e., the one that we are rolling back)
inside its commit-free projection sp0.scom, i.e., the i+ 1-th speculative state in sp0 is the idx-th state in sp0.scom.
Observe that idx is also the index of sp′0.s’s i+ 1-th speculative state, which we are rolling back, inside sp
′
0.scom.
Let id be the transaction identifier in the idx-th speculative state in am0.s. From (1), it follows that id is also the
identifier in the idx-th speculative state in am′0.s. According to the always mispredict semantics, there are k, k
′ such that:
r := am0
ν
=⇒k am2 rollback id·pc `1===========⇒ am1
r′ := am′0
ν′
=⇒
k′
am′2
rollback id·pc `′1===========⇒ am′1
From (1) and (6), we immediately have that k = k′, ν = ν′, and `1 = `′1. Hence, we pick n to be k + 1.
We have already shown that (a) and (b) hold. We now show that (c)-(g) hold as well.
(c): To show that am1 ∼= am′1, we need to show am1.ctr = am′1.ctr , am1.σ ∼pc am′1.σ, and am1.s ∼= am′1.s.
First, am1.ctr = am′1.ctr follows from (1) and ν = ν
′. Second, am1.σ ∼pc am′1.σ follows from (1) (since the
configurations in the speculative states in am0.s and am′0.s are pairwise next-step agreeing and no intermediate
steps in r, r′ has modified the state that we are rolling back in the last step). Finally, am1.s ∼= am′1.s follows from
(1), am1.s = am0.sidx−1, and am′1.s = am
′
0.s
idx−1.
(d): To show that sp1 ∼= sp′1, we need to show sp1.ctr = sp′1.ctr , sp1.σ ∼pc sp′1.σ, sp1.s ∼= sp′1.s, and
sp1.h = sp
′
1.h. First, sp1.ctr = sp
′
1.ctr immediately follows from sp0.ctr = sp1.ctr , sp
′
0.ctr = sp
′
1.ctr , and (2).
Second, sp1.σ ∼pc sp′1.σ follows from (2) (since the configurations in the speculative states are pairwise next-step
agreeing). Third, sp1.s ∼= sp′1.s follows from (2), sp1.s = sp0.si, and sp′1.s = sp′0.si. Finally, sp1.h = sp′1.h
immediately follows from (2), sp1.h = sp0.h · 〈σ0(pc), id0, σ1(pc)〉, and sp′1.h = sp′0.h · 〈σ′0(pc), id ′0, σ′1(pc)〉,
id0 = id
′
0 (from (2)), σ0(pc) = σ
′
0(pc) (since all configurations in the speculative states are pairwise pc-agreeing),
and σ1(pc) = σ′1(pc) (since all configurations in the speculative states are pairwise next-step agreeing).
(e): Here we prove only am1||sp1 (am′1||sp′1 can be proved in the same way). To show am1||sp1, we need to show
am1.σ = sp1.σ and am1.s||sp1.scom. From the SE-ROLLBACK rule in  , we have that sp1.σ = σ1, which is
the configuration obtained by executing one step starting from the configuration σ0 in the i+1-th speculative state
in sp0.s. From the run r, am1 is obtained by applying the SE-ROLLBACK rule in =⇒. As a result, am1.σ is the
configuration obtained by executing one step starting from the configuration in idx-th speculative state in am0.s.
Observe that, from (3), σ0 is exactly the configuration in the idx-th speculative state in am0.s (because the i+1-th
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state in sp0.s that we are rolling back is also the idx-th state in sp0.scom). Hence, am1.σ = sp1.σ. Moreover,
observe that am1.s||sp1.scom immediately follows from (3), am1.s being am0.sidx−1, sp1.scom = sp0.sicom.
(f): For simplicity, we show only INV (am1, sp1), the proof for INV (am′1, sp′1) is analogous. To show
INV (am1, sp1), we need to show that |am1.s| = |sp1.scom| and for all i ≤ i ≤ |am1.s|,
minWndw(sp1.scomi) ≤ wndw(am1.si).
First, |am1.s| = |sp1.scom| follows from (4), am1.s = am0.sidx−1 (because we are rolling back the
idx-th transaction in the speculative state and the semantics only modifies the last speculative state),
sp1.scom = sp0.sicom, and |sp0.sicom| = idx − 1 (because sp0.s’s i + 1-th speculative state corresponds to
sp0.scom’s idx-th state by construction).
We now show that for all 1 ≤ j ≤ |am1.s|, minWndw(sp1.scomj) ≤ wndw(am1.sj). Let j be an arbitrary value
such that 1 ≤ j ≤ |am1.s|. Observe that am1.sj = am0.sj and sp1.scomj = sp0.scomj (since j ≤ |am1.s| <
idx). From this and (4), we therefore immediately have that minWndw(sp1.scomj) ≤ wndw(am1.sj).
(g): The observations τ0 and τ ′0 are respectively rollback id0 · pc σ1(pc) and rollback id ′0 · pc σ′1(pc). From (2),
we have that sp0.s ∼= sp′0.s which implies id0 = id ′0. Moreover, we also have that σ0 ∼next σ′0 and, therefore,
σ1(pc) = σ
′
1(pc). Hence, τ0 = τ
′
0.
This completes the proof of this case.
This completes the proof of this case.
This completes the proof of our claim.
C. Completeness
In Proposition 8, we prove the completeness of the always mispredict semantics w.r.t. the speculative semantics.
Proposition 8. Let w ∈ N be a speculative window and σ, σ′ ∈ InitConf be two initial configurations. If {|p|}w(σ) 6= {|p|}w(σ′),
then there exists a prediction oracle O with speculation window at most w such that JpKO(σ) 6= JpKO(σ′).
Proof. Let w ∈ N be a speculative window and σ, σ′ ∈ InitConf be two initial configurations such that {|p|}w(σ) 6= {|p|}w(σ′).
We first analyze the case when the program does not terminate. There are two cases: either {|p|}w(σ) = ⊥∧{|p|}w(σ′) 6= ⊥ or
{|p|}w(σ) 6= ⊥∧{|p|}w(σ′) = ⊥. Consider the first case {|p|}w(σ) = ⊥∧{|p|}w(σ′) 6= ⊥ (the proof for the second case is similar).
Since speculative execution does not introduce or prevent non-termination, we have that JpKO(σ) = ⊥∧ JpKO(σ′) 6= ⊥ for all
prediction oracles O. Hence, there is a prediction oracle with speculative window at most w such that JpKO(σ) 6= JpKO(σ′).
We now consider the case where both {|p|}w(σ) 6= ⊥ and {|p|}w(σ′) 6= ⊥. From this and {|p|}w(σ) 6= {|p|}w(σ′), it follows that
there are n, k, k′ ∈ N, extended configurations am1, am2, am′1, am′2, final extended configurations am3, am′3, and sequences
of observations τ, τam,1, τam,2, τ ′am,1, τ
′
am,2 such that τam,1 6= τ ′am,1, am1 ∼= am′1 and:
〈0, σ, ε〉 τ=⇒n am1 τam,1====⇒ am2 τam,2====⇒
k
am3
〈0, σ, ε〉 τ=⇒n am′1
τ ′am,1
====⇒ am′2
τ ′am,2
====⇒
k′
am′3
We claim that there is a prediction oracle O with speculative window at most w such that (1) 〈0, σ, ε, ε〉 ν ∗ sp1 and
sp1.σ = am1.σ and INV 2(sp1, am1), and (2) 〈0, σ′, ε, ε〉 ν
∗
sp′1 and sp
′
1.σ = am
′
1.σ and INV 2(sp
′
1, am
′
1), and (3)
sp1 ∼= sp′1.
We now proceed by case distinction on the rule in =⇒ used to derive am1 τam,1====⇒ am2. Observe that from am1 ∼= am′1 and
τam,1 6= τ ′am,1, it follows that the only possible rules are SE-NOBRANCH and SE-BRANCH (since applying the SE-ROLLBACK
rule would lead to τam,1 = τ ′am,1):
SE-NOBRANCH: From the rule, we have that p(am1.σ(pc)) 6= beqz x, `, enabled ′(am1.s), and am1.σ τam,1−−−→ am2.σ.
From am1 ∼= am′1, we also have p(am′1.σ(pc)) 6= beqz x, ` (since am1.σ(pc) = am′1.σ(pc)) and enabled ′(am′1.s)
(since am′1.s ∼= am1.s). Hence, also am′1
τ ′am,1
====⇒ am′2 is obtained by applying the SE-NOBRANCH rule. Therefore,
am′1.σ
τam,1−−−→ am′2.σ.
From our claim, we have (1) 〈0, σ, ε, ε〉 ν ∗ sp1, sp1.σ = am1.σ, and INV 2(sp1, am1), and (2) 〈0, σ′, ε, ε〉 ν
∗
sp′1
and sp′1.σ = am
′
1.σ and INV 2(sp
′
1, am
′
1). From sp1.σ = am1.σ, sp
′
1.σ = am
′
1.σ, p(am
′
1.σ(pc)) 6= beqz x, `,
and p(am1.σ(pc)) 6= beqz x, `, we immediately have p(sp′1.σ(pc)) 6= beqz x, `, and p(sp1.σ(pc)) 6= beqz x, `.
Moreover, from enabled ′(am1.s), enabled ′(am′1.s), INV 2(sp1, am1), and INV 2(sp
′
1, am
′
1), we also have enabled(sp1)
and enabled(sp′1). Hence, we can apply to both configurations the SE-NOBRANCH rule in  . As a result, sp1
τsp,1
sp2
and sp′1
τ ′sp,1
sp′2 where the traces are derived using the non-speculative semantics sp1.σ
τsp,1−−−→ sp2.σ and sp′1.σ
τ ′sp,1−−−→
sp′2.σ. From this, sp1.σ = am1.σ, sp
′
1.σ = am
′
1.σ, and the determinism of the non-speculative semantics, we have that
τsp,1 = τam,1 and τ ′sp,1 = τ
′
am,1. This, together with τam,1 6= τ ′am,1, leads to τsp,1 6= τ ′sp,1. Observe also that both τsp,1
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and τ ′sp,1 are observations in ExtObs . Therefore, there are sequences of observations ρ, ρ
′ such that JpKO(σ) = ν · τsp,1 ·ρ
and JpKO(σ′) = ν · τ ′sp,1 · ρ′. As a result, JpKO(σ) 6= JpKO(σ′).
SE-BRANCH: From the rule, we have that p(am1.σ(pc)) = beqz x, `′′ and enabled ′(am1.s). From am1 ∼= am′1, we also have
p(am′1.σ(pc)) = beqz x, `
′′ (since am1.σ(pc) = am′1.σ(pc)) and enabled
′(am′1.s) (since am
′
1.s
∼= am1.s). Hence, also
am′1
τ ′am,1
====⇒ am′2 is obtained by applying the SE-BRANCH rule. Therefore, τam,1 = start am1.ctr · pc ` and τ ′am,1 =
start am′1.ctr · pc `′, where ` =
{
`′′ if am1.σ(x) 6= 0
am1.σ(pc) + 1 if am1.σ(x) = 0
and `′ =
{
`′′ if am′1.σ(x) 6= 0
am′1.σ(pc) + 1 if am
′
1.σ(x) = 0
.
Since am1.ctr = am1.ctr (from am′1.s ∼= am1.s) and τam,1 6= τ ′am,1, we have that either am1.σ(x) = 0∧am′1.σ(x) 6= 0
or am1.σ(x) 6= 0∧ am′1.σ(x) = 0. Without loss of generality, we assume that am1.σ(x) = 0∧ am′1.σ(x) 6= 0 (the proof
for the other case is analogous).
We now executes two steps starting from sp1 and sp′1 with respect to  , and we construct sp1
τsp,1
sp2
τsp,2
sp3 and
sp′1
τ ′sp,1
sp′2
τ ′sp,2
sp′3. From our claim, we have (1) 〈0, σ, ε, ε〉 ν
∗
sp1, sp1.σ = am1.σ, and INV 2(sp1, am1), and (2)
〈0, σ′, ε, ε〉 ν ∗ sp′1 and sp′1.σ = am′1.σ and INV 2(sp′1, am′1), and (3) |sp1.h| = |sp′1.h|. From sp1.σ = am1.σ, sp′1.σ =
am′1.σ, p(am
′
1.σ(pc)) = beqz x, `
′′, and p(am1.σ(pc)) = beqz x, `′′, we immediately have O(sp1.σ, p, sp1.h) 6= ⊥,
O(sp′1.σ, p, sp′1.h) 6= ⊥, p(sp′1.σ(pc)) = beqz x, `′′, and p(sp1.σ(pc)) = beqz x, `′′. Moreover, from enabled ′(am1.s),
enabled ′(am′1.s), INV 2(sp1, am1), and INV 2(sp
′
1, am
′
1), we also have enabled(sp1) and enabled(sp
′
1). Hence, we can
apply to both configurations the SE-BRANCH rule in  . From sp1.σ = am1.σ, sp′1.σ = am′1.σ, and am1 ∼= am′1, we
immediately have that sp1.σ(pc) = sp′1.σ(pc). From this, (3), and the way in which we construct O (see below), we have
that O(sp1.σ, p, sp1.h) = O(sp′1.σ, p, sp′1.h) = 〈`′′, 0〉. By applying the SE-BRANCH rule to sp1 we get sp1
τsp,1
sp2,
where τsp,1 = start sp1.ctr · pc `′′, sp2.ctr = sp1.ctr + 1, sp2.σ = sp1.σ[pc 7→ `′′], sp2.s = decr(sp1.s) · 〈sp1.σ,
sp1.id , 0, `
′′〉, and sp2.h = sp1.h · 〈sp1.σ(pc), sp1.id , `′′〉. Similarly, by applying the SE-BRANCH rule to sp′1 we get
sp′1
τ ′sp,1
sp′2, where τ
′
sp,1 = start sp
′
1.ctr · pc `′′, sp′2.ctr = sp′1.ctr + 1, sp′2.σ = sp′1.σ[pc 7→ `′′], sp′2.s =
decr(sp′1.s) · 〈sp′1.σ, sp′1.id , 0, `′′〉, and sp′2.h = sp′1.h · 〈sp′1.σ(pc), sp′1.id , `′′〉. Observe that τsp,1 = τ ′sp,1 immediately
follows from (3).
Since sp2.s = decr(sp1.s)·〈sp1.id , 0, n, sp1.σ〉 and sp′2.s = decr(sp′1.s)·〈sp′1.id , 0, n, sp′1.σ〉, we can commit or rollback
the transactions associated with the last speculative states in sp2.s and sp′2.s (i.e., the transactions we started in the step
sp1
τsp,1
sp2 and sp′1
τ ′sp,1
sp′2). We start by considering sp2. From am1.σ(x) = 0 and sp1.σ = am1.σ, we have that
sp1.σ(x) = 0. From this, p(sp1.σ(pc)) = beqz x, `′′, and O(sp1.σ, p, sp1.h) = 〈`′′, 0〉, the configuration σ obtained
as sp1.σ
τ−→ σ is such that σ(pc) = `′′. Hence, we can apply the SE-COMMIT rule to sp2 and obtain sp2 τsp,2 sp3,
where τsp,2 = commit sp1.ctr , sp3.ctr = sp2.ctr , sp3.σ = sp2.σ, sp3.s = decr(sp1.s), and sp3.h = sp2.h. Consider
now sp′2. From am
′
1.σ(x) 6= 0 and sp′1.σ = am′1.σ, we have that sp′1.σ(x) 6= 0. From this, p(sp′1.σ(pc)) = beqz x, `′′,
and O(sp′1.σ, p, sp′1.h) = 〈`′′, 0〉, the configuration σ′ obtained as sp′1.σ τ−→ σ′ is such that σ′(pc) = sp′1.σ(pc) + 1.
From this and the well-formedness of p, we have that σ′(pc) 6= `′′. Hence, we can apply the SE-ROLLBACK rule to
sp′2 and obtain sp
′
2
τ ′sp,2
sp′3, where τ
′
sp,2 = rollback sp
′
1.ctr · pc σ′(pc), sp′3.ctr = sp′2.ctr , sp′3.σ = σ′, sp′3.s =
decr(sp′1.s), and sp
′
3.h = sp
′
2.h · 〈sp′1.σ(pc), sp′1.ctr , σ′(pc)〉. Therefore, there are sequences of observations ρ, ρ′ such
that JpKO(σ) = ν · τsp,1 · τsp,2 · ρ and JpKO(σ′) = ν · τ ′sp,1 · τ ′sp,2 · ρ′, where τsp,1 = τ ′sp,1 and τsp,2 6= τ ′sp,2. As a result,JpKO(σ) 6= JpKO(σ′).
This completes the proof our claim.
Constructing the prediction oracle O: Here we prove our claim that there is a prediction oracle O with speculative window
at most w such that (1) 〈0, σ, ε, ε〉 ν ∗ sp1 and sp1.σ = am1.σ and INV 2(sp1, am1), and (2) 〈0, σ′, ε, ε〉 ν
∗
sp′1 and
sp′1.σ = am
′
1.σ and INV 2(sp
′
1, am
′
1), and (3) sp1 ∼= sp′1.
We denote by RB the set of transaction identifiers that occur am1.s. Observe that from 〈0, σ, ε〉 τ=⇒
n
am1 and 〈0, σ,
ε〉 τ=⇒n am′1 it follows that RB is also the set of transaction identifiers occurring in am′1.s. The set RB identifies which
branch instructions we must mispredict to reach the configuration am1.
We now construct a list of predictions 〈`, w〉. In the following, we write am0 instead of 〈0, σ, ε〉. We construct the list by
analyzing the execution am0
τ
=⇒n am1 (observe that deriving the list from 〈0, σ′, ε〉 τ=⇒
n
am′1 would result in the same
list). The list L is iteratively constructed as follows. During the execution, we denote by idx the position of the configuration
in the execution from which we should continue the construction. Initially, idx = 0. At each iteration, we find the smallest
idx′ ∈ N such that idx ≤ idx′ < n and the extended configuration amidx′ is such that am0 τ1=⇒
idx′
amidx′ , and
p(amidx′ .σ(pc)) = beqz x, ` and enabled ′(amidx′ .s) (i.e., the next step in the execution is obtained using the SE-BRANCH
rule). Next, we proceed as follows:
amidx′ .ctr ∈ RB In this case, we mispredict the outcome of the corresponding branch instruction. The prediction associated
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with the branch instruction is 〈`′′, w〉, where `′′ = amidx′ .σ(pc)+1 if amidx′ .σ(x) = 0 and `′′ = ` otherwise. Concretely,
we update L by appending 〈`′′, w〉 and setting idx to idx′ + 1 (i.e., we continue constructing L by analyzing the next
step in the execution).
amidx′ .ctr 6∈ RB In this case, we correctly predict the outcome of the corresponding branch instruction. The prediction
associated with the branch instruction is 〈`′′, 0〉, where `′′ = ` if amidx′ .σ(x) = 0 and `′′ = amidx′ .σ(pc)+1 otherwise.
Concretely, we update L by appending 〈`′′, 0〉 and we update the index idx to idx′+k+2 where the value k ∈ N is such
that am0
τ1=⇒idx
′
amidx′
start amidx′ .ctr ·pc `′===============⇒ amidx′+1 ν=⇒
k
amidx′+k+1
rollback amidx′ .ctr ·pc `′′=================⇒ amidx′+k+2.
That is, we ignore the portion of the execution associated with the speculative transaction amidx′ .ctr and we continue
constructing L after the transaction amidx′ .ctr has been rolled back. Observe also that idx′ + k + 2 ≤ n (otherwise
amidx′ .ctr would have been included into RB).
Finally, if the configuration am1 in 〈0, σ, ε〉 τ=⇒
n
am1 is such that p(am1.σ(pc)) = beqz x, ` and enabled ′(am1.s), we
append to L the prediction 〈`, 0〉.
The prediction oracle O is defined as follows, where #(h) is the number of unique transaction identifiers in h:
O(σ, p, h) :=
{
〈`′, w′〉 if #(h) + 1 ≤ |L| ∧ L|#(h)+1 = 〈`′, w′〉 ∧ (p(σ(pc)) = beqz x, `′ ∨ `′ = σ(pc) + 1)
〈`, 0〉 otherwise (where p(σ(pc)) = beqz x, `)
Observe that O is a prediction oracle as it depends only on the program counter, the program itself, and the length of the
history. Moreover, its speculative window is at most w (since the predictions contain either w or 0 as speculative window).
The key property of O is that “when the execution starts from σ (or σ′), O follows the predictions in L for the first |L| branch
instructions and afterwards always predicts the branch as taken”.
From 〈0, σ, ε〉 τ=⇒n am1, 〈0, σ, ε〉 τ=⇒
n
am′1, and the way in which we constructed O, we have that (1) 〈0, σ, ε, ε〉 ν
∗
sp1
and sp1.σ = am1.σ and INV 2(sp1, am1), and (2) 〈0, σ′, ε, ε〉 ν
∗
sp′1 and sp
′
1.σ = am
′
1.σ and INV 2(sp
′
1, am
′
1), and (3)
sp1 ∼= sp′1. The proof of this statement is similar to the proof of Lemma 6.
APPENDIX I: RELATING CONCRETE AND SYMBOLIC ALWAYS MISPREDICT SEMANTICS (PROPOSITION 2)
Below, we provide the proof of Proposition 2, which we restate here for simplicity:
Proposition 2. Let p be a program and w ∈ N be a speculative window. Then, {|p|}w = γ({|p|}symbw ).
Proof. The proposition follows from Propositions 9 (proved in Section I-C) and 10 (proved in Section I-D).
We now prove the two directions:
(⇒) : Let 〈σ, τ, σ′〉 be a run in {|p|}w. From this, it follows that 〈0, σ, ε〉 τ=⇒∗ 〈ctr , σ′, ε〉. From Proposition 10 (proved
in Section I-D), there is a valuation µ, a symbolic trace τ ′, and a final symbolic configuration σ′′ such that 〈0, 〈sm0,
sa0〉, ε〉 τ
′
=⇒
∗
s 〈ctr , σ′′, ε〉, µ(τ ′) = τ , µ(〈sm0, sa0〉) = σ, µ(σ′′) = σ′, and µ |= pthCnd(τ ′). Hence, 〈〈sm0, sa0〉, τ ′,
σ′′〉 ∈ symTracesp(w) and 〈µ(〈sm0, sa0〉), µ(τ ′), µ(σ′′)〉 ∈ γ(〈〈sm0, sa0〉, τ ′, σ′′〉) (since µ |= pthCnd(τ ′)). Therefore,
〈µ(〈sm0, sa0〉), µ(τ ′), µ(σ′′)〉 ∈ γ(symTracesp(w)). From this and µ(τ ′) = τ , µ(〈sm0, sa0〉) = σ, µ(σ′′) = σ′, we have
〈σ, τ, σ′〉 ∈ γ(symTracesp(w)).
(⇐) : Let 〈σ, τ, σ′〉 be a run in γ(symTracesp(w)). From this, it follows that there is a symbolic run 〈σs, τs, σ′s〉 ∈
symTracesp(w) and a valuation µ such that µ |= pthCnd(τs) and µ(σs) = σ, µ(σ′s) = σ′, and µ(τs) = τ . From
〈σs, τs, σ′s〉 ∈ symTracesp(w), we have that 〈0, σs, ε〉 τs=⇒
∗
s 〈ctr , σ′s, ε〉. From Proposition 9 (proved in Section I-C) and
µ |= pthCnd(τs), we have that 〈0, µ(σs), ε〉 µ(τs)===⇒
∗
〈ctr , µ(σ′s), ε〉. Therefore, 〈µ(sigmas), µ(τs), µ(σ′s)〉 ∈ {|p|}w. From
this and µ(σs) = σ, µ(σ′s) = σ
′, and µ(τs) = τ , we have 〈σ, τ, σ′〉 ∈ {|p|}w.
This completes the proof of our claim.
A. Auxiliary definitions
Given a symbolic speculative state 〈σ, id , w, `〉 ∈ SpecS , its next-step mispredict path condition pthCnd(〈σ, id , w, `〉) is
the symbolic expression pthCnd(τ) such that σ τ−→s σ′ and σ′(pc) 6= ` (if such a τ does not exists, then pthCnd(s) =
>). Given a sequence of symbolic speculative states s ∈ SpecS∗, its next-step mispredict path condition pthCnd(s) =∧
〈σ,id,w,`〉∈s pthCnd(〈σ, id , w, `〉).
We say that a concrete speculative state 〈σ, id , w, `〉 ∈ SpecS is next-step mispredict well-formed, written wf (〈σ, id , w, `〉),
if σ τ−→s σ′ and σ′(pc) 6= `. We say that a sequence of speculative states s ∈ SpecS∗ is next-step mispredict well-formed,
written wf (s), if
∧
〈σ,id,w,`〉∈s wf (〈σ, id , w, `〉).
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B. Auxiliary lemmas
Lemma 7 provides some useful helping facts, which we will use throughout the soundness proof.
Lemma 7. The following facts hold:
1) Given a symbolic assignment sa and a valuation µ : SymbVals → Vals , then µ(sa)(x) = µ(sa(x)) for all x ∈ Regs .
2) Given a symbolic memory sa and a valuation µ : SymbVals → Vals , then µ(sm)(n) = µ(sm(n)) for all n ∈ Addrs .
3) Given a symbolic assignment sa, an expression e, and a valuation µ : SymbVals → Vals , then µ(JeK(sa)) = JeK(µ(sa)).
Proof. Below we prove all our claims.
Proof of (1): Let sa be a symbolic assignment and µ : SymbVals → Vals . Then, µ(sa) is defined as µ ◦ sa. Hence,
µ(sa)(x) = µ(sa(x)).
Proof of (2): Identical to (1).
Proof of (3): Let sa be a symbolic assignment, e be an expression, and µ : SymbVals → Vals . We show, by structural
induction on e, that µ(JeK(sa)) = JeK(µ(sa)). For the base case, there are two possibilities. If e is a value n ∈ Vals , thenJnK(sa) = n, JnK(µ(sa)) = n, and µ(n) = n. Hence, µ(JeK(sa)) = JeK(µ(sa)). If e is a register identifier x ∈ Regs , thenJxK(µ(sa)) = µ(sa)(x) and µ(JeK(sa)) = µ(sa(x)). From this and (1), we get µ(JeK(sa)) = JeK(µ(sa)). For the induction
step, there two cases. If e is of the form 	e′, then J	e′K(µ(sa)) = apply(	, Je′K(µ(sa))), whereas µ(J	e′K(sa)) is either
µ(apply(	, Je′K(sa))) if Je′K(sa) ∈ Vals or µ(	Je′K(sa)) otherwise. In the first case, µ(apply(	, Je′K(µ(sa)))) = apply(	,Je′K(sa)) (since we are dealing only with concrete values) and Je′K(µ(sa)) = Je′K(sa) since Je′K(sa) ∈ Vals . Therefore,
µ(JeK(sa)) = JeK(µ(sa)). In the second case, µ(	Je′K(sa)) = apply(	, µ(Je′K(sa))). By applying the induction hypothesis
(Je′K(µ(sa)) = µ(Je′K(sa)), we obtain µ(	Je′K(sa)) = apply(	, Je′K(µ(sa))). Hence, µ(JeK(sa)) = JeK(µ(sa)). The proof for
the second case (i.e., e = e1 ⊗ e2) is similar.
C. Soundness
In Lemma 8, we prove the soundness of the symbolic non-speculative semantics.
Lemma 8. Let p be a program. Whenever 〈sm, sa〉 τ−→s 〈sm′, sa′〉, then for all mappings µ : SymbVals → Vals such that
µ |= pthCnd(τ), 〈µ(sm), µ(sa)〉 µ(τ)−−−→ 〈µ(sm′), µ(sa′)〉.
Proof. Let p be a program. Assume that 〈sm, sa〉 τ−→s 〈sm′, sa′〉 holds. We proceed by case distinction on the rules defining
−→s .
Rule SKIP. Assume that 〈sm, sa〉 τ−→s 〈sm′, sa′〉 has been derived using the SKIP rule in the symbolic semantics. Then,
p(a(pc)) = skip, sm′ = sm, τ = ε, and sa′ = sa[pc 7→ sa(pc)+1]. Let µ : SymbVals → Vals be an arbitrary valuation
satisfying pthCnd(τ) (since pthCnd(τ) is > all valuations are models of pthCnd(τ)). Observe that µ(sa)(pc) = sa(pc)
since the program counter is always concrete. Hence, p(µ(sa)(pc)) = skip. Thus, we can apply the rule SKIP of the
concrete semantics starting from 〈µ(sm), µ(sa)〉. Hence, 〈µ(sm), µ(sa)〉 −→ 〈µ(sm), µ(sa)[pc 7→ µ(sa)(pc)+1]〉. From
this, µ(τ) = ε (since τ = ε), and sa′ = sa[pc 7→ sa(pc) + 1], we have that 〈µ(sm), µ(sa)〉 µ(τ)−−−→ 〈µ(sm′), µ(sa′)〉.
Rule BARRIER. The proof of this case is analogous to that of SKIP.
Rule ASSIGN. Assume that 〈sm, sa〉 τ−→s 〈sm′, sa′〉 has been derived using the ASSIGN rule in the symbolic semantics. Then,
p(a(pc)) = x← e, x 6= pc, sm′ = sm, τ = ε, and sa′ = sa[pc 7→ sa(pc)+1, x 7→ JeK(sa)]. Let µ : SymbVals → Vals
be an arbitrary valuation (since pthCnd(τ) is > all valuations are models of pthCnd(τ)). Observe that µ(sa)(pc) =
sa(pc) since the program counter is always concrete. Hence, p(µ(sa)(pc)) = x← e. Thus, we can apply the rule ASSIGN
of the concrete semantics starting from 〈µ(sm), µ(sa)〉. Hence, 〈µ(sm), µ(sa)〉 −→ 〈µ(sm), µ(sa)[pc 7→ µ(sa)(pc) + 1,
x 7→ JeK(µ(sa))]〉. From this, Lemma 7, µ(τ) = ε (since τ = ε), and sa′ = sa[pc 7→ sa(pc) + 1, x 7→ JeK(sa)], we have
that 〈µ(sm), µ(sa)〉 µ(τ)−−−→ 〈µ(sm′), µ(sa′)〉.
Rule CONDITIONALUPDATE-CONCR-SAT. Assume that 〈sm, sa〉 τ−→s 〈sm′, sa′〉 has been derived using the
CONDITIONALUPDATE-CONCR-SAT rule in the symbolic semantics. Then, p(a(pc)) = x e
′?←−− e, x 6= pc, sm′ = sm,
τ = ε, Je′K(sa) = 0, and sa′ = sa[pc 7→ sa(pc) + 1, x 7→ JeK(sa)]. Let µ : SymbVals → Vals be an
arbitrary valuation (since pthCnd(τ) is > all valuations are models of pthCnd(τ)). Observe that µ(sa)(pc) = sa(pc)
since the program counter is always concrete. Hence, p(µ(sa)(pc)) = x e
′?←−− e. Thus, we can apply one of the
rules CONDITIONALUPDATE-SAT or CONDITIONALUPDATE-UNSAT of the concrete semantics starting from 〈µ(sm),
µ(sa)〉. We claim that Je′K(µ(sa)) = 0. Therefore, we can apply the rule CONDITIONALUPDATE-SAT. Hence, 〈µ(sm),
µ(sa)〉 −→ 〈µ(sm), µ(sa)[pc 7→ µ(sa)(pc) + 1, x 7→ JeK(µ(sa))]〉. From this, Lemma 7, µ(τ) = ε (since τ = ε), and
sa′ = sa[pc 7→ sa(pc) + 1, x 7→ JeK(sa)], we have that 〈µ(sm), µ(sa)〉 µ(τ)−−−→ 〈µ(sm′), µ(sa′)〉.
We now show that Je′K(µ(sa)) is indeed 0. Since Je′K(sa) = 0, the value of e′ depends only on registers in sa whose
value is concrete. Hence, for all these registers x, µ(sa)(x) = sa(x). Thus, Je′K(µ(sa)) = Je′K(sa) = 0.
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Rule CONDITIONALUPDATE-CONCR-UNSAT. The proof of this case is analogous to that of CONDITIONALUPDATE-
CONCR-UNSAT.
Rule CONDITIONALUPDATE-SYMB. Assume that 〈sm, sa〉 τ−→s 〈sm′, sa′〉 has been derived using the
CONDITIONALUPDATE-SYMB rule in the symbolic semantics. Then, p(a(pc)) = x e
′?←−− e, x 6= pc, sm′ = sm,
τ = ε, Je′K(sa) = se, se 6∈ Vals , and sa′ = sa[pc 7→ sa(pc) + 1, x 7→ ite(se = 0, JeK(sa), sa(x))]. Let
µ : SymbVals → Vals be an arbitrary valuation (since pthCnd(τ) is > all valuations are models of pthCnd(τ)). Observe
that µ(sa)(pc) = sa(pc) since the program counter is always concrete. Hence, p(µ(sa)(pc)) = x e
′?←−− e.
There are two cases:
µ |= se = 0: Then, µ(se) = 0 and therefore Je′K(µ(sa)) = 0. Hence, we can apply the rule CONDITIONALUPDATE-
SAT starting from 〈µ(sm), µ(sa)〉. Therefore, we get 〈µ(sm), µ(sa)〉 −→ 〈µ(sm), µ(sa)[pc 7→ µ(sa)(pc) + 1, x 7→JeK(µ(sa))]〉. To prove our claim, we have to show that µ(sa′) = µ(sa)[pc 7→ µ(sa)(pc) + 1, x 7→ JeK(µ(sa))].
From sa′ = sa[pc 7→ sa(pc) + 1, x 7→ ite(se = 0, JeK(sa), sa(x))], it is enough to show that µ(ite(se = 0, JeK(sa),
sa(x))) = JeK(µ(sa)). Since µ |= se = 0, µ(ite(se = 0, JeK(sa), sa(x))) is equivalent to µ(JeK(sa)). From this and
Lemma 7, µ(JeK(sa)) = JeK(µ(sa)). Hence, we have that 〈µ(sm), µ(sa)〉 µ(τ)−−−→ 〈µ(sm′), µ(sa′)〉.
µ 6|= se = 0: Then, µ(se) 6= 0 and therefore Je′K(µ(sa)) 6= 0. Hence, we can apply the rule CONDITIONALUPDATE-
UNSAT starting from 〈µ(sm), µ(sa)〉. Therefore, we get 〈µ(sm), µ(sa)〉 −→ 〈µ(sm), µ(sa)[pc 7→ µ(sa)(pc) + 1]〉. To
prove our claim, we have to show that µ(sa′) = µ(sa)[pc 7→ µ(sa)(pc) + 1]. From sa′ = sa[pc 7→ sa(pc) + 1, x 7→
ite(se = 0, JeK(sa), sa(x))], it is enough to show that µ(ite(se = 0, JeK(sa), sa(x))) = µ(sa)(x). Since µ 6|= se = 0,
µ(ite(se = 0, JeK(sa), sa(x))) is equivalent to µ(sa(x)). From this and Lemma 7, µ(sa(x)) = µ(sa)(x). Hence, we
have that 〈µ(sm), µ(sa)〉 µ(τ)−−−→ 〈µ(sm′), µ(sa′)〉.
This completes the proof of this case.
Rule LOAD-SYMB. Assume that 〈sm, sa〉 τ−→s 〈sm′, sa′〉 has been derived using the LOAD-SYMB rule in the symbolic
semantics. Then, p(a(pc)) = load x, e, x 6= pc, sm′ = sm, se = JeK(sa), τ = load se, and sa′ = sa[pc 7→ sa(pc)+1,
x 7→ read(sm, se)]. Let µ : SymbVals → Vals be an arbitrary valuation (since pthCnd(τ) = > all valuations µ are valid
models). Observe that µ(sa)(pc) = sa(pc) since the program counter is always concrete. Hence, p(µ(sa)(pc)) = load x,
e and x 6= pc. Thus, we can apply the rule LOAD of the concrete semantics starting from 〈µ(sm), µ(sa)〉. Hence,
〈µ(sm), µ(sa)〉 load JeK(µ(sa))−−−−−−−−−−→ 〈µ(sm), µ(sa)[pc 7→ µ(sa)(pc) + 1, x 7→ µ(sm)(JeK(µ(sa)))]〉.
Observe that µ(JeK(sa)) = JeK(µ(sa)) (from Lemma 7), and therefore µ(load JeK(sa)) = load JeK(µ(sa)). We claim
that µ(read(sm, se)) = µ(sm)(JeK(µ(sa))). From this, µ(sa)[pc 7→ µ(sa)(pc)+ 1, x 7→ µ(sm)(JeK(µ(sa)))] = µ(sa′).
Therefore, 〈µ(sm), µ(sa)〉 µ(τ)−−−→ 〈µ(sm′), µ(sa′)〉.
We now show that µ(read(sm, se)) = µ(sm)(JeK(µ(sa))). From the evaluation of symbolic expressions, we have
that µ(read(sm, se)) is equivalent to µ(sm)(µ(se)). From this and se = JeK(sa), we have µ(read(sm, se)) =
µ(sm)(µ(JeK(sa))). From this and Lemma 7, we get µ(read(sm, se)) = µ(sm)(JeK(µ(sa))).
Rule STORE-SYMB. Assume that 〈sm, sa〉 τ−→s 〈sm′, sa′〉 has been derived using the STORE-SYMB rule in the symbolic
semantics. Then, p(a(pc)) = store x, e, se = JeK(sa), sm′ = write(sm, se, sa(x)), τ = store se, and sa′ =
sa[pc 7→ sa(pc) + 1]. Let µ : SymbVals → Vals be an arbitrary valuation (since pthCnd(τ) = > all valuations are
valid models). Observe that µ(sa)(pc) = sa(pc) since the program counter is always concrete. Hence, p(µ(sa)(pc)) =
store x, e. Thus, we can apply the rule STORE of the concrete semantics starting from 〈µ(sm), µ(sa)〉. Hence, 〈µ(sm),
µ(sa)〉 store JeK(µ(sa))−−−−−−−−−−→ 〈µ(sm)[JeK(µ(sa)) 7→ µ(sa)(x)], µ(sa)[pc 7→ µ(sa)(pc) + 1]〉. Observe that (1) µ(JeK(sa)) =JeK(µ(sa)) (from Lemma 7) and therefore µ(store JeK(sa)) = store JeK(µ(sa)), and (2) µ(sa)[pc 7→ µ(sa)(pc)+1] =
µ(sa[pc 7→ sa(pc)+1]). Moreover, we claim that µ(sm)[JeK(µ(sa)) 7→ µ(sa)(x)] = µ(write(sm, se, sa(x))). Therefore,
〈µ(sm), µ(sa)〉 µ(τ)−−−→ 〈µ(sm′), µ(sa′)〉.
We now prove our claim that µ(sm)[JeK(µ(sa)) 7→ µ(sa)(x)] = µ(write(sm, se, sa(x))). From the evaluation of
symbolic expressions, we have that µ(write(sm, se, sa(x))) is equivalent to µ(sm)[µ(se) 7→ µ(sa(x))]. From se =JeK(sa), we have µ(write(sm, se, sa(x))) = µ(sm)[µ(JeK(sa)) 7→ µ(sa(x))]. From Lemma 7, we have µ(write(sm,
se, sa(x))) = µ(sm)[JeK(µ(sa)) 7→ µ(sa)(x)].
Rule BEQZ-CONCR-SAT. Assume that 〈sm, sa〉 τ−→s 〈sm′, sa′〉 has been derived using the BEQZ-CONCR-1 rule in the
symbolic semantics. Then, p(a(pc)) = beqz x, `, sa(x) = 0, sa(x) ∈ Vals , sm′ = sm, τ = symPc(>) · pc `, and
sa′ = sa[pc 7→ `]. Let µ : SymbVals → Vals be an arbitrary valuation (since pthCnd(τ) = > all valuations are valid
models). Observe that µ(sa)(pc) = sa(pc) since the program counter is always concrete. Hence, p(µ(sa)(pc)) = beqz x,
`. Thus, we can apply one of the rules BEQZ-SAT or BEQZ-UNSAT of the concrete semantics starting from 〈µ(sm),
µ(sa)〉. We claim that µ(sa)(x) = 0. Therefore, we can apply the BEQZ-SAT rule. Hence, 〈µ(sm), µ(sa)〉 pc `−−→ 〈µ(sm),
µ(sa)[pc 7→ `]〉. Therefore, 〈µ(sm), µ(sa)〉 µ(τ)−−−→ 〈µ(sm′), µ(sa′)〉 (since µ(τ) = µ(symPc(>) · pc `) = pc `).
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We now prove our claim that µ(sa)(x) = 0. We know that sa(x) = 0. Hence, µ(sa(x)) = 0 (since sa(x) is a concrete
value). From this and Lemma 7, µ(sa)(x) = 0.
Rule BEQZ-SYMB-SAT. Assume that 〈sm, sa〉 τ−→s 〈sm′, sa′〉 has been derived using the BEQZ-SYMB-SAT rule in the
symbolic semantics. Then, p(a(pc)) = beqz x, `, sa(x) 6∈ Vals , sm′ = sm, τ = symPc(sa(x) = 0) · pc `, and
sa′ = sa[pc 7→ `]. Let µ : SymbVals → Vals be an arbitrary valuation satisfying pthCnd(τ) = sa(x) = 0. Observe that
µ(sa)(pc) = sa(pc) since the program counter is always concrete. Hence, p(µ(sa)(pc)) = beqz x, `. Thus, we can
apply one of the rules BEQZ-SAT or BEQZ-UNSAT of the concrete semantics starting from 〈µ(sm), µ(sa)〉. We claim
that µ(sa)(x) = 0. Therefore, we can apply the BEQZ-SAT rule. Hence, 〈µ(sm), µ(sa)〉 pc `−−→ 〈µ(sm), µ(sa)[pc 7→ `]〉.
Therefore, 〈µ(sm), µ(sa)〉 µ(τ)−−−→ 〈µ(sm′), µ(sa′)〉 (since µ(τ) = µ(symPc(sa(x) = 0) · pc `) = pc `).
We now prove our claim that µ(sa)(x) = 0. We know that sa(x) = se and µ |= se = 0. Hence, µ(se) = 0. Therefore,
µ(sa(x)) = 0. From this and Lemma 7, we have µ(sa)(x) = 0.
Rule BEQZ-CONCR-UNSAT. The proof of this case is similar to that of the BEQZ-CONCR-SAT rule.
Rule BEQZ-SYMB-UNSAT. The proof of this case is similar to that of the BEQZ-SYMB-SAT rule.
Rule JMP-CONCR. Assume that 〈sm, sa〉 τ−→s 〈sm′, sa′〉 has been derived using the JMP-CONCR rule in the symbolic
semantics. Then, p(a(pc)) = jmp e, ` = JeK(sa), ` ∈ Vals , sm′ = sm, τ = symPc(>) · pc `, and sa′ = sa[pc 7→ `].
Let µ : SymbVals → Vals be an arbitrary valuation (since pthCnd(τ) = > all valuations are valid models). Observe
that µ(sa)(pc) = sa(pc) since the program counter is always concrete. Hence, p(µ(sa)(pc)) = jmp e. Thus, we can
apply the JMP rule of the concrete semantics starting from 〈µ(sm), µ(sa)〉. Observe that JeK(µ(sa)) = µ(JeK(sa)) = `.
Hence, 〈µ(sm), µ(sa)〉 pc `−−→ 〈µ(sm), µ(sa)[pc 7→ `]〉. Therefore, 〈µ(sm), µ(sa)〉 µ(τ)−−−→ 〈µ(sm′), µ(sa′)〉 (since µ(τ) =
µ(symPc(>) · pc `) = pc `).
Rule JMP-SYMB. Assume that 〈sm, sa〉 τ−→s 〈sm′, sa′〉 has been derived using the JMP-SYMB rule in the symbolic semantics.
Then, p(a(pc)) = jmp e, JeK(sa) 6∈ Vals , ` ∈ Vals , sm′ = sm, τ = symPc(JeK(sa) = `) · pc `, and sa′ = sa[pc 7→ `].
Let µ : SymbVals → Vals be an arbitrary valuation satisfying pthCnd(τ), that is, JeK(sa) = `. Observe that µ(sa)(pc) =
sa(pc) since the program counter is always concrete. Hence, p(µ(sa)(pc)) = jmp e. Thus, we can apply the JMP rule
of the concrete semantics starting from 〈µ(sm), µ(sa)〉. We claim JeK(µ(sa)) = `. Hence, 〈µ(sm), µ(sa)〉 pc `−−→ 〈µ(sm),
µ(sa)[pc 7→ `]〉. Therefore, 〈µ(sm), µ(sa)〉 µ(τ)−−−→ 〈µ(sm′), µ(sa′)〉 (since µ(τ) = µ(symPc(JeK(sa) = `) · pc `) = pc `).
We now prove our claim that JeK(µ(sa)) = `. We know that JeK(sa) = se and µ |= se = `. Hence, µ(JeK(sa)) = `. From
this and Lemma 7, we have JeK(µ(sa)) = `.
Rule TERMINATE. The proof of this case is similar to that of the SKIP rule.
This completes the proof of our claim.
In Lemma 9, we prove the soundness of a single step of the symbolic always mispredict semantics.
Lemma 9. Let p be a program. Whenever 〈ctr , 〈sm, sa〉, s〉 τ=⇒s 〈ctr ′, 〈sm′, sa′〉, s′〉, then for all mappings µ : SymbVals →
Vals such that µ |= pthCnd(s) ∧ pthCnd(τ), 〈ctr , 〈µ(sm), µ(sa)〉, µ(s)〉 µ(τ)===⇒ 〈ctr ′, 〈µ(sm′), µ(sa′)〉, µ(s′)〉.
Proof. Let p ∈ Prg be a program. Moreover, assume that 〈ctr , 〈sm, sa〉, s〉 τ=⇒s 〈ctr ′, 〈sm′, sa′〉, s′〉. We proceed by case
distinction on the rules defining =⇒s .
Rule AM-NOBRANCH. Assume that 〈ctr , 〈sm, sa〉, s〉 τ=⇒s 〈ctr ′, 〈sm′, sa′〉, s′〉 has been derived using the SE-NOBRANCH
rule in the symbolic semantics. Then, 〈sm, sa〉 τ−→s 〈sm′, sa′〉, p(sa(pc)) 6= beqz x, `, enabled ′(s), ctr ′ = ctr , and
s′ = decr ′(s). Let µ : SymbVals → Vals be an arbitrary valuation that satisfies pthCnd(s)∧ pthCnd(τ). Observe that µ
also satisfies pthCnd(τ). Therefore, we can apply Lemma 8 to 〈sm, sa〉 τ−→s 〈sm′, sa′〉 to derive 〈µ(sm), µ(sa)〉 µ(τ)−−−→
〈µ(sm′), µ(sa′)〉. Moreover, we immediately have that enabled ′(s) iff enabled ′(µ(s)) and p(sa(pc)) 6= beqz x, `, iff
p(µ(sa)(pc)) 6= beqz x, `,. Thus, we can apply the rule AM-NOBRANCH of the concrete semantics starting from
〈ctr , 〈µ(sm), µ(sa)〉, µ(s)〉. Therefore, 〈ctr , 〈µ(sm), µ(sa)〉, µ(s)〉 µ(τ)===⇒ 〈ctr , 〈µ(sm′), µ(sa′)〉, µ(s′)〉.
Rule AM-BRANCH. Assume that 〈ctr , 〈sm, sa〉, s〉 τ=⇒s 〈ctr ′, 〈sm′, sa′〉, s′〉 has been derived using the SE-BRANCH
rule in the symbolic semantics. Then, p(sa(pc)) = beqz x, `′′, enabled ′(s), 〈sm, sa〉 symPc(se)·pc `
′
−−−−−−−−−→s σ′, ` ={
sa(pc) + 1 if `′ 6= sa(pc) + 1
`′′ if `′ = sa(pc) + 1
, ctr ′ = ctr + 1, sm′ = sm, sa′ = sa[pc 7→ `], s′ = s · 〈〈sm, sa〉, ctr ,min(w,
wndw(s)− 1), `〉, and τ = symPc(se) · start ctr · pc `. Let µ : SymbVals → Vals be an arbitrary valuation satisfying
pthCnd(s) ∧ pthCnd(τ). Observe that µ also satisfies pthCnd(τ), i.e., µ |= se. We can apply Lemma 8 to 〈sm,
sa〉 symPc(se)·pc `
′
−−−−−−−−−→s σ′ to derive 〈µ(sm), µ(sa)〉 µ(τ)−−−→ µ(σ′). Observe that µ(σ′)(pc) = `′ and enabled ′(s) holds iff
enabled ′(µ(s)) does. Therefore, we can apply the rule AM-BRANCH of the concrete semantics starting from 〈ctr , 〈µ(sm),
µ(sa)〉, µ(s)〉. We have 〈ctr , 〈µ(sm), µ(sa)〉, µ(s)〉 start ctr ·pc `
′′′
==========⇒ 〈ctr + 1, 〈µ(sm), µ(sa)[pc 7→ `′′′]〉, µ(s) · 〈〈µ(sm),
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µ(sa)〉, ctr ,min(w,wndw(µ(s)) − 1), `′′′〉〉. We claim that ` = `′′′. Hence, 〈ctr , 〈µ(sm), µ(sa)〉, µ(s)〉 µ(τ)===⇒ 〈ctr ′,
〈µ(sm′), µ(sa′)〉, µ(s′)〉.
We now show that ` = `′′′. There are two cases:
` = sa(pc) + 1 : Then, `′ 6= sa(pc) + 1. There are two cases:
∗ The step 〈sm, sa〉 symPc(se)·pc `
′
−−−−−−−−−→s σ′ has been derived using the BEQZ-CONCR-SAT rule from the symbolic non-
speculative semantics. Then, sa(x) = 0. Therefore, µ(sa)(x) = 0 and `′′′ = µ(sa)(pc)+1 by construction. Hence,
` = `′′′.
∗ The step 〈sm, sa〉 symPc(se)·pc `
′
−−−−−−−−−→s σ′ has been derived using the BEQZ-SYMB-SAT rule from the symbolic non-
speculative semantics. Then, se is sa(x) = 0. From this and µ |= se, we have that µ(sa)(x) = 0 and, therefore,
`′′′ = µ(sa)(pc) + 1 by construction. Hence, ` = `′′′.
This completes the proof of this case.
` = `′′ : Then, `′ = sa(pc) + 1. There are two cases:
∗ The step 〈sm, sa〉 symPc(se)·pc `
′
−−−−−−−−−→s σ′ has been derived using the BEQZ-CONCR-UNSAT rule from the symbolic
non-speculative semantics. Then, sa(x) 6= 0. Therefore, µ(sa)(x) 6= 0 and `′′′ = `′′ by construction. Hence,
` = `′′′.
∗ The step 〈sm, sa〉 symPc(se)·pc `
′
−−−−−−−−−→s σ′ has been derived using the BEQZ-SYMB-UNSAT rule from the symbolic non-
speculative semantics. Then, se is sa(x) 6= 0. From this and µ |= se, we have that µ(sa)(x) 6= 0 and, therefore,
`′′′ = `′′ by construction. Hence, ` = `′′′.
This completes the proof of this case.
This completes the proof of our claim.
Rule AM-ROLLBACK. Assume that 〈ctr , 〈sm, sa〉, s〉 τ=⇒s 〈ctr ′, 〈sm′, sa′〉, s′〉 has been derived using the SE-ROLLBACK
rule in the symbolic semantics. Then, s = sB · 〈σ, id , 0, `〉, σ τ
′
−→s σ′, ctr ′ = ctr , σ′ = 〈sm′, sa′〉, s′ = sB , sa′(pc) 6= `,
and τ = rollback id ·pc σ′(pc). Let µ : SymbVals → Vals be an arbitrary valuation satisfying pthCnd(s)∧pthCnd(τ).
We claim that µ |= pthCnd(τ ′). Therefore, Lemma 8 to σ τ
′
−→s σ′ to derive µ(σ) µ(τ
′)−−−→ µ(σ′). By applying the rule
AM-ROLLBACK of the concrete semantics starting from 〈ctr , 〈µ(sm), µ(sa)〉, µ(s)〉, we obtain 〈ctr , 〈µ(sm), µ(sa)〉,
µ(sB) · 〈σ, id , 0, `〉〉 rollback id·pc σ
′(pc)
==============⇒ 〈ctr , µ(σ′), µ(sB)〉. Since σ′(pc) = µ(σ′)(pc) = ` (since the program counter
is always concrete), we have that 〈ctr , 〈µ(sm), µ(sa)〉, µ(s)〉 µ(τ)===⇒ 〈ctr ′, 〈µ(sm′), µ(sa′)〉, µ(s′)〉.
We now prove our claim that µ |= pthCnd(τ ′). There are four cases:
– The step σ τ
′
−→s σ′ has been derived using the BEQZ-CONCR-SAT rule from the symbolic non-speculative semantics.
Then, pthCnd(τ ′) = > and the claim trivially holds.
– The step σ τ
′
−→s σ′ has been derived using the BEQZ-CONCR-UNSAT rule from the symbolic non-speculative semantics.
Then, pthCnd(τ ′) = > and the claim trivially holds.
– The step σ τ
′
−→s σ′ has been derived using the BEQZ-SYMB-SAT rule from the symbolic non-speculative semantics.
Then, pthCnd(τ ′) is sa(x) = 0. Observe that sa(x) = 0 is one of the conjuncts of pthCnd(s) by construction.
Therefore, µ |= pthCnd(τ ′) since µ |= pthCnd(s).
– The step σ τ
′
−→s σ′ has been derived using the BEQZ-SYMB-UNSAT rule from the symbolic non-speculative semantics.
Then, pthCnd(τ ′) is sa(x) 6= 0. Observe that sa(x) 6= 0 is one of the conjuncts of pthCnd(s) by construction.
Therefore, µ |= pthCnd(τ ′) since µ |= pthCnd(s).
This completes the proof of our claim.
This completes the proof of our claim.
In Proposition 9, we finally prove the soundness of the symbolic semantics.
Proposition 9. Let p be a program and µ be a valuation. Whenever 〈0, 〈sm0, sa0〉, ε〉 τ=⇒
∗
s 〈ctr , 〈sm, sa〉, ε〉, 〈sm, sa〉 ∈
FinalConf , and µ |= pthCnd(τ), then 〈0, 〈µ(sm0), µ(sa0)〉, ε〉 µ(τ)===⇒
∗
〈ctr , 〈µ(sm), µ(sa)〉, ε〉.
Proof. Let p be a program and µ be a valuation. Assume that, for some n ∈ N, 〈ctr0, 〈sm0, sa0〉, s0〉 τ0=⇒s 〈ctr1, 〈sm1,
sa1〉, s1〉 τ1=⇒s . . . 〈ctrn, 〈smn, san〉, sn〉 τn=⇒s 〈ctrn+1, 〈smn+1, san+1〉, sn+1〉, where ctr0 = 0, s0 = sn+1 = ε, and
〈smn, san〉 ∈ FinalConf . Finally, assume that µ |= pthCnd(τ0 · τ1 · . . . · τn). We claim that, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n + 1,
µ |= pthCnd(si−1). We can obtain the concrete execution 〈ctr0, 〈µ(sm0), µ(sa0)〉, µ(s0)〉 µ(τ0·τ1·...·τn)
n
〈ctrn+1, 〈µ(smn+1),
µ(san+1)〉, µ(sn+1)〉 by repeatedly applying Lemma 9 (since for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n+ 1, µ |= pthCnd(si−1) ∧ pthCnd(τi)).
We now show that for all 0 ≤ i ≤ n + 1, µ |= pthCnd(si). We prove this by induction. For the base case of i = 0, the
claim trivially holds since s0 = ε and therefore pthCnd(s0) = >. For the induction step, assume that the claim holds for all
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j < i. We now show that it holds for i as well. There are three cases:
• The i-th configuration has been derived using the SE-NOBRANCH rule. Then, si−1 and si only differ in the length
of the remaining speculation windows. Therefore, pthCnd(si−1) = pthCnd(si). From the induction hypothesis, µ |=
pthCnd(si−1). Therefore, µ |= pthCnd(si).
• The i-th configuration has been derived using the SE-BRANCH rule. Then, si = decr ′(si−1) · 〈〈smi−1, sai−1〉,
id ,min(w,wndw(s) − 1), `〉, where p(sai−1(pc)) = beqz x, `′′, 〈smi−1, sai−1〉 symPc(se)·pc `
′
−−−−−−−−−→s σ′, ` ={
sai−1(pc) + 1 if `′ 6= sai−1(pc) + 1
`′′ if `′ = sai−1(pc) + 1
, and pthCnd(τi−1) = se. From this, it follows that pthCnd(〈σ, id , 0, `〉) = se.
From this, pthCnd(τi−1) = se, and µ |= pthCnd(τ0 · τ1 · . . . · τn), we have that µ |= se. Moreover, from
pthCnd(si) = pthCnd(si−1) ∧ se, µ |= se, and the induction hypothesis, we have µ |= pthCnd(si).
• The i-th configuration has been derived using the SE-ROLLBACK rule. Then, si−1 = si · 〈σ, id , 0, `〉 for some σ, id , and
`. Therefore, pthCnd(si−1) = pthCnd(si) ∧ ϕ for some ϕ. From the induction hypothesis, µ |= pthCnd(si−1). From
this and pthCnd(si−1) = pthCnd(si) ∧ ϕ for some ϕ, we have µ |= pthCnd(si).
This completes the proof of our claim.
D. Completeness
In Lemma 10, we prove the completeness of the non-speculative symbolic semantics.
Lemma 10. Let p be a program, sa be a symbolic assignment, and sm be a symbolic memory. Whenever 〈m, a〉 τ−→ 〈m′, a′〉,
then for all assignments µ : SymbVals → Vals such that µ(sa) = a and µ(sm) = m, then there exist τ ′, sm′, sa′ such that
〈sm, sa〉 τ
′
−→s 〈sm′, sa′〉, µ(sm′) = m′, µ(sa′) = a′, µ(τ ′) = τ , and µ |= pthCnd(τ).
Proof. Let p be a program, sa be a symbolic assignment, and sm be a symbolic memory. Moreover, assume that 〈m, a〉 τ−→ 〈m′,
a′〉 holds. Finally, let µ : SymbVals → Vals be an arbitrary assignment such that µ(sa) = a and µ(sm) = m. We proceed by
case distinction on the rules defining −→.
Rule SKIP. Assume that 〈m, a〉 τ−→ 〈m′, a′〉 has been derived using the SKIP rule in the concrete semantics. Then, p(a(pc)) =
skip, m′ = m, a′ = a[pc 7→ a(pc) + 1], and τ = ε. From p(a(pc)) = skip, µ(sa) = a, and pc being always concrete,
we have that p(sa(pc)) = skip. Thus, we can apply the rule SKIP of the symbolic semantics starting from 〈sm, sa〉.
Hence, 〈sm, sa〉 τ
′
−→s 〈sm′, sa′〉, where τ ′ = ε, sm′ = sm, sa′ = sa[pc 7→ sa(pc) + 1], and ϕ′ = ϕ. From m′ = m,
µ(sm) = m, and sm′ = sm, we have that µ(sm′) = m′. From Lemma 7, a′ = a[pc 7→ a(pc) + 1], µ(sa) = a, and
sa′ = sa[pc 7→ sa(pc) + 1], we have that µ(sa′) = µ(sa[pc 7→ sa(pc) + 1]) = µ(sa)[pc 7→ µ(sa(pc)) + 1] = a[pc 7→
µ(sa(pc)) + 1] = a[pc 7→ µ(sa)(pc) + 1] = a[pc 7→ a(pc) + 1] = a′. From τ = ε and τ ′ = ε, we have that µ(τ ′) = τ .
Finally, from pthCnd(τ ′) = >, we have that µ |= pthCnd(τ).
Rule BARRIER. The proof of this case is similar to that of Rule SKIP.
Rule ASSIGN. Assume that 〈m, a〉 τ−→ 〈m′, a′〉 has been derived using the ASSIGN rule in the concrete semantics. Then,
p(a(pc)) = x ← e, x 6= pc, m′ = m, a′ = a[pc 7→ a(pc) + 1, x 7→ JxK(a)], and τ = ε. From p(a(pc)) = x ← e,
µ(sa) = a, and pc being always concrete, we have that p(sa(pc)) = x ← e. Thus, we can apply the rule ASSIGN
of the symbolic semantics starting from 〈sm, sa〉. Hence, 〈sm, sa〉 τ
′
−→s 〈sm′, sa′〉, where τ ′ = ε, sm′ = sm, and
sa′ = sa[pc 7→ sa(pc) + 1, x 7→ JeK(sa)]. From m′ = m, µ(sm) = m, and sm′ = sm, we have that µ(sm′) = m′.
From Lemma 7, a′ = a[pc 7→ a(pc)+1, x 7→ JeK(a)], µ(sa) = a, and sa′ = sa[pc 7→ sa(pc)+1, x 7→ JeK(a)], we have
that µ(sa′) = µ(sa[pc 7→ sa(pc) + 1, x 7→ JeK(sa)]) = µ(sa)[pc 7→ µ(sa(pc)) + 1, x 7→ µ(JeK(sa))] = µ(sa)[pc 7→
µ(sa)(pc)+1, x 7→ JeK(µ(sa))] = a[pc 7→ a(pc)+1, x 7→ JeK(a)] = a′. From τ = ε and τ ′ = ε, we have that µ(τ ′) = τ .
Finally, from pthCnd(τ ′) = >, we have that µ |= pthCnd(τ).
Rule CONDITIONALUPDATE-SAT. Assume that 〈m, a〉 τ−→ 〈m′, a′〉 has been derived using the CONDITIONALUPDATE-SAT
rule in the concrete semantics. Then, p(a(pc)) = x e
′?←−− e, x 6= pc, Je′K(a) = 0, m′ = m, a′ = a[pc 7→ a(pc) + 1,
x 7→ JxK(a)], and τ = ε. From p(a(pc)) = x e′?←−− e, µ(sa) = a, and pc being always concrete, we have that
p(sa(pc)) = x
e′?←−− e. There are two cases:Je′K(sa) ∈ Vals : We claim that Je′K(sa) = 0. Therefore, we can apply the rule CONDITIONALUPDATE-CONCR-SAT
of the symbolic semantics starting from 〈sm, sa〉. Hence, 〈sm, sa〉 τ
′
−→s 〈sm′, sa′〉, where τ ′ = ε, sm′ = sm, and
sa′ = sa[pc 7→ sa(pc) + 1, x 7→ JeK(sa)]. From m′ = m, µ(sm) = m, and sm′ = sm, we have that µ(sm′) = m′.
From Lemma 7, a′ = a[pc 7→ a(pc) + 1, x 7→ JeK(a)], µ(sa) = a, and sa′ = sa[pc 7→ sa(pc) + 1, x 7→ JeK(a)],
we have that µ(sa′) = µ(sa[pc 7→ sa(pc) + 1, x 7→ JeK(sa)]) = µ(sa)[pc 7→ µ(sa(pc)) + 1, x 7→ µ(JeK(sa))] =
µ(sa)[pc 7→ µ(sa)(pc) + 1, x 7→ JeK(µ(sa))] = a[pc 7→ a(pc) + 1, x 7→ JeK(a)] = a′. From τ = ε and τ ′ = ε, we
have that µ(τ ′) = τ . Finally, from pthCnd(τ ′) = >, we have that µ |= pthCnd(τ).
36
We now show that Je′K(sa) = 0. From Je′K(sa) ∈ Vals , it follows that all variables defining e′ have concrete values in
sa. From this and µ(sa) = a, we have that all these variables agree in a and sa. Hence, Je′K(sa) = Je′K(a) = 0.Je′K(sa) 6∈ Vals : We can apply the rule CONDITIONALUPDATE-SYMB of the symbolic semantics starting from 〈sm,
sa〉. Hence, 〈sm, sa〉 τ
′
−→s 〈sm′, sa′〉, where τ ′ = ε, sm′ = sm, and sa′ = sa[pc 7→ sa(pc)+1, x 7→ ite(Je′K(sa) = 0,JeK(sa), sa(x))]. From m′ = m, µ(sm) = m, and sm′ = sm, we have that µ(sm′) = m′. From τ = ε and τ ′ = ε, we
have that µ(τ ′) = τ . Finally, from pthCnd(τ ′) = >, we have that µ |= pthCnd(τ). Finally, to show that a′ = µ(sa′),
we need to show that µ(ite(Je′K(sa) = 0, JeK(sa), sa(x))) is equivalent to JeK(sa). From the evaluation of symbolic
expressions, µ(ite(Je′K(sa) = 0, JeK(sa), sa(x))) is µ(JeK(sa)) if µ(Je′K(sa) = 0) 6= 0, i.e., if µ(Je′K(sa)) = 0,
and µ(sa(x)) otherwise. We now show that µ(Je′K(sa)) = 0, from this we immediately get that a′ = µ(sa′). From
Lemma 7, we have µ(Je′K(sa)) = Je′K(µ(sa)). From this and µ(sa) = a, we have µ(Je′K(sa)) = Je′K(a). From this
and Je′K(a) = 0, we finally get µ(Je′K(sa)) = 0.
This concludes the proof of this case.
Rule CONDITIONALUPDATE-UNSAT. The proof of this case is similar to that of Rule CONDITIONALUPDATE-SAT.
Rule LOAD. Assume that 〈m, a〉 τ−→ 〈m′, a′〉 has been derived using the LOAD rule in the concrete semantics. Then,
p(a(pc)) = load x, e, x 6= pc, m′ = m, a′ = a[pc 7→ a(pc) + 1, x 7→ m(JeK(a))], and τ = load JeK(a). From
p(a(pc)) = load x, e, µ(sa) = a, and pc being always concrete, we have that p(sa(pc)) = load x, e. We proceed by
applying the LOAD-SYMB rule of the symbolic semantics starting from 〈sm, sa, ϕ〉. Hence, 〈sm, sa〉 τ
′
−→s 〈sm′, sa′〉,
where se = JeK(sa), se′ = read(sm, se), τ ′ = load se, sm′ = sm, and sa′ = sa[pc 7→ sa(pc) + 1, x 7→ se′].
We claim that µ(se′) = m(JeK(a)). From m′ = m, µ(sm) = m, and sm′ = sm, we have that µ(sm′) = m′. From
a′ = a[pc 7→ a(pc) + 1, x 7→ m(JeK(a))], sa′ = sa[pc 7→ sa(pc) + 1, x 7→ se′], and µ(se′) = m(JeK(a)), we have that
µ(sa′) = µ(sa[pc 7→ sa(pc) + 1, x 7→ se′]) = µ(sa)[pc 7→ µ(sa(pc)) + 1, x 7→ µ(se′)] = µ(sa)[pc 7→ µ(sa)(pc) + 1,
x 7→ m(JeK(a))] = a[pc 7→ a(pc) + 1, x 7→ m(JeK(a))] = a′ (by relying on µ(sa) = a, µ(sm) = m, our
claim that µ(se′) = m(JeK(a)), and Lemma 7). From τ = load JeK(a) and τ ′ = load JeK(sa), we have that
µ(τ ′) = load µ(JeK(sa)) = load JeK(µ(sa)) = load JeK(a) = τ (by applying Lemma 7 and relying on µ(sa) = a).
Finally, from pthCnd(τ) = >, we have that µ |= pthCnd(τ).
We now prove our claim that µ(se′) = m(JeK(a)). From se′ = read(sm, se), we have that µ(se′) = µ(sm)(µ(se)) (from
the evaluation of symbolic expressions). From this and µ(sm) = m, we have that µ(se′) = m(µ(se)). From se = JeK(sa),
µ(se) = µ(JeK(sa)) = JeK(µ(sa)) = JeK(a) (from µ(sa) = a and Lemma 7). Therefore, µ(se′) = m(JeK(a)).
Rule STORE. Assume that 〈m, a〉 τ−→ 〈m′, a′〉 has been derived using the STORE rule in the concrete semantics. Then,
p(a(pc)) = store x, e, m′ = m[JeK(a) 7→ a(x)], a′ = a[pc 7→ a(pc) + 1], and τ = store JeK(a). From
p(a(pc)) = store x, e, µ(sa) = a, and pc being always concrete, we have that p(sa(pc)) = store x, e. We proceed
by applying the STORE-SYMB rule of the symbolic semantics starting from 〈sm, sa〉. Hence, 〈sm, sa〉 τ
′
−→s 〈sm′, sa′〉,
where se = JeK(sa), τ ′ = store se, sm′ = write(sm, se, sa(x)), and sa′ = sa[pc 7→ sa(pc) + 1]. For showing
that µ(sm′) = m′, we proceed as follows. From the evaluation of symbolic expressions, µ(sm′) = µ(write(sm, se,
sa(x))) = µ(sm)[µ(se) 7→ µ(sa(x))]. From this, µ(sm) = m, µ(sa) = a, and Lemma 7, we have µ(sm)[µ(se) 7→
µ(sa(x))] = m[µ(se) 7→ µ(sa)(x)] = m[µ(se) 7→ a(x)]. From this, µ(sa) = a, se = JeK(sa), and Lemma 7,
we have m[µ(se) 7→ a(x)] = m[µ(JeK(sa)) 7→ a(x)] = m[JeK(µ(sa)) 7→ a(x)] = m[JeK(a) 7→ a(x)]. Therefore,
µ(sm′) = m[JeK(a) 7→ a(x)]. Since m′ = m[JeK(a) 7→ a(x)], we proved that µ(sm′) = m′. From a′ = a[pc 7→ a(pc)+1]
and sa′ = sa[pc 7→ sa(pc) + 1], we have that µ(sa′) = µ(sa[pc 7→ sa(pc) + 1]) = µ(sa)[pc 7→ µ(sa(pc)) + 1] =
a[pc 7→ a(pc) + 1] = a′ (by relying on µ(sa) = a and Lemma 7). From τ = store JeK(a) and τ ′ = store JeK(sa), we
have that µ(τ ′) = store µ(JeK(sa)) = store JeK(µ(sa)) = store JeK(a) = τ (by applying Lemma 7 and relying on
µ(sa) = a). Finally, from pthCnd(τ) = >, we have µ |= pthCnd(τ).
We now prove our claim that µ(se′) = m(JeK(a)). From se′ = ite(se = 0, sm(0), ite(se = 1, sm(1), . . .)), we have that
µ(se′) = µ(ite(se = 0, sm(0), ite(se = 1, sm(1), . . .))). Hence, µ(se′) = µ(sm(µ(se))) (by relying on the semantics
of ite(se, se′, se′′)). From this and se = JeK(sa), we have that µ(se′) = µ(sm(µ(JeK(sa)))). By applying Lemma 7, we
have µ(se′) = µ(sm)(JeK(µ(sa))). From this, µ(sm) = m, and µ(sa) = a, we have µ(se′) = m(JeK(a)).
Rule BEQZ-SAT. Assume that 〈m, a〉 τ−→ 〈m′, a′〉 has been derived using the BEQZ-SAT rule in the concrete semantics. Then,
p(a(pc)) = beqz x, `, a(x) = 0, m′ = m, a′ = a[pc 7→ `], and τ = pc `. From p(a(pc)) = beqz x, `, µ(sa) = a, and
pc being always concrete, we have that p(sa(pc)) = beqz x, `. There are two cases:
– Assume that sa(x) ∈ Vals . From a(x) = 0 and µ(sa) = a, we have that sa(x) = 0. Hence, we proceed by applying
the BEQZ-CONCR-SAT rule of the symbolic semantics starting from 〈sm, sa〉. Hence, 〈sm, sa〉 τ
′
−→s 〈sm′, sa′〉, where
τ ′ = symPc(>) · pc `, sm′ = sm, and sa′ = sa[pc 7→ `]. From m′ = m, µ(sm) = m, and sm′ = sm, we have that
µ(sm′) = m′. From a′ = a[pc 7→ `] and sa′ = sa[pc 7→ `], we have that µ(sa′) = µ(sa[pc 7→ `]) = µ(sa)[pc 7→
`] = a[pc 7→ `] = a′ (by relying on µ(sa) = a and Lemma 7). From τ = pc ` and τ ′ = symPc(>) · pc `, we have
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that µ(τ ′) = τ . Finally, from pthCnd(τ ′) = >, we have that µ |= pthCnd(τ ′).
– Assume that sa(x) 6∈ Vals and let se = sa(x). We proceed by applying the BEQZ-SYMB-SAT rule of the symbolic
semantics starting from 〈sm, sa〉. Hence, 〈sm, sa〉 τ
′
−→s 〈sm′, sa′〉, where τ ′ = symPc(sa(x) = 0) · pc `, sm′ = sm,
and sa′ = sa[pc 7→ `]. From m′ = m, µ(sm) = m, and sm′ = sm, we have that µ(sm′) = m′. From a′ = a[pc 7→ `]
and sa′ = sa[pc 7→ `], we have that µ(sa′) = µ(sa[pc 7→ `]) = µ(sa)[pc 7→ `] = a[pc 7→ `] = a′ (by relying on
µ(sa) = a and Lemma 7). From τ = pc ` and τ ′ = symPc(sa(x) = 0) · pc `, we have that µ(τ ′) = τ . We now
show that µ |= pthCnd(τ ′). Since pthCnd(τ ′) is sa(x) = 0, we need to show that µ(sa(x)) = 0. From Lemma 7,
µ(sa(x)) = µ(sa)(x). From this and µ(sa) = a, µ(sa(x)) = a(x). Therefore, µ(sa(x)) = 0 since a(x) = 0. Hence,
µ |= sa(x) = 0, i.e., µ |= pthCnd(τ ′).
Rule BEQZ-UNSAT. The proof of this case is similar to that of Rule BEQZ-UNSAT.
Rule JMP. Assume that 〈m, a〉 τ−→ 〈m′, a′〉 has been derived using the JMP rule in the concrete semantics. Then, p(a(pc)) =
jmp e, ` = JeK(a), m′ = m, a′ = a[pc 7→ `], and τ = pc `. From p(a(pc)) = jmp e, µ(sa) = a, and pc being always
concrete, we have that p(sa(pc)) = jmp e. There are two cases:
– Assume that JeK(sa) ∈ Vals . We proceed by applying the JMP-CONCR rule of the symbolic semantics starting from 〈sm,
sa〉. Hence, 〈sm, sa〉 τ
′
−→s 〈sm′, sa′〉, where `′ = JeK(sa), τ ′ = symPc(>) · pc `′, sm′ = sm, and sa′ = sa[pc 7→ `′].
Observe that ` = `′ (since `′ = JeK(sa) and µ(sa) = a). From m′ = m, µ(sm) = m, and sm′ = sm, we have that
µ(sm′) = m′. From a′ = a[pc 7→ `], sa′ = sa[pc 7→ `′], and ` = `′, we have that µ(sa′) = µ(sa[pc 7→ `]) =
µ(sa)[pc 7→ `] = a[pc 7→ `] = a′ (by relying on µ(sa) = a and Lemma 7). From τ = pc `, τ ′ = symPc(>) · pc `′,
and ` = `′, we have that µ(τ ′) = τ . Finally, from pthCnd(τ ′) = >, we have that µ |= pthCnd(τ ′).
– Assume that JeK(sa) 6∈ Vals and let se = JeK(sa). We proceed by applying the JMP-SYMB rule of the symbolic
semantics starting from 〈sm, sa〉, where we pick ` as target label. Hence, 〈sm, sa〉 τ
′
−→s 〈sm′, sa′〉, where τ ′ =
symPc(JeK(sa) = `) · pc `, sm′ = sm, and sa′ = sa[pc 7→ `]. From m′ = m, µ(sm) = m, and sm′ = sm, we have
that µ(sm′) = m′. From a′ = a[pc 7→ `] and sa′ = sa[pc 7→ `], we have that µ(sa′) = µ(sa[pc 7→ `]) = µ(sa)[pc 7→
`] = a[pc 7→ `] = a′ (by relying on µ(sa) = a and Lemma 7). From τ = pc ` and τ ′ = symPc(JeK(sa) = `) · pc `,
we have that µ(τ ′) = τ . We now show that µ |= pthCnd(τ ′). Since pthCnd(τ ′) is JeK(sa) = `, we need to show that
µ(JeK(sa)) = `. From Lemma 7, µ(JeK(sa)) = JeK(µ(sa)). From this and µ(sa) = a, µ(JeK(sa)) = JeK(a). Therefore,
µ(JeK(sa)) = ` since JeK(a) = `. Hence, µ |= JeK(sa) = `, i.e., µ |= pthCnd(τ ′).
Rule TERMINATE. The proof of this case is similar to that of Rule SKIP.
This completes the proof of our claim.
In Lemma 11, we prove the completeness of one step of the symbolic semantics.
Lemma 11. Let p be a program, sa be a symbolic assignment, sm be a symbolic memory, and ss be a sequence of symbolic
speculative states. Whenever 〈ctr , 〈m, a〉, s〉 τ=⇒ 〈ctr ′, 〈m′, a′〉, s′〉 and wf (s), then for all valuations µ : SymbVals → Vals
such that µ(sa) = a, µ(sm) = m, and µ(ss) = s, then there are τ ′, ctr ′, sm′, sa′ such that 〈ctr , 〈sm, sa〉, ss〉 τ
′
=⇒s 〈ctr ′,
〈sm′, sa′〉, ss′〉, µ(sm′) = m′, µ(sa′) = a′, µ(ss′) = s′, µ(τ ′) = τ , and µ |= pthCnd(τ ′).
Proof. Let p be a program, sa be a symbolic assignment, sm be a symbolic memory, ss be a symbolic speculative state.
Moreover, assume that 〈ctr , 〈m, a〉, s〉 τ=⇒ 〈ctr ′, 〈m′, a′〉, s′〉 holds and wf (s). Finally, let µ : SymbVals → Vals be an
arbitrary valuation such that µ(sa) = a, µ(sm) = m, and µ(ss) = s. We proceed by case distinction on the rules defining
=⇒.
Rule AM-NOBRANCH. Assume that 〈ctr , 〈m, a〉, s〉 τ=⇒ 〈ctr ′, 〈m′, a′〉, s′〉 has been derived using the SE-NOBRANCH rule
in the concrete semantics. Then, p(a(pc)) 6= beqz x, `, 〈m, a〉 τ−→ 〈m′, a′〉, enabled ′(s), ctr ′ = ctr , and s′ = decr ′(s).
Observe that p(sa(pc)) 6= beqz x, `, and enabled ′(ss) immediately follow from p(a(pc)) 6= beqz x, ` and enabled ′(s)
respectively. We can apply Lemma 10 to 〈m, a〉 τ−→ 〈m′, a′〉. Therefore, for all valuation µ such that µ(sa) = a and
µ(sm) = m, there are sm′, sa′, τ ′ such that 〈sm, sa〉 τ
′
−→s 〈sm′, sa′〉, µ(sm′) = m′, µ(sa′) = a′, µ(τ ′) = τ , and
µ |= pthCnd(τ ′). Since µ is a valuation for which µ(sa) = a and µ(sm) = m, we therefore have that 〈sm, sa〉 τ
′
−→s 〈sm′,
sa′〉, µ(sm′) = m′, µ(sa′) = a′, µ(τ ′) = τ , and µ |= pthCnd(τ ′). Hence, we can apply the AM-NOBRANCH rule in
the symbolic semantics to 〈ctr , 〈sm, sa〉, ss〉. Thus, 〈ctr , 〈sm, sa〉, ss〉 τ
′
=⇒s 〈ctr ′′, 〈sm′, sa′〉, ss′〉, where ctr ′′ = ctr .
We have already established that µ(sm′) = m′, µ(sa′) = a′, and µ(τ ′) = τ , and µ |= pthCnd(τ ′) (which all follow
from the application of Lemma 10). We still have to show µ(ss′) = s′. This immediately follows from µ(ss) = s,
s′ =
{
decr ′(s) if p(a(pc)) 6= spbarr
zeroes ′(s) otherwise
, ss′ =
{
decr ′(ss) if p(sa(pc)) 6= spbarr
zeroes ′(ss) otherwise
, and sa(pc) = a(pc).
Rule AM-BRANCH. Assume that 〈ctr , 〈m, a〉, s〉 τ=⇒ 〈ctr ′, 〈m′, a′〉, s′〉 has been derived using the SE-BRANCH rule in the
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concrete semantics. Then, p(a(pc)) = beqz x, `′, enabled ′(s), ` =
{
a(pc) + 1 if a(x) = 0
`′ if a(x) 6= 0 , τ = start ctr · pc `,
m′ = m, a′ = a[pc 7→ `], ctr ′ = ctr + 1, and s′ = decr ′(s) · 〈〈m, a〉, ctr ,min(w,wndw(s) − 1), `〉. Observe that
enabled ′(ss) directly follows from µ(ss) = s and enabled ′(s) and p(sa(pc)) = beqz x, `′ follows from pc being
always concrete and µ(sa) = a. Observe also that 〈m, a〉 pc `
′′
−−−→ 〈m, a[pc 7→ `′′]〉 holds where `′′ ∈ {`′, a(pc)+1}\{`}.
We can apply Lemma 10 to 〈m, a〉 pc `
′′
−−−→ 〈m, a[pc 7→ `′′]〉. Therefore, for all valuations µ such that µ(sa) = a and
µ(sm) = m, 〈sm, sa〉 τ
′
−→s 〈sm′, sa′〉, µ(sm′) = m, µ(sa′) = a[pc 7→ `′′], µ(τ ′) = pc `′′, and µ |= pthCnd(τ ′).
Since µ(sa) = a and µ(sm) = m, we thus have that 〈sm, sa〉 τ
′′
−−→s 〈sm′, sa′〉, µ(sm′) = m, µ(sa′) = a[pc 7→ `′′],
µ(τ ′′) = pc `′′, and µ |= pthCnd(τ ′′). Observe that, since p(sa(pc)) = beqz x, `′, τ ′ is of the form symPc(se) · pc `′′.
Therefore, we can apply the AM-BRANCH-SYMB rule in the symbolic semantics to 〈ctr , 〈sm, sa〉, ss〉 to derive 〈ctr ,
〈sm, sa〉, ss〉 τ
′
=⇒ 〈ctr + 1, 〈sm′, sa′〉, ss′〉, where τ ′ = symPc(se) · start id · pc `′′′, sm′ = sm, sa′ = sa[pc 7→ `′′′],
`′′′ =
{
σ(pc) + 1 if `′′ 6= sa(pc) + 1
`′ if `′′ = sa(pc) + 1
, ss′ = decr ′(ss) · 〈〈sm, sa〉, ctr ,min(w,wndw(ss) − 1), `′′′〉, and id = ctr .
We claim that `′′′ = `. From µ(sm) = m and m′ = m, we get that µ(sm′) = µ(sm) = m = m′. From µ(sa) = a,
a′ = a[pc 7→ `], sa′ = sa[pc 7→ `′′′], and ` = `′′′, we have that µ(sa′) = µ(sa[pc 7→ `′′′]) = µ(sa)[pc 7→ `′′′] =
a[pc 7→ `′′′] = a[pc 7→ `] = a′. From τ = start ctr · pc `, τ ′ = symPc(se) · start id · pc `′′′, and ` = `′′′, we
have µ(τ ′) = τ . From µ(ss) = s, µ(sa) = a, µ(sm) = m, s′ = decr ′(s) · 〈〈m, a〉, ctr ,min(w,wndw(s) − 1), `〉,
ss′ = decr ′(ss) · 〈〈sm, sa〉, ctr ,min(w,wndw(ss)− 1), `′′′〉, and ` = `′′′, we have µ(ss′) = µ(decr ′(ss) · 〈〈sm, sa〉, ctr ,
min(w,wndw(ss) − 1), `′′′〉) = decr ′(µ(ss)) · 〈〈µ(sm), µ(sa)〉, ctr ,min(w,wndw(µ(ss)) − 1), `′′′〉 = decr ′(s) · 〈〈m,
a〉, ctr ,min(w,wndw(s) − 1), `′′′〉 = decr ′(s) · 〈〈m, a〉, ctr ,min(w,wndw(s) − 1), `〉 = s′. Finally, µ |= pthCnd(τ ′)
immediately follows from τ ′ = symPc(se) · start id · pc `′′′, τ ′′ = symPc(se) · pc `′′, and µ |= pthCnd(τ ′′).
We now prove our claim that ` = `′′′. There are two cases:
a(x) = 0 : Then, ` = a(pc)+1. Therefore, `′′ = `′. From this and p’s well-formedness, it follows that `′′ 6= sa(pc)+1
(since we consider only µASM programs such that p(`) = beqz x, `′ and `′ 6= `+1). Hence, `′′′ = sa(pc) + 1. From
this and sa(pc) = a(pc), we have that ` = `′′′.
a(x) 6= 0 : Then, ` = `′. Therefore, `′′ = a(pc) + 1. From this and p’s well-formedness, `′′′ = `. Hence, ` = `′′′.
Rule AM-ROLLBACK. Assume that 〈ctr , 〈m, a〉, s〉 τ=⇒ 〈ctr ′, 〈m′, a′〉, s′〉 has been derived using the AM-ROLLBACK rule
in the concrete semantics. Then, s = sB · 〈id , 0, `, 〈m′′, a′′〉〉, τ = rollback id · pc a′(pc), 〈m′′, a′′〉 τ
′′
−−→ 〈m′′′,
a′′′〉, ctr ′ = ctr , m′ = m′′′, a′ = a′′′, and s′ = sB . From µ(ss) = s and s = sB · 〈id , 0, `, 〈m′′, a′′〉〉, it follows
that ss = ssB · 〈id , 0, `, 〈sm′′, sa′′〉〉 and µ(sa′′) = a′′ and µ(sm′′) = m′′. Since µ(sa′′) = a′′ and µ(sm′′) = m′′,
we can apply Lemma 10 to 〈m′′, a′′〉 τ
′′
−−→ 〈m′′′, a′′′〉. We, therefore, obtain that there are sm′′′, sa′′′, τ ′′′ such that
〈sm′′, sa′′〉 τ
′
−→s 〈sm′′′, sa′′′〉, µ(sm′′′) = m′′′, µ(sa′′′) = a′′′, µ(τ ′′′) = τ ′′, and µ |= pthCnd(τ ′′′). We claim that
sa′′′(pc) 6= `. Hence, we can apply the AM-ROLLBACK rule in the symbolic semantics to 〈ctr , 〈sm, sa〉, ss〉. Thus,
〈ctr , 〈sm, sa〉, ss〉 τ
′
=⇒s 〈ctr ′′, 〈sm′, sa′〉, ss′〉, where ctr ′′ = ctr , sm′ = sm′′′, sa′ = sa′′′, and ss′ = ssB . From
ctr ′′ = ctr and ctr ′ = ctr , we have ctr ′ = ctr ′′. From µ(sa′′′) = a′′′, a′ = a′′′, and sa′ = sa′′′, we have µ(sa′) = a′.
From µ(sm′′′) = m′′′, m′ = m′′′, and sm′ = sm′′′, we have µ(sm′) = m′. From τ = rollback id · pc a′(pc) and
τ ′ = rollback id ·pc sa′(pc), we have µ(τ ′) = τ and µ |= pthCnd(τ ′). Finally, from s′ = sB and ss′ = ssB , we have
µ(ss′) = µ(ssB) = sB (thanks to µ(ss) = s) and µ |= pthCnd(ss′) (thanks to µ |= pthCnd(ss)).
We now prove our claim that sa′′′(pc) 6= `. From s = sB · 〈id , 0, `, 〈m′′, a′′〉〉, 〈m′′, a′′〉 τ
′′
−−→ 〈m′′′, a′′′〉, and wf (s), we
immediately have that a′′′(pc) 6= `. From this and sa′′′(pc) = a′′′(pc), we have sa′′′(pc) 6= `.
This completes the proof of our claim.
In Proposition 10 we finally prove the completeness of our symbolic semantics.
Proposition 10. Let p be a program. Whenever 〈0, σ, ε〉 τ
′
=⇒
∗
〈ctr , σ′, ε〉, σ ∈ InitConf , and σ′ ∈ FinalConf , then there is a
valuation µ, a symbolic trace τ ′, and a final symbolic configuration 〈sm, sa〉 such that 〈0, 〈sm0, sa0〉, ε,>〉 τ
′
=⇒
∗
s 〈ctr , 〈sm,
sa〉, ε〉, µ(〈sm0, sa0〉) = σ, µ(〈sm, sa〉) = σ′, µ(τ ′) = τ , and µ |= pthCnd(τ ′).
Proof. Let p be a program and 〈ctr0, σ0, s0〉 τ0=⇒ 〈ctr1, σ1, s1〉 τ1=⇒ . . . 〈ctrn, σn, sn〉 τn=⇒ 〈ctrn+1, σn+1, sn+1〉 be a concrete
execution, where ctr0 = 0, s0 = sn+1 = ε, σ0 ∈ InitConf , and σn+1 ∈ FinalConf . We claim that wf (si) holds for all
0 ≤ i ≤ n + 1. Furthermore, let µ be a valuation such that µ(〈sm0, sa0〉) = σ0. We can construct the symbolic execution
〈0, 〈sm0, sa0〉, ε,>〉 τ
′
=⇒
∗
s 〈ctr , 〈sm, sa〉, ε〉 by repeatedly applying Lemma 11. From the same Lemma, we also obtain that
µ(〈sm0, sa0〉) = σ0, µ(〈sm, sa〉) = σn+1, µ(τ ′) = τ0 · . . . · τn, and µ |= pthCnd(τ ′).
39
We prove by induction that wf (si) holds for all 0 ≤ i ≤ n+ 1. For the base case i = 0, s0 = ε and wf (s0) holds trivially.
For the induction step, we assume that wf (sj) holds for all j < i and we show that it holds also for sj . There are three cases:
• The i-th configuration has been derived using the AM-NOBRANCH rule. Then, si−1 and si only differ in the length of
the remaining speculation windows. Therefore, wf (si) holds iff wf (si−1) does. From the induction hypothesis, wf (si−1)
holds and therefore wf (si) holds.
• The i-th configuration has been derived using the AM-BRANCH rule. Then, si = decr ′(si−1) · 〈σi−1, ctr ,min(w,
wndw(s) − 1), `〉, where p(σi−1(pc)) = beqz x, `′′, σi−1 pc `
′
−−−→ σ′, and ` =
{
σi−1(pc) + 1 if σi−1(x) = 0
`′ if σi−1(x) 6= 0
. From
this, wf (si) holds iff both wf (si−1) and wf (〈σi−1, ctr ,min(w,wndw(s) − 1), `〉) hold. The former follows from the
induction hypothesis, the latter follows from σi−1
pc `′−−−→ σ′ and ` =
{
σi−1(pc) + 1 if σi−1(x) = 0
`′ if σi−1(x) 6= 0
.
• The i-th configuration has been derived using the AM-ROLLBACK rule. Then, si−1 = si ·〈σ, id , 0, `〉 for some σ, id , and `,
i.e., if wf (si−1) holds, then wf (si) holds as well. From the induction hypothesis, wf (si−1) holds and, thus, wf (si) holds.
This completes the proof of our claim.
APPENDIX J: SPECTECTOR’S SOUNDNESS AND COMPLETENESS (THEOREM 2)
Below, we provide the proof of Theorem 2, which we restate here for simplicity:
Theorem 2. If SPECTECTOR(p, P, w) terminates, then SPECTECTOR(p, P, w) = SECURE iff the program p satisfies speculative
non-interference w.r.t. the policy P and all prediction oracles O with speculative window at most w.
Proof. Theorem 2 immediately follows from SPECTECTOR’s soundness (see Lemma 12) and completeness (see Lemma 13).
Lemma 12 states that if SPECTECTOR determines a program to be secure, the program is speculatively non-interferent.
Lemma 12. Whenever SPECTECTOR(p, P, w) = SECURE, the program p satisfies speculative non-interference w.r.t. the
policy P and any oracle O with speculative window at most w.
Proof. If SPECTECTOR(p, P, w) = SECURE, then for all symbolic traces τ , MEMLEAK(τ) = ⊥ and CTRLLEAK(τ) = ⊥. Let
σ and σ′ be two arbitrary P -indistinguishable initial configurations producing the same concrete non-speculative trace τ . From
Proposition 3, σ and σ′ result in two concrete speculative traces τc and τ ′c with the same non-speculative projection. From
Propositions 2, τc and τ ′c correspond to two symbolic traces τs and τ
′
s. Since CTRLLEAK(τs) = ⊥, CTRLLEAK(τ ′s) = ⊥, and
τcnse = τ ′cnse, speculatively executed control-flow instructions produce the same outcome in τc and τ ′c. Hence, the same
code is executed in both traces and τs = τ ′s. From MEMLEAK(τs) = ⊥, the observations produced by speculatively executed
load and store instructions are the same. Thus, τc = τ ′c. Hence, whenever two initial configurations result in the same
non-speculative traces, then they produce the same speculative traces. Therefore, p satisfies speculative non-interference w.r.t.
the always-mispredict semantics with speculative window w. From this and Theorem 1, p satisfies speculative non-interference
w.r.t. any prediction oracle with speculative window at most w.
Lemma 13 states that the leaks found by SPECTECTOR are valid counterexamples to speculative non-interference.
Lemma 13. Whenever SPECTECTOR(p, P, w) = INSECURE, there is an oracle O with speculative window at most w such
that program p does not satisfy speculative non-interference w.r.t. O and the policy P .
Proof. If SPECTECTOR(p, P ) = INSECURE, there is a symbolic trace τ for which either MEMLEAK(τ) = > or
CTRLLEAK(τ) = >. In the first case, pthCnd(τ)∧polEqv(P )∧obsEqv(τnse)∧¬obsEqv(τse) is satisfiable. Then, there are
two models for the symbolic trace τ that (1) satisfy the path condition encoded in τ , (2) agree on the non-sensitive registers
and memory locations in P , (3) produce the same non-speculative projection, and (4) the speculative projections differ on a
load or store observation. From Proposition 2, the two concretizations correspond to two concrete runs, with different traces,
whose non-speculative projection are the same. By combining this with Proposition 3, there are two configurations that produce
the same non-speculative trace but different speculative traces. This is a violation of speculative non-interference.
In the second case, there is a prefix ν ·symPc(se) of τse such that pthCnd(τnse ·ν)∧polEqv(P )∧obsEqv(τnse)∧¬(se1 ↔
se2) is satisfiable. Hence, there are two symbolic traces τ and τ ′ that produce the same non-speculative observations but differ
on a program counter observation pc n in their speculative projections. Again, this implies, through Propositions 2 and 3,
that there are two P -indistinguishable initial configurations producing the same non-speculative traces but distinct speculative
traces, leading to a violation of speculative non-interference.
In both cases, p does not satisfy speculative non-interference w.r.t. the always-mispredict semantics with speculative window
w. From this and Theorem 1, there is a prediction oracle O with speculative window at most w such that p does not satisfy
speculative non-interference w.r.t. O.
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